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ABSTRACT
It is often claimed that Aristotle's ethical theory is founded 
upon selfishness and egoism, and that even in his account of friendship, 
self-interest is paramount. The aim of this dissertation is to examine 
the validity of these claims.
In chapter 1 , Aristotle's theory of friendship is examined in detail. 
The various kinds Of friendship are investigated, principally with a view 
to establishing whether any genuinely other-regarding features may be 
found within them. It is concluded that Aristotle makes provision for 
altruistic well-wishing and well-doing in virtue friendship (that kind 
of friendship in which the phroriimos engages), but that is is impossible 
to state conclusively whether any measure of genuine goodwill exists in 
the two lesser friendships.
Chapter 2 aims to show that virtue friendship is centrally related 
to the cardinal virtue of complete justice, and the active virtuous life. 
It is shown that the phronimos aims to benefit fellow-citizens as well as 
close friends, and that he acts towards fellow-citizens in a spirit of 
friendship, and not of mere rectitude.
By displaying the connection between virtue friendship and complete 
justice, chapter 2 shows that; genuinely other-regarding motivation is 
central to the active virtuous life, but it remains to be discovered 
whether this active virtuous life is supremely valuable for man. An 
examination of the various interpretations of Eudaimonia in chapter 3 
reveals that while we may state positively that the theoretical life is 
supremely valuable for man, no such conclusion is possible in respect of 
the active virtuous life.
Chapter 4 aims to find a place for virtue friendship in the theoretical 
life. A distinction is drawn between intention and justification. It is 
concluded that while Aristotle intends that such friendship should have a 
place in the theoretical life, he cannot justijfy that intention satisfactorily.
Ill
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INTRODUCTION
Kurt Baier notes that "throughout the history of philosophy, by far
the most popular candidate for the position of the moral point of view has
' ' 1 : been self-interest" . In short, self-interest has been assumed to be ll»c
key moral principle by many philosophers . The purpose of this dissertatj^on
is to discover whether such self-interest is the key principle of
Aristotle's ethical theory, whether his ethical theory is built upon
nothing more elevating than self-interest and egoism.
It is a common criticism of Aristotle that his "virtuous man is not
moral at all, but a calculating egoist whose guiding principle is
prudence. Bishop Butler's 'cool self love' , that he admits only the
rationality of prudent self-interest, and not the rationality of moral
v - ' o '
principle". Numerous examples can be cited. Ferguson notes that
3
"Greek ethics, and Aristotle's own thought, tend to be egocentric" ;
Allen tells us that Aristotle "takes little or no account of the motive of
moral obligation" , that"self-interest, more or less enlightened, is
. 5 ■
assumed to be the motive of all conduct and choice" and that "Aristotle 
does not even hint that a man, instead of pursuing his own good or 
happiness, may prefer to choose or act with a view to the happiness of 
another" . Bertrand Russell remarks that "everything that makes men 
feel a passionate interest in one another is forgotten" , and Field, 
generally a fair and sympathetic critic of Aristotle, comments that 
whereas morality is "essentially unselfish'', Aristotle's idea of the final 
end or good makes morality "ultimately selfish" . Finally, we may quote 
MacIntyre who asks: "How could there be an ideal society for a man for
9 ■ ■
whom the ideal is as ego-centred as it is for Aristotle?"
This ego-centred-selfishness criticism has even been extended to his 
theory of friendship. This is very damning indeed, for if concern for 
others, selflessness, and absence of prudential calculation are to be 
found anywhere in human experience, they should surely be found in
friendship. But, according to Copleston, "Aristotle tends to give a
 ^ 10
somewhat self-centred picture of friendship" , and, according to
MacIntyre, "Aristotle’s ideal man, (the "ego-centric ideal") deeply
. 11
injures and deforms his account of friendship" . Allen writes that,
in Aristotle's account Of friendship, men do not really "subordinate
their interests to that of another", they just "appear" to do so. This
is Aristotle's "refreshing realism" . Very similar remarks are made
by Krook and Ferguson: Krook writes that the "breach" (towards concern
for others, and away from concern for the self) "is apparent rather than 
13real" , and Ferguson describes Aristotle's account as "a remarkable
14
attempt to expound altruism in terms of ego-centric psychology" . There
is, in short, "an absolute and irreducible difference", Krook writes,
between the Christian conception of friendship (in which there is genuine
concern and affection for another) and the theory of friendship put for- 
15
ward by Aristotle
Of course, it is not the case that all commentators argue that 
Aristotle's ethical theory reduces to such selfishness and egoism, but 
the quotations given above show that the criticism on this point is sub­
stantial, and that there is a charge to be investigated. It is the 
purpose of this dissertation to look in detail at Aristotle's ethical 
theory as described in the Nicomachean Ethics with a view to discovering 
whether the allegations are completely true, true in part, or plainly 
false.
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CHAPTER 1
ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF FRIENDSHIP
1.1 Introduction; Friendship and Altruism
It would appear that if genuinely altruistic behaviour is to be 
found anywhere in human experience, it should be found in that kind of 
inter-personal relationship that we call friendship. Indeed, according 
to our beliefs, one of the most striking features of friendships is 
precisely that friends characteristically seek each other's well-being 
and that they do so from unselfish motives, from a genuine concern and 
affection for the friend as an end in himself. If A befriends B because 
he perceives that B could be useful to him, because he perceives B can be 
a source of some advantage to him, we would deny that A is a genuine 
friend of B. Insofar as he did not have concern and affection for B 
himself, we would deny his claims to friendship. We would say he was 
insincere about the relationship and regarded B as a means to his own 
ends and purposes. We could fairly say that A's approach to friendship 
was not altruistic, but egoistic. Similarly, if A pursued his own 
interests and well-being in such a way or to such an extent that he showed 
a manifest obtuseness to the interests and well-being of B, we would also 
deny that A was a true friend of B. Insofar as he pursued his own 
interests and well-being at the expense of B's interests and well-being, 
we could reasonably claim that he was manifesting a hostility (or, at 
least, an indifference) to B's good, and could not be called a friend.
JWe could fairly say that his approach to friendship was selfish.
According to our modern conception, friendship is characterised by 
the desire to seek the well-being of the friend, to promote his interests, 
even where this does not lead to an enhancement of one's own interests 
and good, and by a desire not to pursue one's own interests and good in 
such a way that the friend's interests and good is damaged. It is also 
characterised by an emotional bond, an affection, that is "genuine" in
' . 5
the sense that it is not kindled or maintained only by the perception
of self-advantage. But these characteristics have not been central to
all conceptions of friendship. Indeed, they were absent from various
Greek conceptions. It is for this reason that Aristotle's account of
friendship requires such careful scrutiny. It cannot be assumed that
simply because Aristotle devotes two books to the topic of friendship in
the Nicomachean Ethics that his ethical theory has thereby made provision
for genuinely altruistic and unselfish action towards at least a
restricted class of individuals. If Aristotle's theory of friendship
is like that of some of his predecessors, the allegations of selfish
and egocentric behaviour quoted in the introduction may well be true.
Indeed, some commentators such as Adkins have argued that the egocentric
pre-Aristotelian conception of philia (friendship) survived largely
: I
intact in Aristotle’s own theory . In the remainder of this section,
I shall briefly outline two pre-Aristotelian conceptions of philia, in 
order to pinpoint the self-regarding and egoistic elements that prevail 
in these conceptions. When we examine Aristotle's own account, we 
shall then be in a better position to ascertain whether or not the 
Aristotelian conception is an advance over that of earlier conceptions 
or is precisely like it in these respects.
1. Adkins argues that in Homeric society, the effective locus of 
power, the most cohesive social, political and economic unit was the 
oikos, a household ruled over by a warrior chief, and consisting of his 
family, servants and slaves. The members of the household could count 
upon the rest of the world as being nothing but hostile. The words 
philos (adjective), philein (verb) and philotes (abstract noun) are used 
primarily in connection with the warrior chief. Adkins argues that the 
active side of the philotes relationship is exhibited in beneficence, 
that is, in concern for the preservation of the object of the chief's 
attachment. What is vital, according to Adkin's analysis, is that 
these acts of beneficence are in no way altruistic, but aim always at
6
2
the immediate or long-term security of the warrior chief and his oikos .
Philein is an act which creates or maintains a co-operating 
relationship; and it need not be accompanied by any friendly 
feeling at all ; it is the action which is all important
In sum, (1) friendship is not altruistic, but thoroughly self-regarding;
(2) there is no characteristic emotional bond, except a "possessive 
affection" for a dependable instrument and (3) successful action con­
stitutes the relationship; disposition, intention, or attempt are mere 
addenda.
According to this conception, family, friends (in our sense) and
allies (business partners, club members) can all be seen to a greater or
lesser extent as reliable or helpful in one's pursuit of success; philia
is essentially a relationship of advantage and service.
2. The same lack of altruistic motivation is also a feature of
Plato's account of friendship, according to Julia Annas. On Plato's view:
To desire or feel affection for some person is always, at 
bottom, to have a reason that has a reference to the agent's 
own welfare. To love or feel affection for some person is, 
on this view, to see them as a source of something one wants 
and thinks worth having, and this is impossible except insofar 
as one thinks of oneself as lacking or needing something, and 
to that extent in a state which is undesirable.4
Julia Annas refers to a distinction Bernard Williams draws between
egoistic "I-desires" and altruistic "non-I-desires" in order to show
that the Platonic conception of friendship is ultimately egoistic. An
"I-desire" has a self-referential prepositional content in contrast to
a "non-I-desire" which lacks a self-referential prepositional content.
Plato’s account of friendship in thé Lysis can be seen to make the claim
that ail apparently altruistic "non-I-desires" ultimately rest upon, and
would not exist without, an egoistic "I-desire" of some kind such as "I
desire that I continue to have such a useful, entertaining or worthy
friend". According to Plato's account, "non-I-desires" are not the
5 .
basic motivation in friendship . Julia Annas concludes :
If it is right to take Plato in this way, then the analysis 
of friendship can not unfairly be called egoistic, giving 
an I-referring basis to feelings and actions that are 
apparently altruistic.®
In sum, according to this conception of friendship in the Lysis,
(1) friendship is ultimately egoistic; (2) the emotional bond is con­
ditional on an egoistic aim, that is, affection is felt for the friend 
only insofar as he is perceived to be a source of a desirable good;
(3) the relationship is based solely upon a perceived deficiency. Again, 
philia is essentially a relationship of service and advantage.
We must now discover whether Aristotle, as a creative philosopher, 
goes beyond this egoistic conception of friendship, or whether, as Adkins 
suggests, the egoistic conception survives largely intact in Aristotle's 
own ethical theory.
1.2 The Three Types of Friendship '
It is generally accepted that not everything is loved, but 
only what is lovable, and that is either good, or pleasant 
or useful. (NE 1155bl8-19)
For Aristotle, all friendships have an aim or purpose. It is an 
Aristotelian principle that "for any purposeful thing, whether a natural 
object, or an organisation, whether a man-devised tool or activity or 
association, its essential nature is determined by its function, and
7
expressed by the logos which states its purpose" . Although friendships
arise naturally, they are also purposeful. They are goal-directed, and
so defined by their goal or purpose, It is because they are goal-
directed that Aristotle begins his discussion of friendship by considering
the objects of friendship; the good, the pleasant and the useful.
Friendships have a goal (telos) or purpose which determines their
essential nature. Since there are three kinds of goal that any individual
may choose to pursue, so there are three kinds of friendship corresponding
to these goals: those directed towards goodness, those directed towards
8
pleasure, and those directed towards utility .
These goals are also called "goods" by Aristotle. He distinguishes 
between what is "good in itself" or "good without qualification" and what
, ' •  8 
is relatively good, or good for a particular person. This relative good,
the good for a particular person^ is good with regard to the special
needs of the individual. When a person pursues what is relatively good
or good for him as an individual, he is pursuing what is relatively useful
or relatively pleasant, for in Aristotle's theory, the relative good may
be classified into the relatively useful or relatively pleasant. In
contrast, some persons pursue the absolute good or what is "good without
qualification". They aim to perform fine and noble deeds and to develop
virtuous characters. Such a life is also one that affords pleasure, for
that which is absolutely good also gives absolute pleasure. Friendships
formed in pursuit of this good are virtue friendships. The two relative
friendships of utility and pleasure are, according to Aristotle's theory,
the "lesser friendships".
1.2.1 Friendship of Utility
This is the type of friendship found among those who are out to
pursue their own advantage. It is the kind of relationship of which
the participants ask "what benefit can I derive from this?"
So those who love on the grounds of utility do not love each 
other for their personal qualities, but only insofar as they 
derive some benefit from each other (1156al0-12)
In a business relationsip, for example, the friends have interests in
common (interests in a rather derogatory sense: there is no disinterested
love of the "good in itself"). As long as they share these "interests"
they will attempt to remain on "friendly terms" with each other. They
jyill like"each other in a limited way: to the extent that each can get
something out of the other, they wish to continue the relationship.
Neither feels affection for what the other is in himself, but only for
what is incidental to his real nature: affection is not felt because
the friend is conceived to be a man of good character, but because he is
conceived to be a man of wealth and skill. The friends in this
association choose, in short, what is accidental and completely ignore
what is essential.
"^'r' : ' :3''3 " : / - . . .  9 .
Such friends need not find each other useful in every context and
in every way. It is only requisite that they find each other useful in
some ways^. Moreover, they may be useful to each other in dissimilar
ways. If A wants to use B, it is usually the case that B has some good,
M, which A lacks. In respect of the possession of M, A and B are
opposites. However, if the relationship is to be one of friendship and
not pure exploitation, the benefits must be reciprocal and mutual. Thus
A must have some good, S, of which B wants to take advantage. In respect
of S, A and B are again opposites.
Aristotle finds this kind of friendship the most inferior. The
friendship is formed in pursuit of an unworthy goal, and the friends like
each other for what is accidental and not essential to their natures. Men
who form these friendships are pursuing the relative good in preference
to the good in itself. When a man's primary goal is to do not what is
right, but what is most useful to him, he is acting from a motive which
is not the good, but the useful, so correspondingly, to feel affection
for another person not because of what he is in himself, but because of
the fact that he can be of service to one, is to feel affection from a
motive which is not the good, but the useful.
1.2.2 Friendship of Pleasure
This is the type of friendship typically found among the young as 
they tend to live for immediate pleasure. It is the kind of relationship 
of which the participants ask "What pleasure can I derive from this?"
— Similarly with those who love one another on the grounds of 
pleasure; because it is not for being of a certain 
character that witty people are liked but because we find 
them pleasant. (NE 1156al2-13)
Again in such a friendship it is not requisite that the friends conceive
each other to be pleasant in every way or in every context, but only in
some ways or in some contexts^^. "One may well be friends with someone
because he is a pleasant drinking companion even while recognising his
11
unsuitability as a companion in other pleasant pursuits" Moreover,
- , 10 
the friends may give each other pleasure in dissimilar ways. A may
have an easy manner and B may ride horses well. "Up to a certain point,
perhaps, a pleasure friendship is more complete and perfect of its kind,
the greater the variety and scope of the pleasures the friends may share;
but this is a difference in scope and perfection within a class of friend­
ships which all belong to the same basic type" . .
Aristotle argues that friendships based on pleasure are superior to 
those based on utility for two reasons. First, friends who take 
pleasure in each other want to spend time together. This is not 
necessarily true of friendship based on utility for the latter may 
tolerate each other merely for profit. Secondly, "one finds (in pleasure 
friendships) a more generous spirit whereas utilitarian friendships belong 
to the commercially-minded". Thus, inasmuch as friends of pleasure 
enjoy each other’s company, spend time together and have a generous 
spirit, their relationship resembles more closely the friendship of virtue.
Although pleasure friendships are superior to friendships of utility, 
they are not the highest form possible for the participants still pursue 
the relative good (in the form of that which is pleasant to them) in 
preference to that which is absolutely good.
So when people love each other on the grounds of utility 
their affection is motivated by their own good, and when 
they love on the grounds of pleasure it is motivated by 
their own pleasure. (1156al4-15)
When a man’s primary goal is to do not what is right, but what he finds
pleasant, he is acting from a motive which is not the good but the
pleasant, so cori^spondingly, to feel affection for another person not
because of what he is in himself but because of the pleasure he can give
one, is to feel affection from a motive which is not the good but the
pleasant.
It might appear that Aristotle's ethical theory is cold and austere 
for it prizes a life of virtue and regards a life of pleasure as inferior. 
This view would be incorrect. Aristotle notes that relaxation is a vital 
part of life and this "includes spending one's time in amusement". Of
the virtues that Aristotle discusses, one is concerned with "entertaining 
or witty conversation". Thus a man may be virtuous in this respect.
The entertaining or witty man is never offensive for he combines his wit 
with tact, and he always considers the company he is in. (ll28a25-26)
•He is virtuous in that he is entertaining to the right people, in the 
right circumstances, and from the right motive. He may be contrasted 
with the joker or buffoon whose wit is excessive and misses the mean in 
that he pays no regard to the circumstances or the people, but will do 
anything to raise a laugh. (1128a5) His aim is not the good but the 
pleasant; his pleasure-seeking motive is so strong that he will attempt 
to be funny at any cost and indiscriminately. Inasmuch as a man part ici 
pates in a relationship with the man whose entertainment combines with 
tact and is in the mean, he is participating in à virtue friendship of 
the highest kind. , To the extent that he participates in a relationship 
with the buffoon or joker, he is participating in a pleasure friendship. 
Aristotle does not hold that it is wrong to seek out pleasurable 
relaxations and relationships. The wrongness lies in separating one's 
pleasure from the life of virtue - for example, by pursuing it as one's 
primary goal and forming relationships associated with this primary goal.
1.2.3 Friendship of Virtue or Character
Friendships of utility and friendships of pleasure differ from 
friendships of virtue or character inasmuch as the former "love for the 
sake of what is good for themselves". The friend is "loved", he is 
.wished'well, because he is conceived to be a source of pleasure or 
advantage. It is clear that even vicious persons can enjoy such friend­
ships. Virtue is not requisite if friends are such because of their 
usefulness to one another in business deals. The same is true when 
pleasure is the object, as when one values a friend because he is a good 
drinking companion.
Friendships of virtue or character, in contrast, can be found only
among good men. Virtue friends are those who have goodwill for each 
Other, and indeed, love each bther, on account of each having good 
character. In the friendships of utility and pleasure, men value each 
other for what is accidental to themselves, for it is accidental in 
Aristotle’s theory that a man is wealthy or handsome. His essential 
self (and, hence, what is of intrinsic worth) is his character. Thus, , 
in virtue friendships, men value each other for themselves, for their 
essential attributes, and not for their accidental attributes. Cooper 
expresses Aristotle's point very clearly:
' Clearly enough, whether one person is beneficial or pleasant 
to another is an accidental characteristic of him; his being 
so results from the purely external and contingent fact that 
properties or abilities he possesses happen to answer to needs 
or wants, equally contingent, that characterise the other 
person. If then the conception of the other person under 
which one is his friend as beneficial or pleasant to oneself 
is something that is only Incidentally true of him, the same 
thing must also be said of that property which one acquires as 
a result of so regarding him; that one is a friend of the 
other person must be something that holds true only incidentally 
On Aristotle's theory of moral virtue, the virtues are 
essential properties of human kind: a person realises more or
less fully his human nature according as he possesses more or 
less fully those properties of character which count as moral 
excellences. And since individual persons are what they 
essentially are by being human beings, it can be said that a 
person realises his own essential nature more fully the more 
completely he possesses the moral excellences. So if one is 
a friend of another person because of moral qualities he 
possessés, one will be his friend because he is something that 
he is essentially, and not accidentally.13
Such friendships are also enduring, for Aristotle argues that a good 
character, when fully developed, is permanent, or nearly so. Thus, the 
enduring quality of virtue friendship may be contrasted with the trans­
itory quality of_the lesser friendships. Such friendships cease when 
the friends no longer conceive each other to be useful or pleasant. We 
may note here a familiar value in Greek thought - permanence. One reason 
why the friendship of good men is better than any other is that it is 
lasting, imitating in this the duration of the eternal spheres.
Aristotle concentrates almost exclusively on the friendship of 
perfectly good men thereby creating the impression that such friendships 
are possible only among "moral heroes". Cooper suggests that we should
13
not interpret Aristotle too literally here. He points out that it is 
"an aspect of the teleological bias of (Aristotle's) thinking which 
causes him to seek out the best and most fully realised instance when 
attempting to define a kind of thing", but we should not understand him
as implying that only the perfectly virtuous can engage in such friend-
14
ships . Ideally then, virtue friends will be perfectly good, and thus, 
the same not only in their orientation to living, but also in their 
attainment of nobility. But even in cases where there is some difference 
in the kind and degree of their attainment, we should still expect a sub­
stantial degree of likeness in their conception of the ideal and in some 
aspects of their attainment. Furthermore: those who are alike in 
character will tend to be alike in their tastes and in general in what 
they find pleasant and useful. For virtue friendship to develop, the 
parties to the relationship must find in each other by a gradual process 
the same, dedication to the ideal of nobility . Acknowledging this common 
ideal, virtuous people will tend to group together to attain and further 
this ideal with and through each other. What in all cases, though to 
differing degrees, virtue friends will find in each other, is the 
realisation of the human ideal, an ideal which is the end of their 
intentional actions.
In summary, we may say that Aristotle distinguishes the various 
forms of friendship according to the different grounds on which goodwill 
of affection is forthcoming in each. As there are three such grounds - 
the good, the pleasant, and the useful - so, correspondingly, there are 
three fdrms of friendship: friendship on account of the good, friendship
on account of the pleasant, and friendship on account of the useful. 
Friendship on account of the good is based upon good character, and may, 
therefore, be called "virtue" or "charactef-friendship". Friends of 
this type have goodwill and affection for each other because of the 
other's good character. Friendship on account of pleasure, in contrast, 
is based upon the other's providing one with pleasure, and friendship on
account of utility is based upon the other’s providing one with advan­
tage. Pleasure and utility friendships are regarded by Aristotle as 
inferior forms of friendship, while virtue friendship is the paradigm 
of friendship for Aristotle.
1.3 Other Types of Friendship?
We must now pause to consider whether all philia relationships may 
be categorised into the good, the pleasant, or the useful, or whether 
there are some other types which are not discussed by Aristotle, perhaps 
because they lack the crucial element of choice (prohairesis). The term 
philia means any kind of affectionate relationship and, thus, philia or 
friendship is also possible between members of the same family such as 
between mother and child, father and child, brothers, sisters and cousins 
Is Aristotle's classification supposed to apply to these relationships 
too? It is true that Aristotle makes a limited attempt in Book 8 
chapter 12 to align some types of family friendship with the three forms 
of friendship, but this attempt is incomplete and unsystematic, and it 
seems that it is not Aristotle's intention to make family friendships a 
special case of one or more of the three types. Some of Aristotle's 
examples will serve to show this. In dhapter 8, he discusses the case 
of a mother who loves her absent child. According to the theory of the 
three motives, the child must be loved on account of the useful, the 
pleasant, or the good. In this case, utility is clearly ruled out, for, 
being absent, the child has no way of making itself useful to her. 
Further, the mother has no way of knowing the real virtuousness of the 
child, if it is absent, so it cannot be on account of the good that the 
child is loved. Can it then be on account of pleasure? This may seem 
to be the most likely motive, and yet it is clear that if pleasure is 
present, it is not the kind of pleasure that is typical of pleasure 
friendship/ As the child is absent, the mother can derive pleasure only
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from the contemplation of the child. Yet, for Aristotle, all friend­
ships require "active realisation"; affection is kindled and maintained 
through the sharing of activities, rather than through mere feeling and 
thought alone. Further, an important feature of pleasure friendship is 
spending time together, and this clearly cannot he met in the case of the 
absent child. Thus, it is not the typical motive of pleasure that lies, 
behind the love of a mother for her absent child. It seems that none of 
the three motives apply in this case, and, indeed, Aristotle does not 
suggest that any one of the three does so. It is more likely that the 
mother loves her child, not on account of any goal or motive, but merely 
because the child is her own.
It may be thought that the case of the mother separated from her 
child is unusual and that all other cases of family relationships fit 
easily into the three-motive model. Yet this is not the case as 
Aristotle makes clear. He notes that:
Parents love their children as part of themselves, whereas 
children love their parents as authors of their being. (1161bl8)
He also comments :
Brothers love one another as having sprung from the same
origin, because their identity with regard to their parents
identifies them with one another. Hence such phrases as
"the same blood" and the "same stock" etc. Thus brothers
are in a sense the same identity in different bodies. (1161b29-31)
Thus, parents love their children, children their parents and siblings one
another, not because as people they are conceived to be good, pleasant, or
useful, but merely because they are related to each other. There need be
nothing over and abjove a consciousness of family relationship.
It is true, of course, that members of the same family, for example,
brothers, cousins, comrades brought up together could be friends of any
one of the three types in that, when of appropriate age, they could use
their time and energies in the pursuit of virtue, pleasure or advantage.
Yet, even here, it is not clear that Aristotle would accept them as
standard cases of the three forms of friendship. Although they may be
friends of one of the three types of this sense, through it all they are
family friends. They may pursue a particular goal together but the love 
a n d  g o o d w i l l  each has for the other is founded not so much upon the 
essential or accidental qualities of the other, but upon the kinship 
existing between them. It is the kinship that constitues the relation.
The ultimate foundation of even these family friendships is thus clearly 
different. One cannot choose one's kin, hence the foundation is not 
indicative of character. It is for this reason that Aristotle writes 
that although all forms of friendship "involve association" , family 
friendships should be "distinguished as a separate species" . (1161bl2-14) 
It is clear that Aristotle believes that family friendships do not 
fit into the tripartite framework. But does he believe that all philia 
relationships outside the family fit into the framework? Certainly this 
framework is not exhaustive of all friendships between persons not 
related to each other. First, it is possible to have a friendship in 
which the parties like each other on account of their natures/qualities, 
but in which no goal is consciously undertaken, and, secondly, it is 
possible to have a friendship in which even the qualities or natures of 
the parties are not especially significant . The first , a "no goal" 
friendship could arise, for example, between two persons who are "naturally 
virtuous". Aristotle makes a distinction between natural virtue (phusike 
arete) and virtue in the full sense (he kuria) (1144bl2-17). The pursuit 
of good deeds, and the cultivation of good character is a conscious under­
taking, a primary goal for those who are fully virtuous. They choose to 
perform good deeds for the intrinsic goodness and rightness of these 
. deed'sand those engaged in such a life form character friendships. In 
contrast, individuals who are "naturally virtuous" perform the same kind 
Of deeds and display the same kind of character traits as the fully 
virtuous. But, in their case, the bravery, justice, generosity, or self 
control that they display stems from an innate tendency (1144b4-9) . Two 
such naturally virtuous individuals could form a friendship, and have 
affection and goodwill for each other on account of natural, innate.
virtue that each posseses. In such a friendship, the goodwill would be 
based upon the qualities of the persons concerned, but it would be "goal­
less" in that the good deeds are not performed on account of any end - 
advantage, pleasure, or, simply, the intrinsic goodness of the deeds in 
question.
Although Aristotle recognises the existence of this natural virtue,, 
it does not feature in his account of friendship, and the reason appears 
to be that friendship based upon such virtue would lack ethical signifi­
cance in that it is not concerned with choice (prohairesis). Aristotle 
discusses friendship as one of the virtues^ and, in his ethical theory, 
character and virtue are essentially concerned with choice. "virtue", 
he writes, "involves choice". If we want to know about an individual's 
virtuousness (or lack of it), we must look at the choices he makes, in 
particular, at the ends he selects. In the case of natural virtue 
friendship, the performance of good deeds arises from inherent tendencies 
and there is no deliberation and choice of ends. It is probably for the 
same reason that he omits from discussion what we may call "ungrounded 
likings" and"unjustifiable attachments" - friendship relations in which 
there is no goal and in which even the qualities of the friend are not 
especially significant. It is not that Aristotle believes that goodwill 
and affection can be bestowed on a purposive or rational basis alone, but 
that philia relationships In which this purposive or rational basis is 
absent lack the crucial element of choice and do not, therefore, fall 
within the domain of ethics.
1.4 The Place of Goodwill in Friendship
Cooper claims that friendship, for Aristotle, is mutual, recognised 
and active well-wishing and well-doing of good for another for that 
person's own sake . That is to say, friendship is mutual, recognised, 
active goodwill. Cooper supports this claim by an explicit definition
of friendship in the Rhetoric, and by various passages in the Nicomachean
Ethics where Aristotle seems to suggest a close relationship between
friendship and goodwill. We shall quote the important passages in full
as they will be a focus for later discussion.
We may begin by defining friendship and to philein. We may 
describe philein towards anyone as wishing for him what are 
believed to be good things, not for your own sake, but for his, 
and being inclined, as far as you can, to bring these things 
about. A friend is one who has such inclinations, and brings 
forth these inclinations in return. Those who think they are 
thus towards each other think themselves friends.
(Rhetoric 11,4 1380b34-81a2)
Goodwill is friendship only when it is reciprocated. Perhaps 
we should add 'and recognised'; because people are often well- 
disposed towards persons whom they have never seen, but believe 
to be good or helpful, and one of the latter might feel the 
same towards thé former: then clearly these people are well-
disposed towards each other; but how could we call them friends 
when their feelings for one another are not known? So friends 
must be well-disposed towards each other, and recognised as 
wishing each other's good, for one of the three reasons stated 
above (namely, the good, the pleasant, and the useful).
(ÎŒ 8,2 1155-1156a5)
Goodwill seems to be the beginning of friendship ... people 
cannot be friends unless they first come to feel goodwill, 
although feeling goodwill does not make them friends, because 
they only wish for the good of those for whom they feel goodwill; 
they would not actively help them or take any trouble for their 
sake. One might then define goodwill as undeveloped friendship 
which in course of time, when it attains to intimacy becomes 
friendship. (NE 9,5,1167a4-12)
These three passages clearly support Cooper's claim that friendship is 
mutual, recognised, and active goodwill. The requirement of mutuality is 
the requirement that each friend has goodwill for the other on the grounds 
of goodness, or pleasure or advantage. Thus, for example, A has goodwill 
towards B on account of B's good character, and B has goodwill towards A 
,on account of A's good character. The requirement of mutuality is not 
the requirement that goodwill be forthcoming (in one of the friends) 
because of the other friend's goodwill towards him. Thus, if A has good­
will towards B on account of B's good character, but B has goodwill 
towards À on account of A's goodwill towards him, the requirement of 
mutuality is not met. The requirement of recognition is the requirement 
that the relationship be conceived by both friends as one of friendship,
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and that each friend be conceived by the other as a friend. A relation­
ship does not become one of friendship simply because of the presence of 
certain sorts of motivation or behaviour. Certain sorts of virtuous 
acts, for example, could be performed within a relationship of friendship 
or outside such a relationship. The requirement of "active goodwill" Is 
the requirement that the friends actually have goodwill towards each
other, and reasonably frequently do good things for each other. In this
way, "active goodwill" is to be distinguished from what we may term 
"passive goodwill" in which there is merely a disposition to do good to 
the friend. Aristotle does make it clear that friends need not be con­
stantly active in this way, although the more active they are, the better
'
the friendship. Friends who have already proved their friendship (by 
active goodwill and good deeds) can remain friends even if they are 
separated, although lasting separation tends to be the demise of friendship 
It should be noted that these three requirements of friendship that 
Cooper correctly identifies seem to apply primarily to those philia 
relationships that are freely engaged in. They do not seem to apply 
readily to all family relationships. The example of the mother and her 
absent child is a case in point. The mother "feels affection" for her
child but "does not seek to receive affection in return". It is
"sufficient" for her to see her child "prosper" and to "feel affection" 
for it even if the child does not render its "mother her due because it 
does not know her" (1159al7-33). The affection and goodwill is thus 
unilateral rather than mutual or reciprocal and, of course, it is un­
recognised by one of the two parties to the relationship. Also, there 
can be no "active goodwill" since they are separated from each other; 
the mother can only have a "passive goodwill", that is, a disposition to 
do good for her child. Moreover, Aristotle does not suggest that this 
disposition will weaken if the separation is a long one.
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1.5 The Motivation of Well-Wishing
This chapter is concerned above all with the issue of altruism and 
egoism in Aristotle’s theory of friendship. We need to know in particular 
whether Aristotle makes provision for genuinely disinterested concern in 
his account of friendship, and if he does so, whether such disinterested 
concern is a feature of virtue friendship alone, or of the lesser friend­
ships too. Of key importance here is the issue of well-wishing or
goodwill, and we must examine in detail the nature and role of this 
well-wishing or goodwill for the three kinds of friendship.
1.5.1 Well-Wishing and Virtue Friendship
In virtue friendship, well-wishing is genuinely for the other 
friend’s sake. The evidence for this is Aristotle ’s statement : " N o w  . 
those who wish well to their friends for their own sake are most truly 
friends; for they do so by reason of their own nature and not 
incidentally". Aristotle seems to be saying that among those who enter 
into relations of friendship, the group that is distinguished from the 
rest by virtue of the fact that they wish well for the other’s sake are 
most truly friends, and this group is the same group that care for each 
other because of essential qualities. We have already noted that, 
according to Aristotle, it is only in virtue friendship that Individuals 
value each other for their essential attributes. In utility and pleasure 
friendships, individuals value each other for their accidental attributes. 
Aristotle is, therefore, saying that virtue friends are most truly 
friends, and that they are most truly friends because the well-wishing of 
each friend is genuinely for the sake of the other.
We must now consider how it is that the conception of another 
individual as being of good character can motivate concern for that 
individual’s well-being. What is it, in short, that binds one person’s 
virtuous character and another person’s goodwill towards him? Moreover, 
how can this goodwill be so strong that it is sufficient to spur an 
individual into action?
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It is plausible to suggest that admiration might be present, for 
admiration is often forthcoming on the perception of various kinds of 
excellence. But it would also appear that admiration by itself is in­
sufficient to spur one to perform deeds that are intended to benefit the 
friend. A's admiration of B because of B's good character may well 
result in A's wishing B well, and in thinking that it would be appropriate . 
and fitting that B should prosper. But it is far from clear that such 
admiration by itself would be sufficient to move A to seek actively B ’s 
well-being, to do things on his behalf, and it is precisely this feature 
that is so important in Aristotle ’s account of virtue friendship. It is 
far from clear that admiration br respect should issue in anything more 
than a feeling or , indeed, a firm belief that B is a fine individual , 
an example to everyone else, and that he deserves to prosper and get 
what is best. It would seem that Aristotle does .hold that something 
more than mere admiration is required in the kind of goodwill that 
characterises friendship. In NE 9,5, he suggests that the goodwill 
that accompanies appreciation of another’s excellent qualities can be 
very weak, and completely lacking in intensity, desire and activity. In 
such cases, he says, love or affectionate concern (stergein) may be only 
superficial (1167al-2). To promote action, greater intimacy and love 
or affectionate concern is necessary. Cooper spells out this affective 
element in Aristotle’s account very clearly:
(virtue) friendships exist when two persons, having spent 
enough time together to know one another’s character and to 
trust one another (1156b25-29), come to love one another 
because of their good human qualities. Aristotle’s word 
' for ’love’ here is stergein. ... Each loving the other
for his good qualities of character, wishes for him whatever 
is good, for his own sake, precisely in recognition of his 
goodness of character, and it is mutually known to them that 
well-wishing of this kind is reciprocated (1156a3-5)^®^
Mere admiration is insufficient. Love or affectionate concern is an 
essential constituent of virtue friendship; it is not merely a super­
ficial feature that decorates or embellishes the friendship. But why 
should it be the case that for Aristotle good character inspires love or
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affectionate concern? Mere admiration may be insufficient to spur one
into action; an affective element like love may be needed, but it may
still be asked why Aristotle should think that good character should
inspire love. Aristotle does not confront this issue explicitly, but
I think that the following answer may do justice to his position. That
virtuous men seek and love only the good is one of the cornerstones of
Aristotle’s ethics. Such men look for what is good-in-itself, something
that does not point beyond to some further value. Aristotle has no
Platonic Form of the Good. But the good man in his active, virtuous
life is the personification or embodiment of human good. Since the good
man cannot but love the good, affection necessarily accompanies this
awareness of the good. It is for this reason that good men love, or
have affectionate concern for each other. =
Virtue friends will, of course, be useful and pleasant to each other
(1156bl3), but these features are shared with the lesser friendships.
What is distinctive is that virtue friends typically seek to promote
each other’s good character, its development (1172all) , and exercise.
They find in each other a model of human good, and seek to emulate each
other (1162b8). Virtue friends come to share a life of virtue.
In having concern for (philoutes) a friend, men have 
concern for what is good for themselves; for the good 
man in becoming a friend becomes a gobd to his friend
(1157b33-34)
Virtue friends observe each other performing good acts of courage, 
generosity, magnificence, gentleness, truthfulness, temperance, to name 
some of the virtues-that Aristotle explicitly discusses. This observation 
brings with it a consciousness of oneself and other persons as moral 
agents , and this consciousness brings with it an admiration and 
affection for these other people whose aim, like one’s own, is to achieve 
excellence of character. One wishes for the good of these people just 
because, insofar as one is virtuous and noble, one wishes for the good- 
in-itself, and these people as they achieve such excellence are themselves 
the embodiment of the good in itself which is to be found not in the
Platonic heavens, but in the concrete behaviour of virtuous men. Anyone 
who loves the good, Aristotle writes, will love these good men qua good (men).
We must conclude this section by pinpointing the altruistic kind of 
well-wishing that typifies virtue friendship. In section 1.1 we referred 
to Bernard William’s classification of desires into supposedly (1)
egoistic ’’I-desires’’ and (2) altruistic "non-I-desires":
(1) I desire that I prosper
(2) I desire that X prosper
Now it is clear that (2) is more altruistic than (1), but we may still 
ask whether (2) is altruistic enough, and whether it captures what is 
typical of Aristotle’s virtue friendship. It seems that I could main­
tain (quite compatibly with (2)) that "X is a fine person, an example to 
us all, that he deserves what is best, and I hope he gets it", and at the 
same time not be willing to do anything that will promote his wellbeing.
I could reason as follows:
Persons of excellent character should prosper 
This person. A, is of excellent character 
Therefore, A should prosper.
This reasoning is clearly altruistic; if I argued in this way, it would
be unreasonable for people to call me an egoist. But I would surely be
even more altruistic if I desired to be the one who contributes to A's
prosperity. Aristotle, as we have Just seen, argues that virtue friends
seek to promote each other’s good character and its development. Each
friend can thus be construed as saying something like:
(3) I desire that I help X prosper (where ’’prosper" is
understood to be the attainment of excellent character)
Now -(3J-is clearTy an” I-desire" in Williams’s sense of the term, but it
is an altruistic "I-desire", not an egoistic "I-desire" because the goal
is the good of another individual, for that other individual’s own sake,
Moreover, it is reasonable to argue that (3) is more altruistic than (2),
because real concern for another is manifested in a willingness to do
things that benefit that other person and help him prosper. A piously
expressed hope or desire that he might prosper is insufficient.
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1.5.2 Well-Wishing and the Lesser Friendships
Aristotle's position in respect of the motivation of goodwill in 
the lesser friendships is not as clear, for he seems to commit himself 
in various places in the NE to two propositions which are incompatible.
1. Disinterested goodwill (that is, goodwill for the sake of
the other) is found within all three types of friendship.
2. Disinterested goodwill is not a characteristic of the lesser
friendships, for lesser friends are self-regarding in their 
concern for each other and they do not care for each other 
in themselves^^.
Textual support for proposition 1 is found in Book 8 and that for prop­
osition 2 in Book 9. In the EE, Aristotle clearly takes the line that 
goodwill for the sake of the other person is not a feature of the lesser 
friendships. The concern of lesser friends is purely self-directed
(1241a5-8). Thus, in respect of the motivation of goodwill in the 
lesser friendships, the account is like NE Book 9, and ÎŒ Book 8 is 
incompatible with both.
The main passage in support of proposition 1, the proposition that 
goodwill for the sake of the other is a characteristic of all three 
types of friendship (and, hence, a characteristic of the lesser friend­
ships too) is 1156a3-5. It could be argued, though, that in this 
passage Aristotle is referring to friendship simpliciter; that he is 
analysing friendship in general, or is attempting to present the reader 
with a model of friendship. But, as Cooper points out, such an inter­
pretation cannot be correct for Aristotle's words do not support this 
"model of friendship" view. Aristotle writes:
So friends must be well disposed towards each other, and 
recognised as wishing each other's good for one of the 
three reasons stated above.
The implication of the final phrase "for one of the three reasons stated
above" is that goodwill in friendship may be forthcoming on any one of
the three grounds by which friendship is distinguished into types, namely
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the good, the pleasant and the useful. In this passage, then,
Aristotle appears to be arguing that goodwill towards the other is a
characteristic of all three types of friendship (and, hence, of the
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lesser friendships too) .
If Aristotle assents to proposition 1, it appears that he cannot
without inconsistency assent also to proposition 2. But Cooper has
recently attempted to show that this is not so. He argues that
Aristotle assents to the first proposition, and he then proceeds to
argue that, given a particular interpretation of the second proposition,
(an interpretation, that is, of what is meant by caring for a person
"in himself") the two propositions may be seen to be consistent with one
another. '
Proposition 2, Cooper argues, has two parts: (a) that the well-
wishing that characterises the lesser friendships is grounded upon the 
advantage or pleasure perceived to accrue to the self, and (b) that 
lesser friends do not care for each other "for themselves" or for what 
they are "in themselves". These two parts. Cooper argues, have not 
always been distinguished by the various commentators, but they are 
distinct and should, therefore, be kept so. He attempts to show that 
commentators who argue that Aristotle holds proposition 2(a) are mistaken 
for Aristotle does hold that there is at least some measure of dis­
interested well-wishing in the lesser friendships and, therefore, that
these forms of friendship are not wholly egoistic and selfish as is
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sometimes thought . He further attempts to show that Aristotle does
indeed hold proposition 2(b), but that 2(b) has been wrongly interpreted
by commentators, and has no relation at all to the egoistic-altruistic 
20issue . By this method. Cooper attempts to show that there is no con­
tradiction in what Aristotle says : some measure of disinterested goodwill,
that is, goodwill for the sake of the other person, is a feature of all 
three types of friendship.
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We shall begin by discussing 2(b). In describing the three kinds 
of friendship, Aristotle draws a distinction between (i) caring for 
others "for themselves" (1156al0), "for what they are" (1156al2), or 
"on account of themselves" (1157al8) and (ii) caring for others inciden­
tally (1156al7,115Gbll,li57a4). It is clear that (i) is the kind of 
concern associated with virtue friendship, while (ii) is that
associated with the lesser friendships. It might be thought that 
because lesser friends do not care for each other "in themselves", they, 
therefore, do not care for each other "for the other's sake". But 
Cooper argues that Aristotle is not making this equation; he is simply 
making the point that in virtue friendship, care and concern arises
in virtue of an individual's essential qualities, while in the lesser 
friendships, such care and concern arises in virtue of an individual's 
incidental qualities . The particular incidental qualities involved 
might suggest that the lesser friendships are always selfish and self- 
seeking, but this does not change Cooper's point that Aristotle is 
concerned here not to distinguish between egoistic versus altruistic 
behaviour, but between behaviour motivated by essential versus incidental 
attributes of the other individual. Cooper is saying, in other words, 
that it is not necessarily the case that because A does not care for B 
"in himself" or "for himself',' (that is, on account of his essential 
attributes) that he, therefore, cannot care for B for B's own sake.
According to proposition 2(a), lesser friends are completely selfish
and egoistic, for they seek their own benefit or pleasure exclusively.
Cuope^r denies the correctness of this interpretation, arguing that while
lesser friends exhibit more self-interested concern than virtue
friends, there is still room for some degree of mutual disinterested
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concern in these friendships * The important passage is 1156a2-5 which 
we have already quoted, where Aristotle says that friends "wish each 
other's good" on account of (dia) the good, the pleasant or the useful. 
Cooper points out in a footnote that although dia can sometimes be used
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to "express a purpose"j its "normal" usage is in "expressing an
antecedent causal condition". If dia is understood in a purely
purposive sense, it would seem that lesser friends wish each other
good in order to produce pleasure or advantage for themselves. Dia in
this case would express "merely what the well-wisher hopes to achieve
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or produce by his friend's prosperity" . This purposive or prospective
account of dia would render the well-wishing of the lesser friendships
completely egoistic and self-seeking - not because of the purposiveness
or prospectivity in itself, but simply because of the specific self-
regarding purposes involved. Moreover, as this interpretation of ^ a
makes the lesser friendships exclusively self-seeking, there is a clear
contradiction with proposition 1 according to which there is, at least,
some disinterested goodwill (that is, goodwill for the sake of the
other person) in the lesser friendships. "If dia is taken in this
prospective way, as expressing what the well-wisher hopes to produce or
achieve by his friend's prosperity, then it is impossible to interpret
Aristotle coherently"
Cooper points out that it is very likely that Aristotle intends dia
to be similarly understood in all three types of friendship, thus, a clue
might be provided by investigating the use of dia in virtue friendship.
In this case, the 'because' (dia ten areten) seems more 
likely to mean 'in recognition of their friend's having 
a good character’ so that it expresses a consequence or 
result of the friend's being morally good rather than 
some purpose that the well-wisher has in wanting him to 
prosper ... Understanding the 'because' in this causal 
way makes it at least as much retrospective as prospective; 
thewell-wlshing and well-doing are responses to what the 
person is and has done, rather than merely the expression 
of a hope as to what he will be and may do in the f u t u r e . 25
Applying this analysis of dia to the lesser friendships, Cooper continues:
... the pleasure friend will now be said to wish well for 
his friend's own sake in consequence of recognising him as 
someone who is and has been an enjoyable companion, and the 
advantage friend wishes his friend well for his friend's 
own sake, in consequence of recognising him as someone who 
regularly benefits him, and has done so in the past.
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A commentator who held the prospective-purposive interpretation of 
dia might object that Aristotle's comments about the demise of friend­
ships do not support this interpretation. Aristotle says several times 
(1156a22-24,33-36) that the lesser friendships cease if the receipt of 
pleasure or utility ceases. This seems to imply that the friendship 
ceases because personal benefit or pleasure was the one and only goal, •
and if the goal is no longer being achieved, the friends will naturally 
cease wishing each other well, and the friendship will die. Similarly, 
virtue friendship would cease if the good, in this case, good character, 
were to disintegrate, although this is not very likely to occur according 
to Aristotle because good, qualities of character are, once -fully acquired, 
permanent or nearly so (1156bl2).
Such a challenge lacks much force because Cooper does not hold that 
friends are completely backward-looking. He says that dia is "at least
as much retrospective as prospective" . "The antecedent" of their
goodwill is not only (the recognition of) regular past pleasure or 
advantage, or of the other's good character in the past, but also the 
expectation or belief that such pleasure, advantage or good character
will continue in the future. When Cooper is outlining the three types
of friendship, he notes that"it is not the actual properties of a
person, but those that someone else conceives him as possessing, that
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are responsible for the existence of a friendship" . In other words, 
A's well-wishing for B is built upon A's conception of B. Reasonable 
grounds for conceiving B as good or pleasant or useful include not only 
-B's past behaviour, but also his present and likely future behaviour 
and dispositions. A has goodwill towards B because he has a particular 
conception of B and this conception is grounded in beliefs about B's 
past, present and future behaviour. Cooper would argue that when 
Aristotle says that friendship ceases because the benefits cease, he 
means that the particular conception of the other person that is necessary 
to cause the goodwill is now absent.
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According to Cooper, the lesser friendships involve disinterested­
ness but in a subtle and limited way, fairly termed "disinterested", but 
not as fully disinterested as virtue friendships. A lesser friend, A, 
seeks his own benefit, but within the limits imposed by this aim, he 
can, caused by his conception of B, still wish well to B for B's own 
sake. His own benefit is A's overall goal, but it is not his goal in • 
each and every action in the relationship. When A acts he does not 
always seek to maximise or even advance his own well-being, though it 
is the case that each and every action will be scanned to see that it
is likely to remain within the limits of his overall, long-term personal
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benefit from the relationship . While A seeks his overall benefit, 
each act of well-wishing towards B need not be subservient to that end 
in that it will only be undertaken if it be conceived of as a means to 
A's overall personal benefit. According to this analysis, the dis­
interestedness is only limited, but it is an advance on the classical 
case of Hobbesian self-interest. An example may make this difference 
clearer.
A and B are "business friends" who run a business to their mutual
advantage. One day B falls ill and is taken to hospital. A is con­
sidering visiting B in hospital.
(1) It is very inconvenient to me. I should rather go straight home;
from work, and not stop off at the hospital on the way and get
home late for dinner. Still, I shall visit him for otherwise 
people will talk and say I am neglectful. I might then lose 
customers to my rivals. Besides B might feel sore if I don't 
visit him and may end our business partnership which I find very 
advantageous. |
(2) Poor B in hospital I I hope he recovers soon. And with that 
personality he would hate the boredom of hospital. I must go 
and visit him and his time won't drag so much. After all we 
have always been good business friends, and have run the business
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successfully, and, hopefully, we might be doing it again 
■ soon.
The judgement is the same in both cases in that in each A decides he will 
visit B, but the reasoning in the two cases is very different. In the 
first case, A is entirely concerned with his own interests and goals and 
the possible repercussions that his action might have on his interests 
and goals. He specifies no interest in the well-being of B and does 
not wish him well at all. This is a classic statement of self-interest. 
In the second case, in contrast, A genuinely wishes B well, and is con­
cerned about him as and to the extent that B is conceived to be a 
beneficial friend. .He wishes B well for B's own sake, because he has 
a particular conception of B as advantageous, and his conception is 
grounded in beliefs about B's past, present, and likely future behaviour 
and dispositions.
In this way, the lesser friendships are not relationships of pure 
self-interest in which there is no place for well-wishing for the sake 
of the other person. In Cooper's account, lesser friends do wish well
for the others' sake, but in ways limited in their basis and degree.
Cooper's account does have the advantage that it makes the two prop­
ositions compatible and consistent. If Cooper is correct in arguing 
that Aristotle is committed to proposition 1, then Aristotle can be seen 
to be consistent in what he says about well-wishing in the lesser friend­
ships. But we may still ask if Cooper's interpretation is correct. Is
it true to what Aristotle says and means? |
Cooper's argument, as we have noted, depends heavily upon there 
being a clear-cut distinction between concern for a person for his own 
sake on the one hand, and concern for a person for his essential/ 
inessential attributes on the other. But Aristotle does not always 
seem to make such a distinction; indeed, he often equates the two:
Now those who wish well to their friends for their own sake, 
are most truly friends for they do so by reason of their 
own nature and not incidentally. (1156bl6)
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Similarly, the good man wishes himself well:
and does so for his own sake (for he does it for the sake 
of the intellectual element in him which is thought to be 
the man himself) (1166al6-17)
Clearly, then, there is some equation of wishing a person well for his
own sake and for his essential qualities. But, it can reasonably be
argued that this equation is to be expected in the case of the man pf
good character. Indeed, Cooper does not dispute the equation in the
case of the virtuous man.. He is not attempting to sever the essential
qualities/ for the other's sake connection with a view to arguing that
A may wish B well for his essential qualities but not for B's own sake.
The question at issue is not
'
(a) If A wishes well to B for his essential qualities, must he 
also wish well to B for B's own sake?
but rather
(b) If A wishes well to B for B's own sake, must he also wish well 
to B for B's essential qualities?
Cooper answers question (b) in the negative. If A wishes well to B for 
B's own sake, it is not necessary that he wishes well to B for B's 
essential qualities. He may instead wish well to B for B's accidental 
qualities. He thus disputes the equation only in the case of the lesser 
friendships . Thus, in order to refute Copper's claim, we need a passage 
in which Aristotle denies that one can wish another well for his 
accidental qualities and at the same time wish him well for his own sake. 
Unfortunately, Aristotle does not provide one.
Textual siippnxt for proposition 2 is drawn largely from the NE 
account of goodwill in Book 9 chapter 5. In this chapter, Aristotle 
appears to deny explicitly that goodwill exists in the lesser friend­
ships. Thus, this chapter poses a far more significant challenge to 
Cooper's interpretation. In the relevant passage (1166b30-36) Aristotle 
first contrasts"mere" goodwill with fully developed friendship, noting 
that this "mere" goodwill can arise suddenly and spontaneously, but be 
quite superficial in that those who experience it can be unmoved to take
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any trouble for the person for whom they feel it. The example he gives
is that of the short-lived goodwill that spectators can have for
athletes at the games. Because such goodwill can be so "superficial",
it is insufficient to constitute friendship, but it could constitute the
"beginnings of friendship" (1167a3-4). Aristotle continues:
One might, then, by a metaphor define goodwill as undeveloped 
friendship, which in course of time, when it attains to 
intimacy becomes friendship - but not friendship based on 
utility or pleasure for these never in fact arouse goodwill
(1167alO-14)
In this passage, it might appear that Aristotle is denying that goodwill
is a characteristic of the lesser friendships. "For these never in fact
arouse goodwill" appears to suggest it. But Cooper argues that Aristotle
is making a much more limited or "reduced" claim, viz the claim that
"spontaneously'' arising goodwillj when it grows into friendship, cannot
grow into utility or pleasure friendship, but only into virtue friendship.
Spontaneous goodwill is, according to Cooper, that kind of goodwill
that arises without past "association" of receipt of benefit or pleasure.
Spontaneous goodwill of the kind here under discussion can 
only be based on admiration for goodness of character; one 
can feel goodwill towards someone whom one thinks is a good 
person even though one has no deep personal knowledge of his 
character and has not personally been affected by any noble 
action of his, but no one feels goodwill for someone else on 
the mere ground that he might be a pleasant companion or use­
ful business partner. These sorts of goodwill only arise 
after the pleasure or the profit has begun to be actualised, 
and exist always as a response to profit or pleasure one has 
actually found in association with someone else.^0
Thus, according to Cooper's analysis, goodwill may arise in two different
ways, (i) Spontaneously (without prior association of self advantage or
pleasure) and (ii) Derivatively (through prior association of self
advantage or pleasure) which in the lesser friendships would involve
receipt of past benefit or pleasure and certain expectation that these
will continue in the foreseeable future. Spontaneous goodwill can grow
only into virtue friendship because only such friendship can be "actualised"
without prior association of self advantage or pleasure. According to
Cooper, then, Aristotle is not making the claim that there is no good­
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will in the lesser friendships, but only that there is no spontaneous
goodwill in such friendships.
So what Aristotle denies here is that eunoia (goodwill) 
precedes, and possibly turns into a friendship of one of 
the derivative sorts; he does not deny that once such an 
relationship has begun, eunoia develops within it.^^
Is Cooper's interpretation correct? Is Aristotle denying the existence
of spontaneous goodwill alone or of goodwill per se in the case of the
lesser friendships? Perhaps the continuation of the passage will
provide the answer.
A man who has received a benefit does indeed return goodwill 
for what has been done to him, and this is right and proper.
But if a person's motive for doing someone a service is the
hope of getting, through his help, some substantial advantage, 
it looks as if the object of his goodwill were not so much 
the other man as himself - just as a person is not a friend 
if the attentions he pays have an interested motive
(1167al3-14)
In this part of the passage, Aristotle is making a distinction between 
goodwill that is based upon past receipt of benefits (advantage or
pleasure) and goodwill that is based upon expectation of benefit
(advantage or pleasure) to come. It seems clear that he is denying 
the existence of disinterested goodwill in the second, purely prospective, 
case. The goodwill is not disinterested for its object is the self, 
rather than the other. Does Aristotle allow that the goodwill in the 
lesser friendships can come into being derivatively in respect of past 
(but not future) benefits? If he does so, it would appear that Cooper’s 
interpretation is correct - there is not spontaneous goodwill in such 
friendships, but there is one kind of derivative goodwill, viz goodwill 
— derived from past receipt of benefit. It appears that Aristotle does 
allow it. The first case under discussion is one in which there is 
goodwill arising from past receipt of benefit. Moreover, the goodwill 
is disinterested for it is directed towards the other person.
Such an interpretation, however, is open to challenge. According 
to the passage, there can be (and, indeed, should be) disinterested 
goodwill in response to benefits received. But it is plausible to
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argue that this goodwill is the goodwill of gratitude rather than of
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friendship. As Cooper himself makes clear earlier in the article 
the goodwill of gratitude ("goodwill in return for past pleasure or past 
service") is not the goodwill of friendship, for the goodwill "as an 
ingredient of friendship is limited by the other person's continuing to 
(be thought to) be pleasant or advantageous ... Friendships of whatever, 
sort, require a continuing lively interest of one person in another, 
and mere gratitude for past pleasure or past service is not enough to 
provide this". The goodwill Aristotle discusses in this case appears 
to be that of gratitude - goodwill for past receipt of benefits. But 
even if this is so. Cooper's argument is not refuted or even weakened 
by this point alone. It is reasonable to argue that the goodwill of 
gratitude is insufficient in just the respect that he identifies to con­
stitute the goodwill of friendship; the question is whether it can 
constitute the beginnings of friendship. After all, in this chapter, 
Aristotle is concerned above all with the issue of how goodwill (derived 
from one or more sources) can develop into friendship. "Prospective" 
goodwill cannot develop into friendship because then the friendship would 
have an ultimate basis in self-interest, whereas in friendship the 
concern and goodwill is other-directed. But, the goodwill of gratitude 
could indeed develop into friendship because it is disinterested good­
will; its ultimate basis is not self-interest. The problem is that 
Aristotle does not make clear whether or not he believes that the good­
will of gratitude may develop into that of friendship, so it is not 
possible to be certain what this first case proves. The passage does 
not confirm Cooper's thesis, but neither does it refute it.
Aristotle notes finally:
In general, goodwill arises on account of some excellence 
or worth, as when one man seems to another noble, 
beautiful or brave or something of the sort, as we pointed 
out in the case of competitors in a contest. (1167al8-20)
In this summary of Book 9 Chapter 5, Aristotle is making the point that
it is generally various kinds of human excellence or worth that give rise
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to goodwill. He does not say again that past receipt of pleasure or 
advantage can give rise to goodwill. This omission might tend to suggest 
that he does not consider that the goodwill of gratitude may be a source 
for the goodwill of friendship. If this is so, it would seem that 
neither prospective nor retrospective goodwill can be such a source. But, 
equally, it can be argued that in this short summary Aristotle is making 
a rather generalised statement about the origin of goodwill, and he is not 
concerned to enumerate again all its sources. In conclusion, it must be 
said that it is not possible to be certain whether Cooper's interpretation 
is correct or incorrect.
1.6 The Five or Six Types of Friendship
Cooper is surely correct to argue that caring for another for his 
essential/inessential qualities is different from caring for another for 
his own sake. He may be wrong to conclude that Aristotle makes this 
distinction-indeed, as we have seen, it is not possible to be certain as 
to which line Aristotle takes - but it is clear that they are separate, 
and should, therefore, be kept so. Once this distinction is made, 
however, many more forms of friendship will be generated.
Disinterested well-wishing ^ _ Essential Qualities
(Well-wishing for the sake 
of the other)
Self-interested well-wishing . ^  / • .. ■ " Inessential Qualities
(Well-wishing insofar as it
benefits oneself) — —
1. Friendship based upon disinterested well-wishing and essential
qualities (virtue friendship)
2. Friendship based upon disinterested well-wishing and inessential
qualities (Cooper's interpretation of lesser friendships)
3. Friendship based upon self-interested well-wishing and essential
qualities (to be discussed later)
4. Friendship based upon self-interested well-wishing and inessential
qualities (Aristotle's conception of lesser friendship?)
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In fact, once this distinction is made, the result is six forms of friend­
ship, not four, as there are two inessential qualities, viz, pleasure and 
advantage.
According to Aristotle, there are three major ends or goals in life 
that any individual may choose to pursue - the good, the pleasant and the 
useful. It is also the case, for Aristotle, that the forms of friendship 
m irror these goals of life, that friendship may be viewed as the affection­
ate and emotional aspect of the pursuit of the respective goal. "There 
are", he says, "three kinds of friendship corresponding in number to the 
objects worthy of affect ion" (1156a6-8). He develops his theory in such 
a way that pleasure and utility are always relative goods, and virtue the 
absolute good. A relative good, we noted, is a good for a man as an 
individual; it meets a special need of his as an individual. Aristotle 
seems to believe that if it is pleasure or material advantage that a man 
seeks, it must be for himself that he seeks it. From this assumption he 
draws the conclusion that any friendship formed in pursuit of this goal 
must be self-interested. But it is not necessarily the case that the 
relative goals of material advantage and pleasure must be sought on behalf 
of oneself. It seems plausible to argue that where pleasure or material 
advantage are the chief goals or goods, such goals or goods mqybe pursued 
selfishly or unselfishly, egoistically or altruistically. Categories 2 
and 4 above may be clearly expressed in terms of the altruistic and 
egoistic "I-desire" model that we employed before.
I desire that I contribute to my friend's material advantage 
— Iniesire that I contribute to my friend's pleasure
I desire that I get material advantage from my friend
I desire that I get pleasure from my friend
And, in terms of this "I-desire" model, categories 1 and 3 may be 
expressed respectively:
I desire that I contribute to my friend's virtuousness
I desire that I get virtue from my friend
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According to Aristotle’s theory, character virtues are essential 
properties of human kind; a person realises more or less fully his 
human nature according as he possesses more or less fully those 
properties which count as human excellences. For this reason, the 
individual who chooses to live an excellent life chooses what is 
objectively worthy of choice; he chooses a goal that is essential to 
human beings and human lives, and he ignores as irrelevant those other 
major goals such as material advantage and pleasure which are non- 
essential to it. Clearly, then, according to Aristotle’s theory, the 
man who makes pleasure or material advantage his primary goal is making 
a mistake for he chooses what is non-essential to life and ignores what 
is essential to it. His choices are not in line with what is objec­
tively worthy of choice. It is in this way that he differs from the 
truly excellent agent, the phronimos. But from the feet that he makes 
a mistake about which goal is worthy of pursuit, it does not follow 
that he must pursue his goal selfishly or egoistically. In short, if
it is pleasure or material advantage that a man seeks, it need not be
for himself alone that he seeks it. Believing such ends as material
advantage or pleasure to be good for human beings qua human beings, he
may well direct his energies to pursuing them on behalf of his family
and friends, as well as on his own behalf. Earlier, we quoted a
passage from the Rhetoric in which Aristotle described philein:
We may describe philein towards anyone as wishing for him 
what are believed to be good things, not for your own sake, 
but for his, and being inclined as far as you can to bring 
these things-about. (My italics).
It seems quite plausible that an individual may hold the wrong beliefs
about what kinds of ends are good for human beings, but, believing
certain things to be good, such as pleasure and material advantage, may
pursue them actively on behalf of others too. He may ask himself the
question: "How may I help my friends to prosper materially and do well?"
or, "How may I help my friends live a pleasurable life?" Moreover, if
he perceives that his friends have similar tastes to himself, that they
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hold the same things valuable, and pursue the same ends, he may well 
have genuine affection for them of an unrestricted and unlimited kind.
Of course, it is quite possible that an individual who seeks such goals 
as pleasure or material advantage may do so in the selfish and egoistic 
manner that Aristotle outlines. In this case, the individual would, 
indeed, ask of any friendship: "What advantage or pleasure can I derive
from this?" and then, any affection or well-wishing would clearly be 
very negligible or entirely absent. The point is that selfishness and 
egoism is not a necessary concomitant of the pursuit of material advan­
tage or pleasure, although it may be a contingent fact that those who 
pursue such goods often do so on behalf of themselves alone.
The phronimos is the man who does what is objectively worthy of 
choice. He understands that character virtues are essential to human
life, and he, therefore, wants to excel in virtuous deeds and to accom­
plish what is finest in his nature. Is it possible that just as it is 
the case that he who chooses what is non-essential to life may do so 
selfishly or unselfishly, egoistically or altruistically, that he who 
chooses what is objectively good and worthy of choice may also do so 
selfishly or unselfishly, egoistically or altruistically? In terms of 
our "I-desire" model, may the phronimos say equally:
(a) I desire that I contribute to my friend's virtuousness 
■and '
(b) I desire that I get virtue from my friend
or may lie-say only the" first of these? If Aristotle's account of 
virtue friendship is to be seen clearly to be an advance over Plato's 
account, (b) must be rejected. In order to ascertain this, we must 
look at some relevant passages in the IŒ, and some possible challenges 
that could be levelled at them.
Aristotle argues:
If the function of a friend is to do good rather than to
be treated well ; if the performance of good deeds is the
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mark of a good man, and of excellence, and if it is 
nobler to do good to a friend than to a stranger, then
a man of high moral standards will need people to whom
he can do good. (1169bl0-13)
In this passage, Aristotle writes of the importance of benefiting a 
friend. Moreover, it is clear that if an individual practises the 
Aristotelian virtues, his friends will always benefit. In particular, 
they will benefit from the generosity, bravery etc. of his acts. But, 
it could be argued, that, in this passage, Aristotle is making the point 
that in the realm of social action, the good man qua good man cannot be 
entirely self-sufficient, for many good deeds such as generosity, magni­
ficence, and truthfulness can only be done with reference to other people
The good man’s friends thus satisfy a need ; they provide him with the
opportunity to perform good deeds and attain human excellence. This
point is made by Ashmore.
The subtle reconciliation of self-love and love for 
another reveals itself once again. ’The good man will
need people to do well by.' Consequently, in conferring
benefits upon another, he is satisfying his own needs.
The implication of Ashmore's statement is that the good man in performing
Such deeds for his friend does not make any real sacrifice. He does not
ever act contrary to his own interests; rather he acts in a way which
furthers his own interests. In this way he is able to reconcile love
for himself with love for another.
In support of this claim, reference could be made to Aristotle's
discussion of self-love. Aristotle distinguishes between, the kind of
self-love that is a matter for reproach, and that kind which is a matter
for praise. The lovers of self in the bad sense "assign to themselves
the greater share of wealth, honours and bodily pleasures" (1168bl6) .
But the lovers of self in the good sense assign to themselves "the things
that are noblest and best" (1168b29), that is, they assign to themselves
virtuous deeds. The individual who is "exceptionally devoted to the
performance of fine actions receives the approval and commendation of
all "for he both benefits himself and helps others". In contrast, the
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self-lover in the bad sense, he who attempts to assign to himself "the 
larger share of money, public honours and bodily pleasures" is reproached, 
for "he will injure both himself and his neighbours by giving way to 
base feelings".
But our imaginary critic could point out that this self-love in the 
good sense could also be a matter for reproach. Suppose that a man 
makes it his primary goal to do good deeds, and live a virtuous life; 
further, that he seizes every opportunity he can to practise such virtue. 
He may, while still wishing his friend well, and having affection for 
him on account of his virtuous character, stillj try to seize all oppor­
tunity foi"ifmse]JE_. He may see his friend as a provider of opportun! ly, 
as someone on whom he can practise good deeds so that he can attain 
excellence of character. In short, he may take the lion-share of virtue 
on each occasion. The possible criticisms to be examined are that the 
good man always considers his own interests (and does not make sacrifi­
ces) and, further, that he attends to his own attainment of excellence, 
perhaps at the expense of his friend's similar attainment. He can thus 
be "virtuous" according to Aristotle's theory, when really he is egoistic 
and selfish.
We have already noted in our discussion of virtue friendship that 
such friends typically seek to promote each others' good character, its 
development (1172all) and exercise. But, it seems, that A cannot help 
B develop or improve his good character and attain excellence by denying 
him all opportunity for the practise of virtue, for it is by practise 
'that such excellence is attained. Moreover, virtue friends are said 
to share in a life of virtue, but it seems unreasonable to suggest that 
A and B share in a virtuous life, if it is the case that A always 
monopolises the virtuous activity for himself. Aristotle, in fact, 
holds this view. He notes that the good man not only gives up to his 
friend opportunity for material wealth, political honours, and positions 
(1169a29-31) but he also
■ : ;  :
Gives up to his friend opportunity for doing fine actions
(1169a33-34)
Secondly, it seems that in Aristotle's account, self-sacrificing 
behaviour is a feature of virtue friendship. Thus, it is not the case 
that such friends consult only their own interests and never act contrary 
to them.
, But it is also true to say of the man of gopd character
that he performs many actions for the sake of his friends
and his country, and if necessary even dies for them
(1169al9)
By such an act, he sacrifices all the goods that he would have attained
and enjoyed had he continued to live. " F i v e  minutes' or an hour's
virtuous action in which he laid down his life could not outweigh the
good of years of virtue which he might still have had if he had not made
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the sacrifice in questio n" .
A more important point concerns the motivation of virtuousness.
This criticism of Aristotle makes the assumption that an individual can 
live the best life, be virtuous and engage in virtue friendship, but 
do all these things for selfish reasons. But in Aristotle's theory, the 
person who is virtuous, the phronimos^acts not for the sake of pleasure 
or advantage, but for the sake of what is noble and right. If a person
says "I want Eudaimonia, and I want it for me" he is essentially con­
cerned with his own advantage, rather than with the noble and the good. 
The goal of self-development may be a better goal than that of material 
advantage, but, in Aristotle's theory, the motivation is of equal 
importance to the goal. L
Suppose that an individual acts in accordance with some virtue, for 
example, makes a donation to a charitable organisation, but maintains 
that he has done it in order to develop his benevolence and generosity. 
And, in general, let us imagine that this individual does what he con­
siders he ought, but does so in order to,develop his own goodness. We 
would surely deny that this individual was acting in a good and virtuous 
way at all - his is rather a form of disguised egoism. In performing
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these good deeds, he is consulting only his own interests, and he is 
concerned only for his own well-being. Aristotle would agree. In 
his theory, the phronimos is the individual who does what is "objectively 
and "subjectively" correct. The former category specifies that the 
phronimos must do what he does at the right time, to the right person, 
in the right manner etc. The latter category specifies that the proper' 
act must be done with the right motive. The right motive for Aristotle 
is the noble or the good. The benefactor who makes a donation to a 
charitable organisation because it is noble or good is virtuous. He 
who makes the same donation because he enjoys thinking of himself as a 
benefactor (on account of pleasure) or because he wishes to acquire a 
virtuous character (on account of advantage) is not virtuous. The motive 
of the virtuous benefactor is clearly disinterested, while the motives 
of the other two are respectively the seeking of pleasure and advantage. 
The same is true for good deeds done to friends. If A does a generous 
deed for his friend B because he wants B to think of him as generous, or 
because he wants to develop his own goodness of character, he is not 
virtuous and he is not a true friend either. A virtue friend would 
perform a generous act disinterestedly, for the friend's own sake, for 
the sake of the goodness and rightness of the act, not for the sake of 
his own advantage or pleasure however these may be construed. As a 
result of performing such deeds, the good man derives advantage for 
himself (he develops fineness of character) but this is different from 
performing good deeds in order to develop one's benevolence or other 
aspects of one's character. The same is true of pleasure. A virtuous 
individual may derive pleasure from performing deeds of generosity or 
other good deeds for the friend's own sake, but,'in Aristotle's theory, 
the individual who performs these deeds in order to derive pleasure is 
not virtuous at all and is similarly not a true friend.
But, is it still not the case that the virtuous man in Aristotle's 
theory is acting to satisfy his own needs? Suppose he has a need to
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satisfy his own generosity. He sees a blind beggar and gives him some
money "to satisfy his generosity". Nowell-Smith points out that such
a phrase is misleading:
For if we put it in this way, we are apt to suppose that a 
man who does something "to satisfy his generosity" is con­
cerned, not with the beggar's welfare, but with his own 
satisfaction. But this phrase is a misleading way of 
saying that his motive was generosity, and this entails 
that he gives the beggar sixpence in order to relieve the 
beggar's distress. If this too is covert egoism, the 
accusation altogether loses its sting. It is à tautology 
that all my desires, inclinations, wantings, likings, and 
enjoyments are mine; but it is a plain falsehood that
what I desire, like, want or enjoy is necessarily my own
pleasure or my own anything else.35
A virtuous individual may have a need to be generous, brave or otherwise 
virtuous, but when he' acts virtuously, he does not act in order to satisfy 
his own interests or needs, but for the sake of the rightness and goodness 
of the act in question. Similarly, when he does good deeds for a friend,
he does them for the friend's own sake, to satisfy the friend's own needs
and interests, and not in order to satisfy a need of his own.
Our critic could offer a further criticism. He could point out 
that in certain passages, Aristotle seems to commit himself to the idea 
that the good man likes "to assign to himself" the "larger share of what 
is fine", "the greater good". Thus, far from making any sacrifices, 
the "good friend" always aims at taking what is best for himself. Any 
sacrifices he makes are only in order to get something of more funda­
mental value for himself, thus, they are not really sacrifices at all.
The good man is ready to lose money on condition that his 
friend shall get more; for the friend gets more, but he 
himself gains-fineness (of character), so he assigns him­
self the greater good. He behaves in the same way too 
with regard to political honours and positions; all these 
he will freely give up to his friend because this is a fine 
and praiseworthy thing for him to do (1169a27-31) (my italics)
and
He may even give up to his friend opportunities for doing 
fine actions and it may be a finer thing for him to become 
the cause of his friend's doing them than to have done them 
himself. Thus, we see that in the whole field of praise­
worthy conduct, the good man assigns himself the larger 
share of what is fine. (1169a33-1169bl) (My italics)
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In the first passage, Aristotle is talking about the sacrifices that
the good man is prepared to make for his friend. He has just said that
"the man of good character performs many actions for the sake of his
friends", including dying for them, and, in these two passages, he goes
on to enumerate some other sacrifices that the good man will malce for
his friends, and he mentions, in particular, wealth, status, political
position and the opportunity for performing fine actions. Aristotle
is enumerating these sacrifices precisely to make the point that the
individual gains the noble for himself by being to a high degree self-
sacrificing, and not ego-centred and selfish. An individual attains
what is noblest and best by being prepared to make sacrifices and in
not having selfish motives for friendship.
It is clear that statements such as "the good man assigns himself 
the larger share of what is fine" and "he assigns himself the greater 
good" leave open the question of motivation. It is possible that an 
individual may attempt to assign himself what is best, And of course, 
the criticism makes the assumption that it is just for such self- 
interested reasons that the good man acts - he aims to assign himself 
what is best. But, it is equally possible, and, indeed, more compatible 
with Aristotle’s theory of character virtue that the motivation is un­
selfish - the man who makes sacrifices of wealth, status etc. for his 
friend's sake, in order that his friend gets more of these things, gains 
what is noblest and best, by having unselfish, not selfish motivation. 
Ultimately, he assigns himself what is best only by being unselfish.
_ "We noted earlier that a character friend performs good deeds dis­
interestedly, for the friend's own sake, not for the sake of his own 
advantage or pleasure, however these may be construed. We also noted 
that, as a result of performing such deeds, the good man derives advan­
tage for himself (he develops fineness of character). It is in this 
sense that the good man "assigns himself" what is fine and what is best 
for human beings. The same would be true of pleasure. The good man
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enjoys performing good deeds, especially deeds that are intended to 
enhance the well-being of his friends. Thus, by the performance of 
such deeds, he also "assigns himself" pleasure.
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CHAPTER 2
FRIENDSHIP, JUSTICE AND CHARACTER VIRTUE
2.1 Introduction: The Peripheral Role of Friendship?
In the last chapter, we saw that it is not possible to be certain 
whether or not Aristotle believes that there is some degree of unselfish­
ness, some active concern and affection for the sake of the friend in the 
case of the lesser friendships. In contrast, we found no such 
uncertainty in the case of virtue friendships. We saw that arguments 
attempting to reduce the motivation of virtue friendship to ultimate
égocentricity and selfishness were unfounded. Such friendships are
.
typically motivated by altruism and absence of selfishness.
Virtue friendships, we noted, are formed in pursuit of a virtuous 
life; they are the kind of relationship in which the phronimos engages. 
Because such friendships are altruistic and unselfish, it would seem 
reasonable to argue ; that, in Aristotle' s theory , the truly virtuous 
man, the phronimos, is not, as some critics have claimed, egocentric and 
selfish. But such a statement is open to challenge. A critic of 
Aristotle's theory may allow that, in the virtue of friendship, Aristotle 
does make room for some degree of unselfish and even altruistic 
motivation, yet he may argue that this is all besides the point and 
largely irrelevant. It does nothing to rescue the entire theory from 
charges of egocentricity and selfishness. After all, Aristotle's 
"virtuous" individual may be able and willing to act with a view to 
the^weil-being of à few, personally chosen, good friends, while not 
being able and willing to show any such goodwill to individuals out­
side his close circle. A person may be prepared to make sacrifices for 
his family and best friends but this hardly proves his general lack of 
selfishness. It rather proves that he has "limited altruism" or what 
Hume calls "limited benevolence" . Aristotle may be concerned to 
articulate a vision of the well-lived life, and unselfish friendship may
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indeed be an essential constituent of this well-lived life, yet he who 
is virtuous, he who lives such a life, should extend his unselfishness 
beyond his own close circle. The issue of friendship is, therefore, 
merely factitous or ephemeral. Friendship may be a virtue, but it is
a minor and insignificant one. To find altruism and unselfishness in
this peripheral virtue is quite insufficient to rescue the theory as a , 
whole from allegations of selfishness and egocentricity.
Arguments and assumptions like these concerning the role of friend­
ship in Aristotle's theory have in fact been used. Aristotle's 
discussion of friendship has even been dismissed as a separate treatise 
that; somehow managed to get itself attached to his great work on ethics:
In Book 8 we are suddenly and with little explanation 
introduced to the subject of friendship which occupies this 
and the next book. These books stand in no vital relation 
to the rest of the work, and one is left with the suspicion 
that they may have been originally a separate treatise which 
faulty editing has included in the Ethics.^
In order to rescue Aristotle's theory from the charge of pure selfishness^ 
we need to show that there is a strong other-regarding tendency in one 
of his key and significant character virtues. To show that there is 
such a tendency in some minor and ephemeral virtue would not do very much 
to rescue the theoryi Clearly, if Ross's point quoted above is true, 
that is, if the virtue of friendship is of'no significance and stands in 
no vital relation to his theory, then this is all that we have succeeded 
in doing; We would have established that Aristotle allows that in one 
quite insignificant area in his life, that is, in his personal friend­
ships , the good man_ will be prepared to act unself ishly by giving due 
consideration to his friend's interests. It is therefore important to 
look at the virtue of friendship in context. In this chapter we shall 
try to establish what role the virtue of friendship plays in Aristotle's 
ethical theory, whether, in particular, it has any relationship to 
virtue as such, and to any of the particular virtues such as that of 
justice. In short, we want to establish whether the virtue of friend­
ship is central or peripheral to Aristotle's theory.
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2.2 The Incompatibility of Friendship and Justice?
Aristotle argues that there is a strong relationship between 
friendship and justice. Certainly it is clear that both are "social 
virtues". Whereas it is possible to be temperate, brave or resourceful 
in the absence of other people, one cannot be just or a good friend in 
the absence of others. Lucas points out that "Robinson Crusoe had no , 
opportunity of practising justice or injustice until Man Friday came on 
the scene"^. We could add that Robinson Crusoe had no opportunity for 
friendship until Man Friday came on the scene. As social virtues both 
friendship and justice require other people as a sine qua non.
However, the simple condition that two virtues require other people 
as a  sine qua non is not enough to establish a strong link between them. 
Mercy and compassion also require other people as a sine qua non, but 
they do not seem to be vitally connected to justice. Indeed, they seem 
to be very different virtues.
Similarly, we would be inclined to separate justice and friendship 
very firmly, to put them into separate camps, and to do so on the 
following kind of grounds. Friendship differs from justice in that if 
I chose not to befriend you, you would have no cause for complaint, 
whereas if I were unjust to you,you would. My reasons for engaging in 
friendship are less coercive than those requiring me to be just. 
Friendship is based on first4personal reasons. If I choose not to 
engage in friendships, not to be friendly towards anybody, if consider­
ations of friendship do not move me to action, no further argument is in 
-place; whereas arguments of justice, in contrast, can be put into every 
person, second and third, as well as first, and urged unremittingly on
me, however disinclined I am to heed them. ’'Justice’!, as Lucas says,
4
" is what we can insist on" . 1  can insist on being treated justly.
But I cannot insist that another befriend me. Unwilling justice is 
still justice. , I can fulfil my obligations of justice in a grudging 
way. It might be better if I do the same deeds gladly, but justice is
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satisfied if I do them at all. In this way justice is a cold virtue
and an external one. In contrast, friendship, like fraternity is an
inward, warm virtue. , Lucas says:
Justice is not fraternity because fraternity is a warm 
virtue concerned with fellow-feeling, whereas justice 
is a cold virtue which can be manifested without 
feeling ...^
If I fulfil certain obligations of friendship but without the warm spirit
or good will of friendship, it is no longer friendship. Unwilling
friendship is not friendship, but unwilling justice is still justice.
With these ideas and distinctions in mind, let us turn to Aristotle's
account of the relationship between friendship and justice.
In Aristotle's accountyfriendship and justice do not resemble each
other merely because both are social virtues. There is a much more
intimate relation between these two virtues. Aristotle argues:
Friendship and justice seem to be exhibited in the same 
sphere of conduct and between the same persons (1159b25-28)
And
It is natural that the claims of justice should increase 
with the intensity of friendship, since both involve the 
same persons and have an equal extension; (1160a7-8)
Why is it the case that justice and friendship should be exhibited
between the same people? And why is it the case that the one virtue
should be present to the extent that the other one is present so that
the more intense the friendship the more intense is'the claim of justice?^
To answer these questions we must look briefly at Aristotle's
account of justice. We have seen how he distinguishes between the
s.epara1re”classes"bf friendship. We must now investigate the different
classes of justice with a view to establishing whether any of the classes
of friendship cohere with any of the classes of justice.
Aristotle opens his discussion of justice by defining it as "that
state of character which disposes (people) to perform just acts and
behave in a just manner, and wish for what is just". (1129a7-10) He
then distinguishes between two main classes of justice: (1) Complete
ÿKSiilMsgX
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(or legal) justice and (2) Particular justice.
2.3 The Two Types of Justice
2.3,1 Complete Justice
Aristotle proceeds to identify complete justice with "legality"
and, for this reason, complete or universal justice is also called
legal justice. He says that the man who is lawless, grasping and
unfair (unequal) is unjust, whereas the just man is law-abiding and
fair. He concludes by saying that "just means lawful and fair; and
unjust means both unlawful and unfair". (1129a32-34)
This identification of complete justice with law has led some
philosophers to believe that complete justice is not an ethical concept
at all. Thus Joachim assumes that Aristotle’s legal just ice was a
7
description of Athenian legal structures and practices, and, in
similar vein, Vinogradoff argues in his history of jurisprudence that
8
Aristotle gave complete justice a narrow legalistic interpretation .
Are their views correct? Or, is it the case that by "complete justice' 
and ’’law" Aristotle means something quite distinct from the modern con­
cept of law with its narrow juridical sense?
We have seen that Aristotle opens his discussion of justice with 
a definition. Justice is"that state of character that disposes 
(people) to perform just acts, and behave in a just manner, and wish 
for what is just". Justice is thus a moral habit or disposition. It 
is aTvirtue. Harrison, challenging Joachim's narrow legalistic view,
stresses this point. Justice is before all else a moral habit, and not
9
a science or faculty, a crucial distinction that Aristotle makes .
It is also the case that Aristotle’s concept of law is something 
much wider than mere positive law. Law, in this broad sense, is an 
expression of the ethos of the community and cannot be identified with 
its later restricted notion of legal enactment. Aristotle says that
the law commands men to practise the virtues of courage, temperance,
gentleness and all the other virtues, and to refrain from acts of
wickedness (1129b20-25). The law, as Barker points out, prescribes
ethical conduct :
The law enjoins courage, and continence and consideration.
It speaks about every virtue and vice, commanding and for­
bidding. Its rules are laid down in political science, 
as the standard of what men should do, and what they should 
forbear to do. As the moral code of a community, law sets 
forth the end, the Final Good, which that community pursues.
The content of the law being thus identified with that of
morality, it follows that action in accordance with that 
content, or justice, is equivalent to action in accordance 
with the content of morality, or virtue.
Thus both law and complete justice are ethical concepts. It is in the
concept of the "flourishing of the community" that Aristotle sees the
link between the virtue of complete justice and law. The law aims at
the good of the community. (1129bl4-15) Similarly, "in one of its
senses, the term ’just’ is applied to anything that produces or preserves
the happiness, or the component parts of the happiness, of the political
community". (1129bl7-19) The sense of justice that Aristotle has in
mind, as he makes clear a few lines later, is complete justice. Acts
of complete justice aim at the well-being of the community. Both law
and complete justice promote the common welfare and advantage and,
thereby, promote Eudaimonia in the society (1129bl4-15).
After linking the concepts of complete justice and law, Aristotle
analyses the relationship between complete justice and the other
character virtues. Complete justice, he says, is complete virtue
(1130al0)_. It is-thus the totality of virtue, and not a part of it.
He then adds the crucial qualifying phrase: "but not absolutely, but
(only) in relation to others". (1129b26). It is this "relationship to
others’’, this dimension of plurality that distinguishes complete justice
from all the other character virtues. Complete justice is not merely a
quantitative aggregate of all possible virtues; there is an important
qualitative difference involved. Complete justice is complete virtue
not with respect to an agent's acts towards himself, but with respect to
4 : ' ; ' 4;;V '  ^V, ' ', : ; #  ;
those towards others. It has an essentially other-regarding aspect.
It is for this reason that Aristotle comments that a man cannot commit 
injustice against himself in the strict sense. He cannot do so because 
the significant dimension of relationship to others would be lacking.
We may thus say of the virtuous man, that qua doing the right thing, 
virtue is present, but qua doing the right thing in relation to others, . 
complete justice is present.
It would appear that by arguing that virtue can become complete 
justice only when it is exercised in relation to others, Aristotle is 
attributing an important other-regarding or altruistic quality to 
complete justice. But some critics may challenge this interpretation. 
They may argue that the condition of "in relation to others" does 
nothing to prove that Aristotle’s ideal man, the completely just man, 
is not selfish and self-regarding. Aristotle has merely offered a 
rationally thought-out, sensible way, of garnering the good things of 
life simply because short-term, unenlightened selfishness is often self- 
defeating. Because he sees that the "direct" method of gaining increase 
for oneself does not succeed, he proposes an "indirect" way of profiting
the self by first profiting someone else in an other-directed act of 
11
justice
Such an interpretation is not supported by what Aristotle says about
complete justice. He writes that the individual who practises the
virtue of complete justice is virtuous in the "fullest" sense (1129b31) 
for he acts with a view to the good of others and not for his own good 
' alone. He notes that "there are plenty of people who can behave 
virtuously in their own affairs, but who are incapable of doing so in 
relation to someone else". (1129b32-1130al) But the "best person is
not the one who exercises his virtue towards himself but the one who 
exercises it towards another, because this is a difficult task". 
(1130a8-ll) It could, of course, be suggested that this individual is 
’’best" because he is selfish in an enlightened way, and that it is "more
54
difficult" to be self-seeking in this way than to pursue one’s own good
directly. But this is not what Aristotle is saying. He is making a
straightforward distinction between the individual who can satisfy his
own interests and needs by practising virtues that aim at his own good,
and the individual who can look beyond his own needs to the interests
12
and cares of others, and can exercise virtue for their good . It is . 
easy to be selfish and self-regarding, but it is "difficult" to be 
selfless and altruistic for there is always a temptation to seek one's 
own good in preference to the good of others. "Justice", he says, 
"secures advantage for another person"; it is for "someone else's 
good". (1130a3-5)
In proposing the virtue of justice as the virtue which is most 
complete or perfect precisely because it is other-directed, Aristotle 
is recognising that an individual can increase his own worth only by 
going outside himself. It is from the outside that qualities of good­
ness can enter the individual. But, as explained in èKapter oiiej. 
this is not the same as saying that an individual looks outside himself 
in order to profit himself or attain what is best. The individual who 
does the latter is still concerned exclusively with his own advantage.
2.3.2 Particular Justice
Justice in this sense is but one part of the multitude of virtues 
and, as such, is only a part of complete justice. It is that part of 
it which is especially concerned with "matters of honour, material goods 
and personal security or safety". It thus has a narrower scope than 
complete justice. (1130a32-1130b5)
Particular justice may itself be distinguished into types. On 
the one hand, there is distributive justice which is found in the 
"distribution of honour, wealth, and other divisible assets of the 
community which may be allotted among its members" (1130b31-34) while, 
on the other hand, there is that type of particular justice which "has
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a rectifying function in private transactions". (1130b30-113IaJ) The 
essential feature of both these kinds of particular justice is fairness or 
equality, although what is meant by these terms is different in the two 
cases.
2.3.2.1 Distributive Justice
In the case of distributive justice, the equality in question is 
that provided by what Aristotle calls a "geometric proportion". To 
•express the proportional equality of distributive justice at least four 
terms are needed: two persons for whom it is just and two shares which
are just. Proportional equality is a merit-determined relationship 
between persons and the goods distributed. This is to say that the just 
distribution of the divisible assets of the community is that in which 
what is distributed is proportional to the persons involved. The ratio
between the shares will be the same as the ratio between the persons.
Thus if A and B are equal their shares will be equal, but if either A or
B is superior (inferior) to the other, his share will be greater (less)
and in the same ratio as the difference between them. (1131a20-29)
Thus, for Aristotle, the equal in the case of distributive justice is 
not an egalitarian concept but rather a proportional one based vupon the 
differences between the individuals in question.
In order to offer a solution to the problem of merit as the basis
of distributive justice, Aristotle gives as an example the distribution
13
of flutes. (1282b32-1283a?) If a number of flute-players are equally 
skilled in the art, _no advantage should be given to those who are better 
born, better looking or wealthier than the others who lack such advan­
tages. The reason is that these advantages do not make them better 
flute-players. Thus, he concludes> "it is the superior performers who 
ought to be given the superior instruments". Distributive justice con­
sists in giving to each man what is fitting or appropriate in the 
circumstances. Everyone should get what he deserves. (1131a25 and
1281b32)
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2.3.2.2 Corrective or Rectifying Justice
Aristotle defines corrective justice as that particular justice
which "plays a rectifying part in transactions between man and man".
(1131al) These transactions take place within the private sphere and
between citizens. Whereas distributive justice is concerned with the
distribution of common goods to individuals, for such justice is a
relationship between the community and the individual, corrective justice
14
concerns the transactions between individuals within the community .•
But the two forms of particular justice do not differ only in this respect . 
They also differ in what is meant by fairness or equality. As dis­
tributive justice is concerned with the individuating features of the 
individual^ and awards him according to his degree of relevant excellence, 
it is best expressed as a ’’geometrical, proportional equality or fair­
ness". In the case of corrective justice, on the other hand, the 
equality or fairness in question is best expressed by an "arithmetic 
proportion". (1132a3-4) Again this is not an egalitarian concept 
(there is no claim that everyone must be given exactly the same thing) 
but neither is it the same as a geometric proportion. If two people 
enter into a transaction, their share should be equal both before and 
after the transaction. Thus, if I steal from you, the amount stolen 
must be returned so that we have the same amount we started with (perhaps 
you should also get some additional compensation for the inconvenience 
you suffered) whereas if I buy some olives from you, I must pay you 
exactly what they are worth, so that there is neither loss nor gain in 
- ôürtransaction. In the case of corrective justice, the positions of 
the persons involved relative to each other is not considered. Each man 
has a right to the amount of goods he started with, and this element 
alone is taken into account. The point is that corrective justice 
considers each man as a member of the human species^^, and from this 
vantage point every man is arithmetically equal to every other without 
difference. The character of the agents involved or their particular
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skills and capacities do not influence the amount which is to be 
transferred from one agent to the other.
In Aristotle’s account, then, there are two kinds of equality or 
fairness: geometrical and arithmetical. In arithmetical equality or
fairness, not two ratios but two amounts are equal; it is a question of 
subtraction and addition, and not of division. He says "the equal is a. 
mean by way of arithmetical proportion between the greater and the less". 
If the two equal persons are A and B, and C is the common amount of gain 
for A through the loss of the same inflicted on B by A, then equality 
between A and B is restored by the subtraction of C from A and by its 
simultaneous addition to B.
Aristotle divides corrective justice into voluntary and involuntary 
transactions. (1131al-2) Lee points out that this distinction seems 
to correspond to that between contract and tort in English law, or to 
that between obligationes ex contractu and ex delicto in Roman law . 
Voluntary transactions are those in which the actions of the persons 
involved are voluntary, for example, selling, lending, leasing, or 
depositing, whereas/ in involuntary transactions, at least one of the 
persons involved has been the involuntary victim of some kind of behaviour 
such as theft, poisoning or defamation.
It would appear, as Burnet and Vinogradoff point out, that the
arithmetical equality or fairness of corrective justice - that is, seeking
adjustment by transferring gain to the side of loss to compensate for 
material inequalities - could be used only in the case of voluntary 
— transactions, but not in the case of involuntary transactions since, in
the latter case, the aggrieved party suffers not only material damage,
17
but also,dishonour . I t  is undeniable that Aristotle’s treatment of 
involuntary transactions as a species of corrective justice which 
rectifies inequalities on a merely arithmetical basis is rather puzzling. 
Trude offers an ingenious solution to this problem . He argues that 
Aristotle not only distinguishes between private and public justice, but
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also between civil and penal justice. Corrective justice, he argues, 
is not only private—  in contradistinction to public - but also civil 
- in contradistinction to penal - justice. Penal justice functions 
according to the principle of geometric proportion, punishing according 
to the individual deserts of the criminal, over and above material 
restitution: it gives retribution according to the measure of guilt.
In contrast, corrective justice aims not at the rectification of dis­
honour, but is concerned only with the rectification of material wrongs, 
apart from punishment. This material, arithmetical equality or fairness 
demands that if a bed is stolen, a bed be returned, apart from the 
dishonour suffered. The aggrieved party is to be compensated for the 
material loss (where this is possible); further compensation for 
humiliation endured does not fall within the domain of corrective 
justice. , Corrective justice supplies the civil effects of criminal 
law; while Aristotle leaves its penal effects to reciprocal justice.
2.3.2.3 Reciprocal Justice
Aristotle’s discussion of reciprocal justice, as Hardie points out,
has caused a great deal of confusion owing to the "unsuccessful attempts
of certain commentators to locate it within one or other of Aristotle's
19
two main divisions of particular justice" . Commentators, in other 
words, are divided into two camps: those who maintain that Aristotle
presents three distinct kinds of particular justice, and those who think 
that he has only two species of it: distributive and corrective,
reciprocal justice,Jiot being a separate kind. The reason for this 
divergence of opinion is rooted in the fact that Aristotle is naturally 
read as saying that particular justice is of two kinds, distributive and 
corrective (1130b31-1131al). However, he also states clearly that 
"reciprocity does not coincide either with distributive or corrective 
justice - although people want to identify it with the latter when they 
quote the rule of Rhadamanthus ... for in many cases reciprocity is at 
variance with corrective justice" (1130b31-1131al). Aristotle thus
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begins his short digression on reciprocal justice with a warning that 
contradicts his earlier remark, and his subsequent discussion shows that 
the earlier remark needs qualification.
It is clear that the various kinds of justice have their own dis­
tinctive kinds of equality or fairness. To each kind of equality or 
fairness, there is a corresponding kind of justice. In other words, .
there are exactly as many kinds of justice as there are of equality or 
fairness. Aristotle lists geometric fairness (proportion) for distri­
butive justice, arithmetical fairness (proportion) for corrective justice, 
and since he presents a third kind of fairness, reciprocal fairness
20
(proportion), this would, as Jolif and Gauthier, and Ritchie point out , 
positively argue for a distinct type of particular justice which, although 
unnamed by Aristotle, could be called "reciprocal justice". Ritchie 
writes :
We have three distinct mathematical formulae: (1) direct
geometrical proportion (2) arithmetical proportion - or, 
more properly, the finding of the arithmetical mean, and 
(3) reciprocal proportion; and we may reasonably expect 
to find a separate division of justice corresponding to 
each.
This reciprocal proportion is symbolised mathematically in the same way
22^
by Jolif and Gauthier, Heath and Ross . Ross writes "'Reciprocal 
proportion' involves simply a re-arrangement of the terms of a geometric 
proportion. If A:B = C:D, A. and B are said to be in a geometric proportion 
to C and D, and A, D in reciprocal proportion to B and C". Whereas 
arithmetical equality or fairness in justice is the mathematical 
expression of the-specific numerical equality of all men, precisely as
members of the human species, reciprocal equality or fairness, like
geometric equality or fairness, is based upon the individuating merits 
(or demerits) of persons.
It appears, further, that there are two distinct kinds of reciprocal 
justice. (Aristotle does not explicitly divide reciprocal justice into
two kinds, but, as he uses reciprocal proportion for establishing justice
in meting out punishment and in exchanging goods, this division is
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implied by him), We shall look at penal (retaliatory) justice and
commercial justice in turn.
Trude argueSj as we have seen, that penal justice is to be conceived
of as complementary to corrective justice. While corrective justice 
seeks to rectify material damage (if any) inflicted by the commission of 
a crime, penal justice seeks to make good the wrong done to the aggrieve^ 
party in the form of punishment over and above the arithmetical equal­
isation of unjust loss and gain. Thus, the equalisation of material 
wrongs in involuntary transactions (of corrective justice) is effected 
through arithmetical equality or fairness, but the dishonour is compen­
sated for by the restoration of equilibrium according to the reciprocal 
proportion of penal justice ; The civil effects of material restitution 
are supplemented by the penal effects of punishment.
The clearest statement of reciprocal proportion in penal justice is 
to be found in NE Book 5 chapter 5. Aristotle writes:
For example, if an official strikes someone, it is wrong for 
him to be struck in return; and if someone strikes an 
official It is right for him not only to be struck in return 
but to be punished as well. Again it makes a great difference 
whether the act was voluntary or involuntary (1132b28-31) .
The simple arithmetical fairness or equality of corrective justice is 
inadequate to restore equilibrium. The principle of reciprocal prop­
ortion must be used and, according to its correct application, account 
must be taken of the positions of the persons involved.
The second kind of reciprocal justice is "commercial justice". 
Aristotle expressly says that in associations for the exchange of services 
this sort of justice (reciprocal justice) which holds men together is 
based upon reciprocal proportion and not upon arithmetical proportion or 
equality (1132b21-23). There is disagreement among commentators on the 
basic point of the worth of individuals involved in commercial exchange. 
The reason for this is that in a commercial exchange of goods, it would 
appear that there is only a question of maintaining arithmetical
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proportion or equality. Thus, it is not immediately clear what sense 
it makes to say A:B=C:D. A and B, as the humans involved, do not seem 
to belong In the equation in the same sense in which they belong in an 
equation representing either distributive or penal justice. Distributive 
justice is a function of the merit of the people who are its beneficiaries, 
and penal justice is a function of the demerits of certain categories of 
people such as aggressors, but it seems that the reciprocity in commercial 
exchange has nothing to do with the people, but only with the products 
they wish to exchange. But Aristotle explicitly says at 1133a33-bl that 
"reciprocity will be attained when the terms have been equalised, and 
when, as a result, the product of the shoemaker is to the product of the 
farmer as the farmer is to the shoemaker".
The most plausible explanation is that the difference in the economic 
value of the products D and C is the direct result of the difference in 
the economic value of the producing artisans, but not vice-versa. The 
kind of producer determines the kind of product produced, both in quality 
and quantity. The exchange of goods in commercial justice comes about 
only because producers are different in terms of different skills.
Through these different skills, or economic values of the producers, 
different products are created, whose market value is a reflection of 
the economic worth of the producers. This difference in the economic 
value of producers and their products leads to the commercial exchange 
of goods and services.
Aristotle notes that people with different skills, not two doctors, 
"but a doctor and a farmer, would be involved in commercial exchange.
In economic value or skill, they are not equal and must be equated before 
the necessary exchange can take place between them (1133al7-18) . (If 
two people with identical skills and products were to engage in trading 
the same kinds of products among themselves, they presumably would have 
no difficulty in relying upon arithmetical proportion.) Among different 
producers and their products, Aristotle lists such pairs as a farmer and
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a shoemaker trading shoes for food (1133a33-35, 1133b5-6) and a weaver
and a shoemaker exchanging their products. He also gives the case of 
trading a house for beds, presumably between a builder and a carpenter 
(1133b23-25).
2.4 Conclusion; The Two Types of Justice
We must complete this brief account of the types of justice by pin­
pointing the similarities and differences between complete and particular 
justice. We may begin by quoting Aristotle:
It is manifest that there is another sort of injustice apart 
from injustice as a whole (complete injustice), the first 
being a part of the latter. It is called by the same name 
because its definition falls in the same genus, both sorts 
of injustice being exhibited in a man's relationship with 
others; but whereas injustice in the particular sense is 
concerned with honour or money or safety - or whatever term 
we may employ to include all these things - its motive being 
the pleasure that arises from gain, injustice in the general 
sense (i.e. complete injustice) is concerned with all the 
things with which the good man is concerned. (1130a34-1130b5)
In order to shed light on the reverse side of this coin, Aristotle adds :
"It is clear, then, that there is more than one kind of justice, and
that the term 'justice' has another meaning besides virtue ap a whole"
(1130b5-8). In other words, what is the case in respect of the
relationship and nature of injustice, in general (i.e. complete injustice)
and in particular, holds also for justice in general and in particular,
but in reverse. The distinguishing characteristic of justice, both as
general and particular is identified as its "other-relatedness". It is
this-feafure which identifies both as justice, that links them together,
and at the same time distinguishes them from the other virtues. But
there is a difference in the extent of this other-relatedness which
distinguishes the two sorts of justice from each other: complete justice
takes a global view of all the things that belong to the good life of the
community in general, whereas particular justice deals with particular
goods in rendering each individual that which is his due.
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In particular justice, the scope of the other-relatedness is 
limited to certain kinds of goods - "material goods" such as wealth, 
property, honours and positions. In contrast, in complete justice, the 
scope of the other-relatedness is not limited to these kinds of goods 
alone. The individual who plans a military campaign and fights bravely 
throughout acts in accordance with the virtue of complete justice, but 
his completely just conduct is aimed not at the material well-being of 
the community, but at its.autonomy and its honour. Of course, as 
complete justice ^is concerned with all the things with which the good 
man is concerned^ it will include material benefits to the community
(or part of it) as well. Thus, the individual who makes a donation to
' 22 
a charitable organisation also performs an act of complete justice
We have seen that Aristotle emphasises the principle of "proportion" 
or "due" In his discussion of particular justice, but that in his dis­
cussion of complete justice he emphasises the principle of "relationship 
to others". We have already seen what "proportion" or "due" means in 
the various kinds of particular justice. The key element appears to 
be that of fair and equitable treatment. But when we attempt to apply 
"due" or "proportion" to complete justice, we find that it reduces to an 
almost metaphorical sense ; Indeed , it seems odd to talk about "due" or 
"proportion" at all, for what is "due" to the community at large in the 
case of complete justice seems to be a whole attitude expressive of 
readiness on the part of the individual to respond in the most positive 
and whole-hearted way to the needs of the community. Thus, the principle 
jof "due^br "proportion" has a stronger and more meaningful application 
in the case of particular justice. When we turn to the principle of the 
"other", we find the reverse to be true. The sense of "other" is much 
stronger in the case of complete justice. The individual who acts with 
a view to the well-being of the community, and who is prepared to undergo 
great personal loss to achieve this end is considering the "other" in 
the fullest way possible. Of course, the individual who desires to
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treat another fairly and equitably, and, therefore, pays back the money 
he has borrowed from him or returns to him something of commensurate 
value for a service or good received does consider the other's good too, 
but the emphasis is more upon not leaving the other worse off, not doing 
him down, rather than expressly benefiting him or promoting his well­
being. Further, such fair and equitable action is not generally 
associated with great personal sacrifice.
It is clear that an ."attitude expressive of readiness to respond 
positively and whole-heartedly to the needs of the community" and acting 
to ’’benefit the community" are much more altruistic intentions and 
motivations than giving others "their due", what one "owes" them, or not 
leaving them ^worse off". The former requires a much more positive 
spirit of goodwill.
2.5 The Relation Between Justice and Friendship
Now that we have investigated briefly the various types of justice
in Aristotle's theory, we can return to the main topic which is the
relationship between justice and friendship. We noted that Aristotle
asserted a very close relationship between the two virtues and claimed
that the two virtues were exhibited in the same sphere of conduct and
between the same persons, and that it was natural that the claims of
justice should increase with the intensity of the friendship.
Friendship and justice seem to be exhibited in the same 
sphere of conduct and between the same persons; because 
_ ^in every community there is supposed to be some kind of 
justice and also some friendly feeling ... The proverb 
"Friends have all things in common" is quite right because 
friendship is based on community. Brothers and close com­
rades hold all their possessions in common, and all friends 
share specified things to a greater or less extent, because 
friendships too differ in degree. The claims of justice 
also differ. The duties of parents to children are not the 
same as those of brothers to one another, nor are the duties 
the same for comrades as for fellow-citizens. Hence the 
wrongs committed against these several types of friend differ 
too; they are aggravated in proportion to the degree of 
intimacy. For example, it is more serious to defraud a
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comrade than a fellow-citizen, and to refuse help to a 
brother than a stranger; and to strike your father than 
anybody else. It is natural that the claims of justice 
should increase with the intensity of the friendship, 
since both involve the same persons and have an equal 
extension. (1159b25-1160a8)
We must first clarify which kind of justice and which kind of 
friendship Aristotle has in mind. In respect of justice, it is 
surely clear that Aristotle is not discussing particular justice in any 
of its forms. Let us take distributive justice first as it seems very 
clear that he cannot be discussing this form of particular justice.
2.5.1 Particular Justice and Friendship : The Problem of Bias
We saw that distributive justice has as its subject matter the just
distribution among the members of the community of those benefits (and
23a
burdens) that are assignable and privative (exclusive) in nature . No
issue of distributive justice can arise over non-assignable goods like
truth, or over non-privative (non-exclusive) ones like happiness,
health and knowledge/ for if A is healthy, this does not prevent B's
being healthy, and if C is happy, he can invite D to share his happiness,
so that his own happiness is not diminished thereby, but may actually 
23b
be enhanced . But neither can an issue of distributive justice
arise over those kinds of goods that are so abundant that every man can
have all that he could ever Üesire. N o  issue of distributive justice,
therefore, arises over, for example, the air we breathe. In normal
conditions, if A takes more air than usual, he does not leave B and G
short T ^ and he doies^not thereby infringe their rights or damage their
interests. The goods that are at issue in distributive justice are
typically assignable, transferable, privative, and in short supply, so
that if I have more; you or somebody else must have less, and it makes
24
sense to maintain that I should give you some of mine, or vice versa . 
If such goods are to be assigned justly, they must be assigned 
according to known and public criteria. Aristotle suggests, as we saw,
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a merit-determined relationship between persons and the goods 
distributed. If A and B are equal, their shares will be equal, but 
if either A or B is superior (inferior) to the other, his share will 
be greater (less) , and in the same ratio as the difference between them. 
Aristotle's example is that of the flute-players. Flutes must be dis­
tributed according to merit or excellence in flute-playing. In more . 
modern terms, we could say that scholarships in a musical academy 
should be awarded to those with the highest musical or performing 
abilities. They should not be awarded on the grounds of irrelevant 
criteria, for example, because the applicant is wealthy, good-looking 
or the best friend of the principal of the academy. This is the crucial 
point. If the absolute basis of distribution is merit or excellence, 
it cannot also be philia or friendship. If an award is made on the 
grounds of merit or excellence, it cannot also be true that it is made 
on the grounds of friendship. It could, of course, be the case that 
the finest performer is also the principal's best friend, but the basis 
of the award, if it is a just one, would be merit not friendship. To 
make an award, not on the grounds of merit, but because the applicant 
is a best friend or relative is nepotism and a paradigm case of 
injustice. Aristotle clearly sees this for he says : "it is the
superior performers who ought to be given superior instruments". The 
point is that the claims of distributive justice cannot increase with 
the intensity of the friendship. A person endowed with the power to 
distribute the divisible assets of the community whether this be medals , 
ships, flutes, or anything else, cannot favour his friends and push 
their claims forward. In sum* the intensity of the friendship is 
irrelevant on Aristotle's own criteria, and it would contradict merit 
as the absolute ground of distribution.
I think that a similar argument could be proposed in respect of 
corrective justice. Again such justice cannot increase with the 
intensity of the friendship. We saw that, if two people enter into a
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transaction; their shares should be equal both before and after the 
transaction. If I buy some olives from you, I must pay you exactly 
what they are worth so that there is neither gain nor loss in our trans­
action. Similarly, if I steal from you, the amount stolen must be 
returned so that we both have the same amount that we started with. We 
also saw that the positions of the persons relative to each other is 
not considered, but each man has a right to the amount of goods he 
started with, and this element alone is taken into account. The 
character, and the special abilities of the parties are irrelevant. If 
this is so, the fact of friendship can make no difference. Similarly, 
the intensity of the friendship can make no difference. If A and B 
enter into a sales transaction in which A buys some olives from B, A 
must pay B what they are worth so that there is neither gain nor loss 
on either side. A must do this whether B is his best friend or a 
person scarcely known to him; In sum; the intensity of the friendship 
is irrelevant in corrective justice.
The same is true of penal justice. The claims of friendship are 
completely irrelevant to this kind of public and criminal justice. The 
judge who is called upon to try such cases can no more reduce or waive 
the penalty because the man who committed the assault is his close 
friend than he can make the penalty harsher because the man who committed 
the assault is somebody he personally dislikes. If penalties are to be 
measured according to reciprocal proportion, they cannot also be measured 
according to the claims of friendship. The intensity of the friendship 
is irrelevant on Aristotle's own criteria, and would contradict 
reciprocal proportion as the absolute ground of this kind of justice.
The idea that like penalties should be meted out for like crimes was as 
familiar to the Greeks as it is to us. " I t  is just"y Isocrates writes, 
"that those who attempt to commit the same crimes should pay the same 
penalty"^®.
It is unlikely that it is particular justice in any of its forms
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that Aristotle has in mind when he claims that there is an intimate
relationship between justice and friendship. In all the forms of 
particular justice, the criteria used are impersonal and disinterested. 
We cannot show favour to our friends and even greater favour to our 
closest friends. In our friendships we may be partial and choose our 
own criteria, explaining to nobody else the grounds of our choice. In , 
justice we must be impartial and choose according to impersonal and 
known criteria - according to geometric proportion in the case of dis­
tributive justice, according to arithmetical proportion in the case of 
corrective justice, and according to reciprocal proportion in the case 
of penal and commercial justice.
2.5.2 Complete Justice and Friendship:
The Problem of Bias Eliminated
If we rule out the various forms of particular justice, we are left
with complete justice. There is much evidence to suggest that this is
the type of justice that Aristotle had in m i n d . I n  discussing the
justice and friendship that a King can show his subjects, he says :
That of a King for his subjects consists in outstanding 
beneficence; because he does good to his subjects 
(assuming that, being good himself, he is concerned to 
promote their welfare, like a shepherd caring for his 
flock - which is why Homer called Agamemnon 'shepherd 
of the people'). , (1161all-15)
Aristotle is suggesting that a good king can do good to his subjects in
a variety of ways. "Outstanding beneficence" and the promotion of
well-being is something much greater than distributive and corrective
justrfce"(or both of these forms of particular justice combined). A
good king would certainly be just in his transactions and distribute
honours fairly, but to be outstandingly beneficent and to promote the
welfare of his subjects, he would have to do much more than that. He
may have to show great bravery, and great generosity as well and
perhaps more than that. In short, the good king would have to practise
virtue (in its entirety) in relation to others (his subjects) - and
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this, of course, is the virtue of complete justice. The kind of 
justice that the good king practises in relation to his subjects is 
not merely particular justice; . it is complete justice. The kind of 
justice Aristotle is discussing when he says that friendship and 
justice are related to each other is complete justice. That this is 
so may be seen from other comments Aristotle makes. Again, discussing , 
the relationship of the two virtues, he says "It is more serious to 
refuse help to a comrade than to a fellow-citizen". "Help" seems to 
be more a component of complete justice than it does a component of 
particular justice. For to give a person help whether this be to help 
them financially by an act of generosity, or to help them in another way, 
for example, by an act of bravery^is something that exceeds what is 
required by particular justice whose content we have already investigated.
If it is complete justice, and not particular justice, the problem 
of bias disappears. We saw that it did not make sense to argue that 
the claims of justice should increase with the intensity of the friend­
ship in the case of particular justice as this would be inconsistent 
with the geometric proportion that is supposed to hold in the case of 
distributive justice, with the arithmetic proportion that is supposed to 
hold in the case of corrective justice, and with the reciprocal proportion 
that is supposed to hold in the case of reciprocal justice. With com­
plete justice the case is very different. Whereas a man must be just 
(in the sense of particular justice) to all, his friends and strangers 
alike, there is no reason why he should not be especially virtuous to 
those who are his family or his close friends. Why indeed should he 
not be especially brave in defence of, or especially generous towards, 
those for whom he has special affection? Every man can insist that he 
be given that which he is owed - for example, payment for a service 
agreed upon - but great bravery or great generosity, for example, cannot 
be insisted upon for they are over and above what one man owes another. 
They are,therefore,freely given. It is for the agent himself to decide
towards whom such virtuous deeds be directed. It is surely clear that 
it is right to do more of such deeds for those for whom one has great 
affection than for those whom one scarcely knows.
This view that it is complete justice and not particular justice 
that is under discussion may, of course, be questioned for the following 
reason. Aristotle says:
For example, it is more serious to defraud a comrade than
a fellow citizen, and to refuse help to a brother than to
a stranger, and to strike your father than anybody else.
(1160a4-8)
Whereas help may fall outside the scope of particular justice, fraud and 
assault clearly fall within it, fraud being covered by corrective 
justice, and assault\by both reciprocal and corrective justice. It may 
surely then be argued that it ^ p a r t i c u l a r  justice that is under dis­
cussion , or, possibly, complete justice and particular justice together. 
We saw that, for Aristotle, complete justice is the practice of complete 
virtue in relation to one’s fellow men. As such, it includes all the 
particular virtues and, thus, includes particular justice. One thus 
commits an act of (corrective) injustice whether one defrauds a comrade 
or fellow citizen, and one commits an act of (reciprocal and corrective) 
injustice whether one assaults one’s father or a stranger. From the 
point of view of corrective and reciprocal justice, these wrongs must 
be remedied by the relevant proportions in all cases; it does not 
depend upon whether the wrong was done to a friend or stranger. However, 
from the point of view of complete justice, the case is different.Here 
we are expected to._be more virtuous to those for whom we have the most 
affection; or whom we know best. Defrauding a friend thus remains an 
act of corrective injustice, and assaulting one’s father remains an act 
of corrective and reciprocal injustice, but because we have special 
duties to those who are our family and friends, and should have greater 
affection for them, we are adding other wrongs to the wrong of particular 
injustice. In addition we are being ungrateful and undutiful (or, 
completely unjust). Aristotle is not saying that it does not matter
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very much if you defraud or strike somebody little known to you, but 
it matters a lot if the person is well known to you, or that it is 
permissible to waive the geometric proportion, reciprocal proportion 
or arithmetical proportion rules when one’s family or friends arc 
involved. This would raise the problem of bias that we examined before.
If Aristotle means that we should be more virtuous or completely 
just towards those for whom we have special affection or goodwill, 
sense can be made of his statement that ’’the claims of justice should 
increase with the intensity of the friendship” . The demands of com­
plete justice (but not particular justice) increase and decrease 
according to the quality (the degree, intensity) of the friendship.
We may, therefore, say that there is a qualitative relation between 
friendship and (complete) justice.
2.5.3 The Complementarity in Society of
(Complete) Justice and Virtue Friendship
We have just seen that there is an important qualitative relation 
between justice and friendship in Aristotle’s theory. I think that it 
is in fact possible to establish another strong link between these two 
virtues, namely that they always co-exist in a community, and, moreover, 
increase and decrease to the same extent.
We know that for Aristotle virtue consists in doing what is right 
for the sake of the good. Complete justice is very similar to it; 
complete justice consists in doing what is right (in relation to others) 
for the sake of ihe good. When a man does what is right, he does the 
right deed,to the right people, in the right circumstances. When a man 
acts for the sake of the good, he acts for the sake of the inherent 
goodness of the action; he does not perform the action because of the 
pleasure or utility he can derive from it. Of the three goals possible 
- the useful, the pleasant,.and the good - the virtuous man and the 
completely just man choose only the third. I think that it would be 
possible to establish that (complete) justice increases with that type
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of friendship that Aristotle calls virtue friendship, and that it does 
so for the following reason.
The greater the incidence of complete justice (virtuous activity 
in relation to others) that is practised in the society, the greater 
will be the incidence of good men in that society, (for it is only good 
men who can be completely just and virtuous). Now good men love the 
good, but the good that they love is not some Platonic Form of the 
Good; the good man in his virtuous life is the personification of 
human good and it is for this reason that good men have affection for 
each other. Virtue friendship is found among men who feel affection 
for each other qua good men, as or to the extent that they are good. 
Thus, the more complete justice there is to be found in the society, the 
greater will be the incidence of good men, and hence the greater will be 
the incidence of virtue friendships. The point is that the good man 
(and the completely just man) chooseswhat is essential to life and 
ignores what is incidental to it. Not only does he choose the goal 
that is essential (the good) and ignores goals that are incidental (the 
useful and the pleasant), but he also chooses what is essential to a 
human being (a good character) and ignores what is accidental or 
irrelevant (wealth, special skills). He chooses both what is essential 
to life and what is essential to a person. He chooses a goal that is 
good and essential and he forms friendships that are based on what is 
good and essential. Thus, where there is a high incidence of complete 
justice in society, it will be matched by a high incidence of virtue 
friendships. The two phenomena co-exist, and increase together. 
Conversely, where there is little complete justice, there will be few 
virtue friendships.
The situation is, of course, very different in the case of the two 
"lesser friendships". It is not the case that pleasure and utility 
friendships increase and decrease in the same proportion as the extent 
of complete justice in society. It would be fair to say that the
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opposite is the case; that the greater the incidence of these forms of 
friendship in a society, the less the incidence of complete justice in 
a society, and that this is so for the following reason. We noted 
before that virtue consists in doing what is right for the sake of the 
good, and that complete justice consists in doing what is right (in 
relation to others) for the sake of the good. The motive is of crucial 
importance. If an action is not done for the sake of the good, neither 
virtue nor complete justice will be present. There are, for Aristotle, 
only three possible goals. If we rule out the good, we are left with 
the useful and the pleasant. Where the useful or the pleasant replace 
the good as the motive for action, virtue and complete justice will be 
absent, y But where these other goals prevail, so also will the lesser 
types of friendship which are grounded upon them. Thus, it is fair to 
say that a high prevalence of "incidental goals" that is, the goals of 
utility and pleasure, will correlate with a high prevalence of lesser 
friendships, (simply because "lesser” Incidental friendship is based on 
such incidental goals) To the degree that these incidental goals and 
friendships are present, complete justice will be absent. Conversely, 
a high prevalence of people pursuing the essential goal, that is, the 
goal of the good, will correlate with a high prevalence of virtue 
friendships, (simply because virtue or essential friendship is grounded 
on such an essential g o a l ) . T o  the extent that this essential goal 
and friendship is present in a society, complete justice will also be 
present.
It is clear why complete justice and friendship have this intimate
relation to each other. An act of supreme bravery, or great generosity 
for a friend * s sake is an act of friendship. However, at the same time, 
that act is also an act of complete justice for it is an act of virtue 
(doing what is right) with reference to another (the friend) for the 
sake of the good (the inherent goodness of the act). It is clear how 
an act of friendship and of (complete) justice can be found among the .
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same people, and can exist in the same sphere of conduct. The virtuous 
act itself can be described as one of complete justice or as one of 
virtue friendship. It is the same act described from different aspects 
or viewpoints.
One problem that results from the analysis we have given thus far 
is that it makes complete justice highly restrictive. It seems to 
limit the application of acts of complete justice to close friends and 
family, and yet we should expect that a really virtuous man would do 
good to more people than just a few close friends and relations. Even 
allowing for the fact that a Greek City State was smaller and more 
personal than a modern city ; and that the virtuous man would know more 
people in i t , the problem still remains for Aristotle places limits on 
the number of virtue friendships an individual may have. "Probably 
this would be the largest number with whom one can be on intimate 
terms" (T171al-3). "Indeed it woüld seem to be impossible to be the 
devoted friend of many", (llTlalO) and "it is not possible to have many 
friends whom we love for their own sake and for their goodness" (1171a 
19-^). C o m p l e t e  justice coheres with virtue friendship, but the 
Virtuous man should surely do good deeds to a wider circle than his 
closest friends. As we noted at the beginning of the chapter, if a 
person is prepared to make sacrifices for his family and friends, this 
does not prove his general lack of selfishness. It merely proves that 
he has "limited altruism” or "limited benevolence". Is it the case, 
then, that the truly virtuous man, the phronimos, is prepared to extend 
his'Virtuous activity to those outside his close circle?
Aristotle does make it quite clear that a virtuous individual 
should display his virtue towards those who are outside his close circle. 
He writes :'
The actions that we ought to do or not to do have been 
divided into two classes as affecting either the whole 
community or some one of its members. From this point 
of view, we can act justly or unjustly in either of two 
ways : towards one definite person or towards the
community. (Rhetoric 1373b20-4)
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The avoidance of military service is Aristotle's example of an action 
that is unjust towards the community at large. Conversely, it is 
clear that, in fighting willingly for the community, an individual is 
displaying the virtue of justice towards the community. The individual 
who is willing to fight, knowing that he might be sacrificing his own 
life if killed, or his well-being if injured, displays an other-regarding 
attitude and motivation that is an essential characteristic of complete 
justice.
The virtue of complete justice is, therefore, intimately related 
to the good of the community too. In Book 8 of the ^ , we find that 
Aristotle extends the relationship of complete justice and community to
y'-: ;:/.;;::y:y ;:yy, ... y :y::-Av: y y  \ y '
include friendship too:
Friendship and justice seem to be exhibited in the same 
sphere of conduct and between the same persons; because 
in every community there is supposed to be some kind of 
justice and also some friendly feeling. (1159b25-27)
This "friendly feeling” Aristotle elsewhere describes as "concord" 
(1167a21) and he notes that "concord is evidently friendship between 
the citizens of a state” (1167b2-3). A good community should, there­
fore, show evidence of both justice and this "friendly feeling" which is 
"concord” or. "civic friendship” . Such concord or civic friendship is 
promoted and fostered by rulers and law-makers for it is the bond that 
holds the community together (1155a23-25).
We noted earlier that friendship has certain logical features: 
reciprocity, awareness, and goodwill. Friendship is consciously 
reciprocated goodwill. It does seem reasonable to argue that civic 
friendship (or concord) will be present to the same extent as complete 
justice. The more virtuous activity in relation to other persons that 
is practised in the community, the more consciously reciprocated goodwill 
there should be. Acts of courage or generosity done by citizens to 
each other would generate goodwill and concord in a society. The more 
virtue that is practised on fellow-citizens, the more mutual goodwill 
there will be among those citizens. If a private citizen, a man who
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is very brave, jumps into a fast-flowing river to rescue a fellow- 
citizen's child, such goodwill will be generated. Equally, if a 
wealthy man gives generously to a charitable organisation which helps 
the dependants of those killed in battle, such an act will also arouse 
goodwill in the community. The more virtuous activity that is 
practised on fellow-citizens, the more mutual goodwill there will be 
among those citizens. Aristotle notes: "A man who has received a
benefit does indeed return goodwill for what has been done to him, and 
this is right and proper", (1167al4) and "in general, goodwill is roused 
by some merit and goodness" (1167al8-19).
Conversely, the less complete justice that is practised on fellow- 
citizens, the less reason there is for mutual goodwill. If the citizens 
of a state never do good to each other, goodwill would have no place. 
Equally, if the citizens of a state practise good deeds on one another 
but do so on account of the pleasant or useful, goodwill is again out 
of place. Thus, if a man makes a large donation to a charitable 
organisation with a view to enhancing his reputation and thereby gaining 
political office, no goodwill is deserved. Similarly, if he makes this 
large donation because he derives pleasure from being thought of as a 
great benefactor, again no goodwill is deserved. The deed is done for 
the sake of pleasure, and not for the sake of the good. Complete 
justice is absent and so also is goodwill and civic friendship.
We saw earlier that complete justice could be present to the extent 
that virtue friendship was present, but that it was strange to limit the 
application of complete justice to a few close friends. We can now see 
that complete justice also increases to the same extent as civic friend­
ship, and thus has a wider field of application. Whereas Aristotle 
argues that one can have only a few good friends, he argues that this 
is not so in the case of civic friends.
It is possible indeed to be friendly with many in the 
civic sense ... in fact to be a man of really admirable
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character; but it is not possible to have many friends 
whom we love for their own sake and for their goodness.
(1171al7-20)
Virtuous deeds can be practised by private citizens on each other,
but also by rulers towards their subjects. Rulers clearly have great
opportunity to practise complete justice on their subjects. In a good
constitution such as in a good monarchy this is what happens.
On the other hand, in the perverted constitutions 
friendship, like justice, is little found, and least 
in the worst. (1161a30-31)
In a tyranny (the perversion of monarchy) the two decrease together. The
reason for this is not difficult to find. The tyrant fails to do good
to his subjects, to be beneficent like the good king. He thus fails
to practise the virtue of complete justice. Justice is absent. He
bears them no goodwill; in fact, "their relation is like that of the
craftsman to his tool" (1161a35). In short, he treats them like
inanimate objects. In return they bear him no goodwill. It is the
man who has "received a benefit who returns goodwill for what has been
done to him". In this case, only burdens and no benefits are meted
out so goodwill has no place. Both justice and friendship are absent.
The case is different where there is a good and beneficent king -or : :
where there is a timocracy in which "all the citizens are equal and
good" (1161a27). Justice and friendship both flourish.
We can see that friendship in the widest sense (virtue and civic
friendship) is no small or insignificant virtue in Aristotle * s ethical
theory. It has an important role; it is related in such a way to
virtue and complete justice (the cardinal virtue) that they are always
present together, and increase and decrease to the same extent. In
sum, friendship is central and not peripheral to Aristotle’s ethical
theory. Friendship and the” friendly feeling" are of crucial
importance to the virtuous life.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CONTENT OF EUDAIMONIA
3.1 Introduction: Eudaimonia - The Problem Stated
In the last chapter, we examined the relationship between the 
virtue of friendship and the cardinal virtue of justice. This was 
necessary for thé following reason. It is only in the virtue of friend­
ship; Cooper points out/that Aristotle expresses himself directly on 
the subject of taking an interest in others merely as such and for their 
own sakes. Now to find genuinely other-regarding tendencies in some
minor, insignificant virtue that stands apart from the main part of
y / j':;: ' ' : ' : - ' ■
Aristotle's ethical theory would hardly suffice to exonerate that theory
from criticisms of selfishness and self-seeking. On the other hand, to 
find such genuinely other-regarding tendencies in some major and signi­
ficant virtue that is fundamentally related to all the other moral 
virtues is quite a different story. Thus it was necessary to show our 
critic that friendship is not some isolated, insignificant virtue that
found its way into Aristotle's NE by "faulty editing" but that it is
la
essentially and fundamentally related to the other moral virtues.
Suppose that our critic concedes the point that the virtue of 
friendship does stand in a vital relation to the other moral virtues, 
but argues that this goes noJway to prove that friendship has any con­
nection with Eudaimonia, with the life that is best for man, for a life 
devoted to the exercise of these moral virtues is not after all the life 
.thafmakes a man truly Eudaimon. Clearly, if Eudaimonia were such that 
it excluded precisely those moral virtues like justice to which the 
virtue of friendship is connected, there could still be a problem for 
Aristotle. If Eudaimonia consisted not in the life of morally virtuous 
activity, but, for example, in the life of theoretical (philosophical) 
contemplation, then the argument so far would have done nothing to show 
that friendship had any relation to Eudaimonia. It would still be
. : _ . . ' 82. 
necessary to show that the virtue of friendship stood in some relation
to this life of theoretical (philosophical) activity.
It is to this problem that we must now turn. We must first 
establish whether Eudaimonia includes moral activity, the life of good 
deeds with which this dissertation has so far been concerned. If it 
does so, there is no problem, for we have already seen that friendship 
is fundamentally linked to this form of life. If, however, we find 
that there is some doubt as to whether Eudaimonia dops include morally 
virtuous activity, or, if we find that Eudaimonia definitely excluded 
such activity, our work would not/ of course, be complete. We would 
have to establish independently that friendship stood in some vital 
relation to the activity(ies) of Eudaimonia -- whichever this (these) 
turned out to be. The task of this chapter will be to examine the con­
tent or nature of Eudaimonia, to find out what kind of activities would 
make a man truly Eudaimon. In the next chapter^we shall attempt to 
establish whether friendship, andyin particular, virtue friendship, 
stands in any vital relation to these activities, and whether friendship 
is really necessary to the life that is truly Eudaimon.
3.2 Eudaimonia: The Three Interpretations
What kind of activities Constitute Eudaimonia? Unfortunately, the
Nicomachean Ethics exhibits a certain lack of clarity on this topic. Not
surprisingly^ therefore, commentators have differed greatly in the inter-
_pretatibns they have offered. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between the
Intellectualist and Comprehensive interpretations^^ According to the
Intellectualist interpretation, "Eudaimonia is realised in the activity
of the most divine part of man, functioning in accordance with its proper
2
e x c e l l e n c e . T h i s  is the activity of theoretical contemplation" . 
Eudaimonia consists in the activity of theorising. This activity is 
considered paramount, everything else being pursued merely and solely as
a means to the attainment and furtherance of this end. According to 
the Comprehensive account, Eudaimonia "essentially involves not just the 
activity of the theoretical intellect, but the full range of human life 
and action/ in accordance with the broader excellences of moral virtue 
and practical wisdom" / T h e  Comprehensive interpretation denies that 
there is only one activity/ the activity of theoretical contemplation, . 
that constitutes Eudaimonia. It holds that Eudaimonia consists in a
plurality of activities, good in themselves, and desired (at least in
part) for their own sakes. Nagel points out that "this view connects 
Eudaimonia with the conception of human nature as composite, i.e. as 
involving the interaction of reason, emotion, perception and action in 
an ensouled body"^. Whereas the Intellectualist interpretation connects 
Eudaimonia with the conception of man as nous, that is, as pure intellect 
or mind with no material counterpart, the Comprehensive interpretation 
connects Eudaimonia with the conception of man as suntheton, that is, as 
strictly human, as matter (appetites, desires, sensations, emotions etc.) 
organised by reason.
5
A third interpretation has recently been proposed by John Cooper ,
His view is that there are two Eudaimonias, one corresponding to the 
intellectual life, and the other to the comprehensive life. The former 
life, that which Aristotle considers better and more worthy, consists in 
intellectual activity alone, while the latter "secondary" Eudaimonia, 
though primarily concerned with morally good activity, also allows for 
intellectual activity. In respect of content. Cooper’s interpretation 
has much"in common with the other two interpretations just outlined. His 
primary Eudaimonia which consists in nothing but theoretical activity is 
precisely the Eudaimonia that the supporter of the Intellectual inter­
pret at ion espouses , while/his secondary^ Eudaimonia which consists in 
both moral activity and theoretical activity is precisely the Eudaimonia 
that thé supporter of the Comprehensive interpretation espouses. Cooper, 
in fact, calls his primary intellectualist Eudaimonia "unmixed" Eudaimonia,
and his secondary Comprehensive Eudaimonia "mixed" Eudaimonia, but, for 
the sake of clarity, I shall use Nagel's terminology of Intellectualist 
and Comprehensive Eudaimonia throughout the chapter.
3.2.1 The Intellectualist Interpretation
Proponents of the Intellectualist interpretation of Eudaimonia
draw their main source of support from the following passage:
The good of man is an activity of the soul in conformity 
with excellence or virtue, and if there are several virtues, 
in conformity with the best and most complete. (1098al6-17)
In this passage, Aristotle clearly claims that Eudaimonia consists ex­
clusively of activity in accordance with the best virtue, and he denies 
as constitutive of Eudaimonia any activity that is considered intrin­
sically worthwhile but is not in conformity with the best virtue. If 
it is the case that Eudaimonia consists in an activity of the soul in 
accordance with the best virtue, then, adherents of this interpretation 
will argue, we shall know the nature of Eudaimonia as soon as we find 
that virtue. Which, then, is the best virtue?
We have already seen that Aristotle says that Eudaimonia will be 
attained when a man fulfils his "function", when he realises his nature 
or his distinctively human powers. This does not mean fulfilling his 
"function*^ qua athlete, or realising his nature qua flute-player, but 
fulfilling his function and realising his nature qua man. It is in the 
attainment of excellence in the exercise of the distinctively human 
powers that a man will become a good man, and his life a good life.
_ holds that it is the ability to think that distinguishes
men from other animals, and that the good life is one in which this 
capacity is exercised well. Man's end or Eudaimonia lies in the 
activity, not the mere possession of his rational element, that sets him 
apart from other animals. It is by exercising his soul in conformity 
to reason, or to the rational element that man fulfils his function and 
attains Eduaimonia.
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However, the rational capacity is clearly at work in both theoretical 
activity and in practical (moral) activity. For Aristotle, the choice is 
thus between the virtue of theoretical wisdom and that of practical wis­
dom. He chooses the former (for reasons to be explained shortly). His
choice has appeared strange to many commentators. Hardie, for example, 
writes :
It is no doubt true that man is the only theoretical animal.
But the capacity of some men for theory is small. And
theory is not the only activity in respect of which man is 
rational and no other animal is rational ... What is common 
and peculiar to men is rationality in a general sense, not 
theoretical insight which is a specialised way of being 
rational. A man differs from other animals not primarily in 
being a natural metaphysician, but rather in being able to 
plan his life consciously for the attainment of an inclusive 
end.® '
Nagel attempts to explain why, for Aristotle, "the use of reason
to earn a living or procure food does not form part of the central
function of man", why the "proper exercise of the rational faculty does
have a point beyond the uses of cleverness, prudence, and courage,
beyond the rational calculation of the most sensible way to spend one's
7
time and money, or to organise society" .
Humans, like animals, can "employ reason in the service of nutrition 
and reproduction. Reason is also employed in the control of perception, 
locomotion and desire". But:
Human possibilities reveal that reason has a use beyond the 
ordering of practical life. The circle of mutual support 
between reason, activity and nutrition is not completely 
closed. In fact all of it, including the practical employ­
ment of reason, serves to support the individual for an 
activity that completely transcends these worldly concerns.
The model of.JEeedback does not work for the ergon of humans
_   "^because the best and purest employment of reason has nothing
to do with daily life. Aristotle believes, in short, that 
human life is not important enough for humans to spend their 
lives on. A person should seek to transcend not only his 
individual practical concerns, but also those of society of 
humanity as a whole.®
Aristotle writes:
For it would be strange to regard politics or practical 
wisdom as the highest kind of knowledge, when in fact man 
is not the best thing in the universe ... There are other 
things whose nature is much more divine than man's: (for 
example) ... the constituent parts of the universe.
(1141a20-22 and a34-b2)
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Our discussion has shpwn that theoretical wisdom comprises 
both scientific knowledge and (apprehension by the) 
intelligence of things which by their nature are valued 
most highly. (1141b2-3)
Aristotle’s point is that theoretical wisdom is superior because it deals
with higher and more noble truths. It is the best virtue because it
deals with things that are best and are valued most highly. Aristotle
implies that activity of the more elevated sort is by its nature more
desirable and worthwhile than activity that is mundane and not concerned
with eternal truths and objects. Thus, theoretical wisdom, being the
virtue that promotes and makes possible this kind of superior activity
is the best virtue.
The second reason Aristotle gives for regarding theoretical wisdom
as superior to practical wisdom is that practical wisdom is a means to
the attainment of theoretical wisdom. It is thus subservient to
theoretical wisdom.
Still, practical wisdom has not authority over theoretical 
wisdom or the better part of our soul any more than the art 
of medicine has authority over health. (Just as medicine 
does not use health, but makes the provisions to secure it^so) 
practical wisdom does not use theoretical wisdom but makes the 
provisions to secure it. It issues commands to attain it, but 
it does hot issue them to wisdom itself. (1145a6-10)
Aristotle does not make clear how practical wisdom can be a means to the
attainment of theoretical wisjdom, nor how it can make provision to secure 
8bit . Nevertheless, he certainly holds that practical wisdom can in no 
way be considered superior to theoretical wisdom, any more than medicine 
could be considered superior to health. Theoretical wisdom is the 
'ultimate virtue, and part of the value of practical wisdom is that it 
can assist in obtaining this virtue. Theoretical wisdom is never sub­
servient to practical wisdom^ and, thus, there is no way in which 
theoretical wisdom can be considered the lesser of the two virtues.
To these two reasons for regarding theoretical wisdom as superior 
to practical wisdom, we could add a third one. Hardie points out that:
Aristotle does not fail to see and mention the fact that 
an object may be desired both independently for itself 
and independently for its effects (EN 1.6, 1097a30-34).
He was aware also that theoretical activity is not the 
only kind of activity which is independently desired.
But hé evidently thought that an activity which was never 
desired except for itself would be intrinsically desirable 
in a higher degree than an activity which, in addition, to 
being desired for itself, was also useful. It is, so to 
say, beneath the dignity of the most godlike activities that 
they should be useful. Aristotle is led in this way, and 
by other routes, to give a narrow and exclusive account of 
the final good, to conceive of the supreme end as dominant 
and not inclusive.®
The "narrow, exclusive" or "dominant end" is Hardw^'s terminology for
the Intellectualist interpretation of Eudaimonia; an "inclusive end"
is his terminology for the Comprehensive interpretation.
The reasoning bbhind the Intellectualist interpretation is thus
clear. Aristotle says that Eudaimonia is an activity of the soul in
conformity with virtue, or with the best one if there are several. We
have found that Aristotle argues that there are two virtues, but that
theoretical wisdom is the better. Adherents of the Intellectualist
view, therefore, conclude that, for Aristotle, Eudaimonia is a life
dedicated to attaining theoretical knowledge.
Hardie says, as we have just noted, that Aristotle "gives a narrow
and exclusive account of the final good", and "conceives of the end as
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dominant and not inclusive" . Nagel argues that Aristotle "pares away 
everything except the intellect, till the only thing which intrinsically 
bears on Eudaimonia is the quality of contemplative (theoretical) 
activity"^^.
He_:summarises-what he understands to be Aristotle's position (and
adds that he believes it is a very"compelling position") .
This divine element which gives us the capacity to think 
about things higher than ourselves, is the highest aspect 
of our souls, and we are not justified in foregoing its 
activities to concentrate on lowlier matters, viz. our own 
lives, unless the demands in the latter area threaten to 
make contemplation impossible. As he says at 1177b33, 
we should not listen to those who urge that a human should 
think human thoughts, and a mortal mortal ones. Rather 
we should cultivate that portion of our nature that promises 
to transcend the rest. If anyone insists that the rest
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belongs to a complete account of human life, then the view 
might be put, somewhat paradoxically, by saying that com­
prehensive human good is not everything, and should not be 
the main human goal. We must identify with the highest 
part of ourselves, rather than with the whole. The other 
functions including the practical employment of reason 
itself, provide support for the highest form of activity, 
but do not enter into our proper excellence as primary 
component factors. This is because men are not simply the 
most complex species 6f animals, but possess as their 
essential nature a capacity to transcend themselves and 
become like gods. It is in virtue of this capacity that 
they are» capable of Eudaimonia, whereas animals are 
incapable of it, children have not achieved it, and _
certain adults e.g. slaves, are prevented from reaching it.^
It should be noted that the Intellectualist interpretation poses no 
problem if man is viewed as nous, as his divine element, as pure intellect 
with no material counterpart. In theoretical activity, the "best" part, 
the theoretical element of the rational soul is emphasised. But there 
is a problem if man is viewed as suntheton, as both matter (body, 
desires, appetites, emotions etc.) and reason. And it is true to say 
that in the IŒ, man is viewed in just this way too. The problem is
that man as suntheton would have little or no share in Eudaimonia, if
theoretical activity alone constituted Eudaimonia; little share if 
one allows that impure forms of theoretical activity could constitute 
Eudaimonia, and no share at all if one allows only pure theoretical 
activity (since such activity is beyond man's nature as suntheton) 
(1177b24-30). But if man as suntheton can have no share in Eudaimonia, 
Aristotle's position becomes inconsistent because he states clearly that 
"the good we are now seeking must be obtainable" (1096b35). Thus, the 
purely Intellectualist interprétât ion makes Aristotle's position incom­
prehensible and inconsistent.
If one attributes a certain theory or viewpoint to a particular
philosopher, it is insufficient to look at just one passage in a work,
and it is even more insufficient to look at just a few sentences in a 
single passage and then attempt to reach firm conclusions as to what 
that philosopher really means. Thus, in the case of Aristotle, it is 
not sufficient to look at one short passage, (1177al2-13) and then
reach the conclusion that he identifies Eudaimonia with the life of 
theoretical activity. I think that if one looks at other passages in 
N E , and even at the wider context oif the passage from which we earlier 
quoted <1177al2-13 ) , there is good reason to cast doubt on the validity 
of the Intellectualist interpretation of Aristotle. This is not to say
that a search of other passages proves conclusively that Aristotle does .
not hold the Intellectualist position, but merely that these passages 
seem to cast a certain daubt upon it,
We may begin by examining the wider context of the passage from 
which we quoted earlier (1177al2-13). When we study the paragraph in 
its entirety, we find evidence to suggest that the first sentence may 
be misleading.
Now, if happiness is activity in conformity with virtue, it
is to be expected that it should conform with the highest
virtue, and that is the virtue of the best part of us.
Whether this is intelligence or something else which, it is 
thought, by its very nature rules and guides us, and which 
gives us our notions of what is noble and divine ; whether 
it is itself divine, or the most divine thing in us; it is 
the activity of this part (when operating), in conformity 
with the excellence or virtue proper to it that will be 
perfect happiness. That it is activity concerned with 
theoretical knowledge or contemplation has already been 
stated. (1177al2-18)
The Intellectualist proponent can point out that the "highest 
virtue ", "the virtue of the best part of us" is theoretical,' not prac­
tical wisdom, and that this passage supports his position. The 
proponent is certainly correct that the "highest virtue", or "the virtue 
of the best part of us" is theoretical wisdom. However, the words of
the passage must-be clearly noted. Aristotle begins by talking about
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Eudaimonia, and ends by talking about complete or perfect Eudaimonia . 
He clearly identifies perfect Eudaimonia with theoretical knowledge and 
activity. Perfect Eudaimonia is, therefore, intellectualist in nature. 
Is Eudaimonia simpliciter also just a life of theoretical activity? 
Aristotle is unclear on this point. While he certainly does not deny 
that Eudaimonia simpliciter is intellectualist in nature, he obviously
wants to emphasise the intellectualist character of teleia Eudaimonia.
He does so again at 1177b24-26:
The activity of our intelligence constitutes the perfect 
happiness of man, provided it encompasses a complete span 
of life
If both Eudaimonia simpliciter, and teleia Eudaimonia were both purely 
intellectualist, they would not be distinguishable. Aristotle is 
clearly attempting to make a distinction. It, therefore, seems 
reasonable to conclude that Aristotle thinks teleia Eudaimonia, and not 
Eudaimonia simpliciter is purely intellectualist.
We may now consider other important passages that help to elucidate 
the nature of Eudaimonia. Book 10 chapter 8 opens with the following 
comment :
A life guided by the other kind of virtue (the practical) 
is happy in a secondary sense since its active exercise is 
confined to man. (1178a9-10)
If Aristotle believes that Eudaimonia consists only in theoretical 
activity, it Is odd that he should call a life devoted to some other 
kind of activity happy (Eudaimon). If Eudaimonia Is identical or co­
extensive with theoretical activity, then a life guided by practical 
activity cannot also be happy. In this passage, Aristotle clearly 
argues that some non-theoretical activity is a constituent part of 
Eudaimonia, of man's good. Admittedly, the moral life results in 
Eudaimonia of a "secondary kind'', not a primary kind . But this is 
different from denying that such a life has a part in Eudaimonia at all. 
We can say that, for Aristotle, intrinsically pursued moral activity is 
a constituent part of "secondary Eudaimonia". The distinction between 
Eudaimonia and secondary Eudaimonia, like that between complete/perfect 
Eudaimonia and Eudaimonia simpliciter certainly casts doubts upon the 
purely Intellectualist interpretation.
Again, at 1178al9-22, Aristotle writes:
The fact that these (moral) virtues are also bound up
with the emotions indicates that they belong to our *
composite nature, and the virtues of our composite nature
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are human virtues; consequently, a life guided by these 
virtues and the happiness (that goes with it are likewise 
human). The happiness of the intelligence, however, is 
quite separate from that kind of happiness.
This passage is important for the following reason. If Aristotle
means to identify Eudaimonia with theoretical activity alone, it is
not clear why he should talk about two kinds of Eudaimonia, one
associated with nous ("intelligence") and the other associated with
"human virtue". The life associated with "human virtue" should not
be called Eudaimon at all. Again we find Aristotle attempting to make
a distinction between two kinds of Eudaimonia. We have, on the one
hand, teleia (complete/perfect) Eudaimonia, or the activity of the
intelligence (nous) o n  the other hand, we have Eudaimonia simpliciter,
"secondary Eudaimonia", or "moral virtue" Eudaimonia.
From the passages we have examined, I think it is reasonable to
conclude that we cannot say beyond doubt that Aristotle identifies
Eudaimonia with the life of theoretical activity alone.
3.2.2 The Comprehensive Interpretation
We have already seen that it is implausible to argue that intrin­
sically pursued moral activity is not a constituent part of Eudaimonia.
We saw, first; that if Eudaimonia is identified with theoretical 
activity alone/Aristotle's position becomes incomprehensible and in­
consistent. We saw, secondly, that many passages in the show clearly 
that Aristotle believes that moral activity is, in some way, a constituent 
part^ of JEudaimoniav
The question to be addressed now is in what sense Aristotle con­
ceives such moral activity to be a constituent part of Eudaimonia. In 
this section, we shall examine the Comprehensive interpretations advanced 
by philosophers such as Ross and Joachim. In the next section, we 
shall examine the two-Eudaimonias interpretation advocated by Cooper. 
According to the Comprehensive interpretation, there is one
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Eudaimonia which "essentially involves not just the act ivity of the
theoretical intellect, but the full range of human life and action in
accordance with the broader excellences of moral virtue and practical
wisdom. This view connects Eudaimonia with the conception of human
nature as composite i.e. as involving the interaction of reason,
15
emotion, perception, and action in an ensouled body"
The important point about the Comprehensive interpretation is that, 
according to it.there is one Eudaimonia that consists in theoretical 
and moral activity. However, it is not an essential part of this 
interpretation that these two constituent parts be placed on one level, 
and Share an equal s t a t u s . T h e  Comprehensive interpretation allows 
that the activities of Eudaimonia may be graded, that theoretical 
activity may be regarded as intrinsically more valuable and more worth­
while than moral activity. Joachim summarises this interpretation of 
Eudaimonia:
Aristotle does not, and could not, leave the two lives 
side by side, as each the best life. Two best lives - 
two supreme and all embrasing tele would be absurd, a 
contradiction in terms. As we shall see, in Book 10, he 
decides that the life of the thinker is the supremely 
valuable life for man, is indeed super-human, a god's 
life which man enjoys in virtue of the divinity in him.
But he recognises a genuine.though secondary and sub­
ordinate, value in the life of the statesman and citizen.
That is to say, he measures the value of the two lives.
The ideal is manifested in both these forms, and both, 
therefore, have genuine value.but the one is more 
valuable than the other ... i.e. (itl more fully or 
more perfectly manifests the ideal.
According to Joachim, then, Aristotle places great importance on both
kinds jofy activity:^—but finishes by making theoretical activity the more
valued, the more prized of the two activities. Both these activities
are part of one Eudaimonia for these two lives are related to each 
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other . T h e  two-Eudaimonias interpretation is dismissed by Joachim 
as "absurd" a n d"a contradiction in terms". In the next section we 
shall attempt to establish whether this view is as "absurd" and 
"contradictory" as Joachim believes.
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Proponents of the Comprehensive interpretation can point to the 
language that Aristotle uses in Book 10 chapters 7 to 9. In his dis­
cussion of Eudaimonia, Aristotle several times uses comparative and 
superlative versions of the word, thereby implying that Eudaimonia may 
be graded, and possibly even attained to differing extents. At 1178a4-8, 
Aristotle says that the life guided by reason (nous) is "happiest"; at, 
1178a9-10, he says that the life guided by moral virtue is happy in a 
"secondary" sense, and at 1179a22-31, he tells us that the man who 
"exercises and cultivates" his intelligence and engages in theoretical 
activity, will be most dear to the gods, and "happiest" too.
It should be noted that the use of comparatives and superlatives 
is not conclusive or even strong evidence in favour of the Comprehensive 
interpretation. It is, after all, quite possible for there to be two 
quite separate Eudaimonias, the activity of one of which makes a man 
"happy", while the activity of the other makes a man "more happy" or 
"most happy". The language is.therefore, compatible with both the 
Comprehensive interpretation and with Cooper's interpretation. It is, 
of course, not compatible with the Intellectualist interpretation.
The best support for the Comprehensive, but graded interpretation 
comes from Aristotle's passages concerning teleia Eudaimonia. To show 
that this Is so we must summarise Aristotle's general ideas briefly, and 
then see just how the teleia. Eudaimonia passages fit into the account.
We have seen that.according to Aristotle.Eudaimonia is to be 
identified with the active exercise of man's rational capacities since 
man^lone is capable of rational activity. "The proper function of 
man", Aristotle writes, "consists in an activity of the soul in con­
formity with the rational principle'^ (1098a7-8).Eudaimonia results 
from man's fulfilling his function or end as a rational being. How 
then can man best fulfil his function as a rational being? Aristotle 
writes :.." '
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First of all, then, we should insist that both theoretical 
and practical wisdom are necessarily desirable in themselves, 
even if neither of them produces anything. For each of 
them is the virtue of a different part of the soul.
Secondly, they do in fact produce something: theoretical
wisdom produces happiness; not as medicine produces health,
but as health itself makes a person healthy. For since
theoretical wisdom is one part of virtue in its entire-hy,
possessing and actualising it makes a man happy (for
happiness as we have seen (1.7) consists in the activity of ,
virtue).
In the third place, a man fulfils his proper function only
by w a y  of practical wisdom and moral excellence or virtue :
(moral) virtue makes us aim at the right target, aftd 
practical wisdom makes us use the right means. (1144al-9)
In this long passage, Aristotle makes it clear that it is not only theo­
retical activity (the outcome of the exercise of nous ) that promotes 
and produces Eudaimonia. Practical wisdom and moral virtue also promote 
and produce Eudaimonia because these virtues too make it possible for 
man to fulfil his end as a rational agent. In order to fulfil his end 
or function as a rational being, a man must possess and exercise nous
(so that he can engage in theoria which is the best and most prized
rational activity), but so he must also possess and exercise moral 
virtue and practical wisdom (so that he can engage in moral deliberation 
and choice). .
It is clear that in this passage Aristotle is not subscribing to the
view that Eudaimonia may only result from the one best virtue, but he is
saying that it stems from the activity of rational virtue in its entirety. 
Is there, then, a contradiction between this passage and 1098al6-17 where 
Aristotle says :
' '^Eudaimonia is an activity of the soul in conformity with 
excellence or virtue, and if there are several virtues, in 
conformity with the best and most complete.
Earlier we examined one of the passages in which Aristotle draws a dis­
tinction between Eudaimonia simpliciter and teleia Eudaimonia. Aristotle 
begins Book 10 chapter 7 by saying:
Now if happiness is activity in Conformity with virtue,
it is to be expected that it should conform with the highest 
virtue , and that is the virtue of the best part of us (1177al2-13)
(This passage is consistent with 1098al6-17 where Aristotle argues that 
Eudaimonia results from activity in conformity with the best and most 
complete virtuelii But we also saw that Aristotle concludes the passage 
as follows;
It is the activity of this part (when operating) in con­
formity with the excellence or virtue proper to it that 
will be complete/perfect happiness. (1177al6-17)
It would be reasonable to argue that Aristotle holds the view that the
highest virtue, theoretical wisdom, is identical with teleia Eudaimonia,
not Eudaimonia simpliciter. Teleia Eudaimonia clearly allows Aristotle
to give theoretical activity a special status while at the same time n ^
denying that moral activity is also a constituent part of Eudaimonia.
Both practical activity and theoretical activity result from the exercise
of man's rational element.
This interpretation of the passage quoted gains support from another
at 1177b24-27. Here Aristotle writes:
The activity of our intelligence (i.e. theoretical activity) 
constitutes the perfect/complete happiness of man, provided it 
encompasses a complete span of life ...
Theoretical activity is again identified with perfect/complete Eudaimonia
rather than with Eudaimonia simpliciter. It is quite plausible to argue
that Aristotle's view is that it is teleia Eudaimonia, not Eudaimonia
simpliciter that excludes moral activity. While activity in conformity
with theoretical wisdom constitutes the fullest flourishing of our
natures as rational beings, activity in conformity with practical virtue
also results in the realisation of our natures as rational beings, but
—  at a^iess high level.
The Comprehensive interpretation holds that there is only one
Eudaimonia whose component parts are accorded different levels of priority.
The supreme and highly prized life is that of theoretical activity; the
lower, but nevertheless important, life is that of moral (practical)
activity. It seems to be necessary to the Comprehensive interpretation
that these two "lives" or components of Eudaimonia be substantively
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related, for if they are not so, it would surely be reasonable to argue 
that there are two distinct Eudaimonias, not one. This is a view that 
we shall investigate in the next section of this chapter, and also, more 
indirectly, in chapter 4^ when we examine Aristotle's conception of the 
soul. In the remainder of this section, we shall briefly mention how 
three of Aristotle's commentators have viewed the relationship between . 
the two components of Eudaimonia; and offer a few comments about these 
views.
Ross has the idea that moral activity is a providing condition for
theoretical activity. This idea probably stems from Aristotle's claim
that theoria is perfect Eudaimonia, and from the fact that he has made
theoria the only activity that is sought for its own sake, and never for
the sake of any further end. Ross writes :
And it (moral activity) helps to bring into being the
higher kind (theoretical activity). Aristotle says very 
little about how it does this. The practical wisdom of 
the statesman provides by legislation for the pursuit of 
scientific and philosophical studies. And we must suppose 
that in the individual life also, Aristotle thought of 
moral action as providing for the existence of intellectual 
activity by keeping in subjection the passions. But though 
his formal theory thus makes the moral life subsidiary to
the intellectual, this relationship is not worked out in
detail.IB
According to Ross, then, moral action is a providing condition for theo­
retical activity. It acts as a providing condition in the sense that 
it keeps the emotions in subjection, thereby creating the kind of psycho­
logical state that is requisite for successful theoretical activity.
Ross does not claim that there is a causal connection between the two 
kindsbf"activity; he only claims that the control of the emotions that 
is vital to moral action provides the psychological state that is also 
conducive to theoretical activity.
It is clear, however, that Ross's explanation provides only the 
weakest of links between the two forms of activity. If these two forms 
of activity are supposed to be related as aspects or components of one 
Eudaimonia, we would expect a much tighter or more intimate link between
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the two aspects or components. If none can be provided, there is 
little strength to the argument that there is one Eudaimonia. It would 
seem reasonable to suggest that there are two Eudaimonias, the lesser 
form of which acts as a providing condition for the superior form.
According to the interpretation given by Burnet, and Stewart, the 
theoretical life is the gooJt or final cause for men’s moral activity. 
Burnet writes:
Now we see what is the true "standard of the means" (horos
ton mesoteton) ... it is the theoretic life which the
phronimos keeps in view when he determines the mean; for
he knows that his own practical wisdom is only ancillary to 
the theoretical wisdom of the philosopher.^^
Their idea is that Aristotle attempts to relate the two forms of virtue
by making the theoretical life the target or goal (skopos) and standard
(horos) to which the man of moral virtue refers when he determines the
mean. They both argue that the rational principle (logos) to which the
man of practical wisdom attends when he determines the mean has a close
connection with theoria. The mean which is so essential to morally
correct action would be defined in terms of logos (a rational principle)
which in turn would be defined by reference to theoria as a standard and
goal.
If it were the case that theoria were the standard and goal for
all men's good actions, it would seem that Aristotle has provided a
single and final end for men's actions. However, this interpretation
can be criticised for it seems unlikely that Aristotle intends the
phronimos to "keep in view'?, to look to^the life of theoria as a standard
-or goal, in short, to use this life as a yardstick for his own activities
Jaeger makes this point clearly. He says that according to Aristotle,
the man of practical wisdom has his own standard; he judges according
to his own type of wisdom and experience and does not look to any other
form of life for guidance.
The NE does not make moral insight dependent on knowledge 
of the transcendental; it looks for a "natural" foundation 
of it in practical human consciousness, and in moral character.
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And
The good man judges each class of things rightly, and 
in each the truth appears to him ... and perhaps the 
good man differs from others most by seeing the truth 
in each class of things ...^^
Aristotle, he tells us, "rejects universal norms", and "recognises no
,22
measure but the autonomous conscience of the ethically educated person’ . 
Jaeger, thus, denies that theoria is the yardstick that the phronimos 
uses to determine morally good action. He also denies that the 
phronimos "keeps theoria in view" as a goal or end. The theoretical 
life is neither a standard nor a goal for the phronimos. Each form of 
life has its own standard and goal.
3.2.3 The Two-Eudaimonias Interpretation of J.M. Cooper 
In Reason and human good in Aristotle, Cooper proposes and defends 
a two-Eudaimonias interpretation. His view is that there are two separate 
and distinct Eudaimonias, one which corresponds to the theoretical life 
alone, and the other which corresponds to the moral life. The first, 
the better and more prized Eudaimonia, consists of theoretical activity 
alonCj while the second, or lesser, Eudaimonia consists largely of moral 
activity, but admits of some theoretical activity in addition . In 
respect of content, there is, of course, much in common between Cooper’s 
interpretation and the otherltwo interpretations. Primary Eudaimonia 
which consists in nothing but theoretical activity is intellectualist in 
nature, while secondary Eudaimonia which consists in moral activity and 
some theoretical activity is comprehensive in nature.
The most significant difference between Cooper's interpretation and 
the other interpretations is not then in respect of content. The dif­
ference lies in his claim that there are two Eudaimonias, not one.
Cooper defends his view by reference to the meaning of the word "biosV, 
and from a detailed reading of 1177b26-1178a22. In this passage, 
Aristotle writes of an intellectual (theoretic) life, and a moral life. 
Cooper argues that these are not two aspects of a single life, but
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rather two completely separate and distinct forms of life . His
justification is that the Greek word bios always means "(mode of) life", 
and that ^in any one period of time, one can have only one mode of 
life" . The bios of an individual, then, is not a single aspect of 
a person's life; rather^it refers to the total organisation of that 
individual's life. In English, however, it is clear that we often 
speak of aspects of a person's life. Thus, we can speak of a person's 
moral life, social life, and political life. There is a Greek equiva­
lent of this English "aspect of life". This, Cooper says, is zoe. It 
is not bios. It is incorrect in Greek to speak of a person's social 
bios, moral bios and political bios as being all different aspects of an 
individual's bios, for bios means a person's manner of being, the total 
organisation of his life. At any one period of time, one can have only one 
mode of life, and, further. Cooper argues, bioi do not combine. Thus, 
he concludes, if there are two separate and distinct lives which cannot 
combine, so there must be two separate and distinct Eudaimonias corres­
ponding to these separate and distinct lives.
Cooper justifies his claim that there are two Eudaimonias by ref­
erence to the,two distinct bioi that men may lead - the theoretical life 
and the moral life. Suppose, however, that there are more than two 
bioi that men can lead. Are there then more than two Eudaimonias? At 
lQ96bl4-1097all, Aristotle writes of the life (bios) of pleasure. Is 
there then a Eudaimonia corresponding to this bios? Perhaps, if there 
is a bios of advantage, we should have to admit a Eudaimonia corresponding 
— to tliis bios too? This, of course, would be a total misrepresentation 
of Aristotle's position. A man is only Eudaimon when he fulfils his 
function as a rational being. There are only two kinds of excellent 
rational activity - activity in accordance with theoretical wisdom and 
activity in accordance with practical wisdom. It is not the bios 
itself which is significant; it is the kind of activity that constitutes 
a bios that is important. A bios or mode of life organised around
100
pleasure or advantage is not a candidate for Eudaimonia. But a life 
that is organised around theoretical or moral activity is clearly 
Eudaimon, If one admits that Aristotle predicates "Eudaimon" of only 
two different bioi, and if one further admits that bioi can never 
combine, then one must accept that there are only two Eudaimonias.
Proponents of the Comprehensive interpretation might attempt to 
salvage their case by the following kind of argument. They could 
challenge Cooper's assumption that Aristotle is speaking literally when 
he refers to a "moral life" and an "intellectual life". Cooper assumes 
that Aristotle really intends to say that there are two separate lives 
a man can lead, and that if he is to be Eudaimon, he might choose one 
or the other, but not both. A Comprehensivist might argue that 
Aristotle uses the expressions "moral life" and "intellectual life" only 
in a figurative and not in a literal sense in order to clarify and show 
in their pure forms the two different rational activities that can con­
stitute Eudaimonia. Such an argument is really an extension of Stewart's 
point that the "wise man" (who corresponds to ho kata ton noun bios) 
and the "practical man'^ (who corresponds to ho kata ten alien areten
bios ) are not intended by Aristotle as real men, but are abstractions
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used for the purpose of illustration and clarification . Thus, in 
Book 10: 7 and 8, Aristotle is not speaking literally about Eudaimonia, 
but is giving a general outline of it by arguing that it is attained when 
we realise the divine and purely human aspects of our rational nature 
by engaging in theoretical and moral activities respectively. In this 
-wayr the Comprehensivist could argue, there are not two distinct 
Eudaimonias, but only one - one that incorporates two parts of men's 
rational soul, but each of which can be attained to a greater or lesser 
extent by real men.
The plausibility of this Comprehensivist attack depends upon whether 
there is a good case for arguing that man as nous and man as complex 
being are in fact two separate and distinct entities or whether they are
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two parts of a single complex unit. If the former were true, it would 
seem that Cooper is correct to argue that there are two Eudaimonias, 
one corresponding to nous and the theoretic life, and the other to man 
as complex being and the moral life. If the latter were true Instead, 
it would surely be the case that the Comprehensivist interpretation is 
more sound than Cooper's two-Eudaimonia interpretation. I shall argue , 
that Cooper has a good case for claiming that the two natures in the NE 
do in some sense constitute two separate "men" and two separate souls.
Cooper points out that nous in Book IQ : 7 refers to the theoretic 
intellect alone; it does not refer to the practical intellect or to a
"mixed" intellect. He supports his case by reference to 1177b28-9, and
1178a6-22, two passages in which Aristotle is explicit about the nature 
of nous. In the first passage, Aristotle sharply distinguishes man 
qua nous from man qua suntheton.and argues that man qua nous is divine, 
but man qua suntheton is strictly human. Man qua nous is regarded as 
superior to man qua suntheton, just as the activity of man qua nous is 
superior to the activity of man qua suntheton. In the second passage, 
he makes it clear that the moral virtues (the virtues of practical 
wisdom) are not excellences of the nous. Cooper adds that Book 10 is 
especially important as it is the only place in the ÎŒ where Aristotle 
speaks of man as pure intellect.
Cooper also uses Aristotle's De Anima in support of his theory. In
this work, Aristotle makes a clear distinction between man's highest 
powers and his biological and psychological functions. The latter are 
_intnhsically linked with the body. This is not the case, however, with 
the former, with man's highest intellectual powers. This is because 
Aristotle does not view the mind as being inextricably linked with the 
body and its activities. Cooper quotes Aristotle:
It (nous) seems to be a distinct kind of soul and it alone admits 
of separation, as the immortal from the perishable (413b26-7)
Clearly, it is difficult to envisage how the mind constitutes a different 
kind of soul. But it seems that in De Anima, Aristotle dichotomises Man
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into two separate and distinct ôouls, one associated with the activity of a body,
and the other something quite distinct’ from the body and its activities.
Cooper argues that the theory of the souls in De Anima coincides
with Aristotle's discussion in Book 10: 7-9 of man qua nous and man qua
suntheton, where the former is regarded as purely theoretical and divine,
and the latter as a combined body and soul. Cooper writes:
It is then the late and technical psychological theory of 
the De Anima to which Aristotle appeals in arguing the 
identification of a human being with his (theoretical) 
nous. According to the theory of the De Anima a 
human being cannot correctly be thought of as a single 
complex creature, possessing physical, emotional and 
intellectual characteristics of various kinds, and bound 
together and unified as parts or aspects of the soul, 
which being his form, make him the creature lie is. Instead,
the highest intellectual powers are split off from the
others and make, in some obscure way, to constitute a 
soul all on their own.^^
It should also be noted that Aristotle's introduction of teleia Eudaimonia 
in Book 10, to which we referred earlier, gives support to Cooper's inter­
pretation. If, in this final book of IŒ, Aristotle does adopt the 
psychology of De Anima and, therefore, assumes that in a strict sense 
there are two souls and two "men", it is not surprising that he should 
introduce terminology that would enable him to refer to the final ends 
or Eudaimonias of both souls or "men". The final end of man qua nous 
is a life devoted to theoretical activity, a life that, according to 
Aristotle, is teleios Eudaimon; and the final end of man qua complex 
being (qua suntheton) is a life that is predominantly practical, a life 
that, according to Aristotle, is "secondarily" Eudaimon.
Cooper's two Eudaimonias interpretation thus receives support from 
(a) the meaning of the word bios, and (b) from Aristotle's psychological 
theory. It seems that Cooper has good grounds for arguing that Aristotle 
has two Eudaimonias, one that corresponds to man qua nous and the theo­
retical life, and a second corresponding to man qua suntheton, and the 
moral life.
We h a v e  just stated that, according to Cooper's interpretation, the
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final end of man qua nous is a life devoted to theoretical activity, 
a life that is teleios Eudaimon; and the final end of man qua suntheton 
is a life that consists predominantly of moral activity, but includes 
some theoretical activity in addition, a life that is secondarily 
Eudaimon.
What evidence does Cooper offer to support his view that the superior 
teleia Eudaimonia is to be identified with the life of theoretical 
activity alone?
In many passages in Book 10; 7-9, Aristotle implies directly and 
indirectly that life in accordance with nous includes only theoretical 
activity as intrinsically worthwhile. At 1177b24-31, for example, ho 
says;
... It follows that the activity of our intelligence con­
stitutes the complete/perfect happiness of man, provided 
that it encompasses a complete span of life; for nothing 
connected with happiness must be incomplete.
However, such a life (bios) would be more than human.
A man who would live it would do so not insofar as he is 
human, but because there is a divine element within him.
This divine element is as far above our composite nature 
as its activity is above the active exercise of the other 
(ieu practical) kind of virtue. So if it is true that 
intelligence (ho nous) is divine, in comparison with man, 
then a life guided by intelligence is divine in comparison 
with human life.
Aristotle is clear in this passage that it is the activity of our in­
telligence that constitutes teleia Eudaimonia. It should be noted that 
no such claim is made about moral activity. Aristotle is also clear 
that the activity of nous is as superior to the activity of practical 
virtue as the nature of man as nous is superior to the nature of man qua 
"suntheton. This suggests that the activity of nous (theoretical activity) 
is attributed to man as nous, while the activity of practical virtue is 
attributed to man as suntheton, and also that these two activities are 
as separate as man qua nous and man qua Suntheton. This passage seems 
to suggest that the life (bios) in accordance with nous is completely 
intellectualist.
Cooper's view gains further support from 1178b8-24 where Aristotle
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writes that the gods whose lives are divine engage only in theoretical 
activity. If life in accord with nous is divine (godlike), and the 
gods lead lives that are exclusively intellectualist, it is reasonable 
to conclude that life in accord with nous (ho kata ton noun bios) is 
strictly intellectualist.
Given that (1) man qua nous is man (1178a6-7), (2) that Eudaimonia is. 
attained when an individual fulfils his end qua man and (3) that man qua
nous fulfils his end by engaging in theoretical activity, it follows
that only theoretical activity is worthy of pursuit as an end. Other 
forms of activity (for example, intrinsically pursued moral activity) 
would not enable an individual to fulfil his end qua nous. Cooper 
concludes ;
The identification of oneself, and thus one's true 
interests, with one's intellect and its interests, means 
that one regards everything else as alien, and having no 
independent claims on one's energies. (But)such an 
attitude is obviously incompatible with moral virtue as 
Aristotle understands it. If one possesses a virtue,
one performs the relevant acts for their own sakes,
regarding them as good in themselves; but this one 
could assuredly not do if one thought that any value 
they might encompass was not of any direct interest to 
oneself.
According to Cooper's interpretation, intrinsically pursued moral activity 
is not a constituent part of teleia Eudaimonia, of the life associated 
with man as nous. But at 1178b3-7, Aristotle states that the individual 
who engages in theoretical activity requires external goods so that he 
can perform actions in conformity with moral virtue. Cooper calls this
a "moral slip" on Aristotle's part, and he points out that a man who per-
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_-forms morally virtuous actions is not ipso facto a virtuous man . He
points out that, for Aristotle, a man is only morally virtuous when he
performs morally virtuous acts from a firm and unchangeable character
(1105b5-9; 1105a28-33). Thus, for example, a man who performs just
acts is a just man only if he acts knowingly, does the acts for their
own sakes, and acts from a firm and unchangeable character. But,
Cooper argues, the théoriser who performs virtuous actions is not a
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virtuous man since "Aristotle conspicuously avoids saying that the
30
théoriser will be a virtuous person" . He is merely acting
virtuously because it best suits his interests.
He (the théoriser) may, as Aristotle maintains, have 
reason to act justly from time to time, or liberally 
or courageously, and so on; but he will regard such 
actions as forced upon him by the involvement with 
others that he inescapably finds himself entangled in.
He does in fact live among other men, and must there­
fore keep up appropriate relations with them if he is 
to devote himself as fully as possible to his intel­
lectual work.81
Clearly, of great importance to Cooper’s analysis is the distinction 
between moral activity that is intrinsically pursued (pursued for its own 
sake), and moral activity that is extrinsically pursued (pursued for the 
sake of some further end). According to Cooper’s interpretation, the 
théoriser performs moral actions because it suits him, because it serves 
his other (theorising) interests. The moral activity he engages in is 
thus extrinsically pursued. He engages in moral activity because "he 
does in fact live among other men, and must, therefore, keep up 
appropriate relations with them, if he is to devote himself as fully as 
possible to his theoretical work". In short the théoriser needs 
society if he is to devote himself fully to his intellectual work. He 
needs it for the external goods and general support it can give him. 
Society, however, would not support individuals who openly disregard 
its established moral standards and practices. So, if the théoriser 
wants to remain part of society, if he is to have the external goods he 
requires for study such as libraries and other necessities, he must per- 
, form'moral actions and act according to established moral practices so 
that he will be fully accepted by that society.
Cooper's view, I believe, can be challenged by looking at other - 
passages in the NE which cast serious doubts upon the interpretation.
An alternative view is that the théoriser acts as virtue demands because 
he is a human, and chooses to live as a human being; At 1178b3-7, 
Aristotle writes:
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Blit insofar as he (the théoriser) is human, he 
chooses to act as virtue demands ...
Aristotle implies that although the théoriser is in some sense his nous,
he must still live in the light of the fact that he is also, in some
sense, a human being. It is significant that Aristotle uses the word
"chooses". That the théoriser chooses to act as virtue demands,
suggests that he engages in such activities because he wants to do them
and opts to do them voluntarily for "choice" Aristotle tells us, is a
"deliberate desire for things that are within our power" (lllSall), In 
Cooper’s analysis, in contrast, the théoriser does not freely opt to 
perform these activities at all; he finds that he must comply because 
of his other needs ahd interests.
We know from 1178a9-23 that morally virtuous acts are what Aristotle 
has in mind when he says that the théoriser is human and lives as a human. 
So we can argue that when Aristotle writes that the théoriser chooses 
to live as a human being because hs is human, he is implying that the 
théoriser in some way wishes to develop and exercise his moral capacities.
Such a view is very different from Cooper’s, and it is not clear 
which is to be preferred. If an individual is to be identified with 
his nous alone, then indeed he would have no real use for intrinsically 
pursued moral activity. But neither IŒ nor De Anima give a precise 
and detailed account of the sense in which an individual is his nous, or 
even of the sense in which man qua nous is separate and distinct from 
man qua suntheton.
It should also be noted that, if Cooper’s view is correct, the 
results would be thoroughly unpalatable. If a person acts morally for 
calculated reasons alone, there is no reason why he who is teleios 
Eudaimon should not violate moral principles whenever it would serve his 
best interests, whenever it would maximise his opportunities for theo­
retical activity. There is nothing to prevent us from viewing as teleios 
Eudaimon a man who engages in theoretical activity but who would some­
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times be unjust to others, disrespectful of their worth, and inattentive 
to their personal n e e d s . S u c h  a view would of course have important 
implications for our topic of friendship. But it does seem to be a 
logical consequence of the view that theoretical activity alone con- 
stitutes teleia Eudaimonia, and that man is to be identified strictly 
with his nous.
We must finally consider briefly the nature of the life that is 
secondarily Eudaimon, the life that Aristotle calls ho kata ten alien 
areten (bios) , Such a life clearly consists in intrinsically pursued 
practical and moral activity (1178a9-23). The interesting question is 
whether it includes intrinsically pursued theoretical activity in addition, 
Cooper’s view is that it does so; the life that is secondarily Eudaimon 
is what he calls a ’’mixed life’’. It includes both intrinsically
pursued moral activity, and intrinsically pursued theoretical activity, 
but the balance is weighted in favour of the former.
I think that it is possible to argue that Aristotle does not intend 
the life that is secondarily Eudaimon to include intrinsically pursued 
theoretical activity.
The first point is that Aristotle does not suggest anywhere in NE 
that such activity will be a constituent part of ho kata ten alien areten 
(bios) . If he does intend this life to include theoretical activity, 
in some sense, it is strange that he makes no mention of it.
A second, more important, point that tends to suggest that this 
secondary life does not include intrinsically pursued theoretical 
activity is made by D e v e r e u x .  He points out that in Book 10: 7-9, 
Aristotle always associates ho kata ten alien areten bios, not with nous, 
but with suntheton. These two facts suggest that the man who is secon­
darily Eudaimon has no concern for theoretical activity and pursuits. We 
may also recall that in Book 10; 7-9, Aristotle refers to man qua nous 
as divine, and to man qua suntheton as human. If theoretical activity 
is a manifestation of the divine, but man qua suntheton is human (not
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divine), it is reasonable to argue that the life that is secondarily
Eudaimon, the life that is associated with man as suntheton, does not
include intrinsically pursued theoretical activity. Devereux writes:
In Chapter 8 of Book 10, he (Aristotle) describes the 
second best form of Eudaimonia as a "life in accordance 
with the virtues of our composite (suntheton) nature", 
and he specifies these as moral virtues plus practical 
wisdom; philosophical (theoretical) wisdom is not a 
virtue of our "Composite nature". This way of character­
ising the second best form of Eudaimonia at least suggests 
that the exercise of philosophical wisdom is not an 
essential constituent of the active life.
3.3 Conclusion: The Content of Eudaimonia
' .
The goal of this chapter was to discover the nature or content of
Aristotle's Eudaimonia, We have found that there is good reason to 
argue that there are two Eudaimonias, not one, but the results in respect 
of the content or nature of Eudaimonia are not at all definitive. We 
have failed to establish conclusively whether or not theoretical activity 
is a constituent part of secondary Eudaimonia. We have also failed to 
establish conclusively whether or not intrinsically pursued moral 
activity is a Constituent part of teleia Eudaimonia. Our failure to 
establish conclusively the latter is, for our purposes, more serious 
than our failure to establish conclusively the former. This is so for 
the following reason. "It is only in friendship". Cooper points out, 
"that Aristotle expresses himself directly on the importance to a 
flourishing human life of taking an interest in other persons, merely as 
such^arid” for their own sake" . I t  is thus in friendship alone 
(especially virtue friendship) that we find genuinely other-regarding 
tendencies. In chapter 2, we found that there is an intimate link between 
friendship and the morally virtuous life. We saw, in particular, that 
Aristotle holds that morally virtuous actions may be directed towards 
personal friends and fellow-citizens. The good man performs good deeds 
that benefit his personally-chosen friends, but he is, nevertheless.
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disposed to act well by, and, indeed, benefit, those with whom he is 
not personally connected; In other words, the good man conducts himself 
towards his fellow-citizens in a spirit of friendship rather than of more 
rectitude. There are thus genuinely other-regarding tendencies 
associated with the morally virtuous life. Our next step was to establish 
conclusively that intrinsically pursued moral activity is part of the beçt 
life for man, that it is, in short, part of teleia Eudaimonia. If we 
had been successful in proving this, we would then have shown that there 
are genuinely other-regarding tendencies in Aristotle’s teleia Eudaimonia, 
and that critics who argue that Aristotle’s ethical theory is "ultimately 
selfish" are really unjustified in so doing. As it is, however, we
have not been able to make this final step. We have failed to prove
conclusively that intrinsically pursued moral activity is a constituent 
part of man’s final good.
It might appear that it is Cooper’s two-Eudaimonias interpretation 
which does most harm to the case we have been attempting to construct in 
that the damage for Aristotle is created by pushing intrinsically pursued 
moral activity into a secondary, lesser^Eudaimonia. This, however, is 
not really the case. Comprehensivists argue that there is one Eudaimonia, 
not two, and that this one Eudaimonia consists in intrinsically pursued 
moral activity anh theoretical activity, but most concede that Aristotle
does not place the two activities on a level. It is, of course, the
theoretical life which is placed on a pedestal. Joachim, as we saw, 
noted the absurdity involved in according the two alternative ideals 
^ eqüaT status. There is no doubt in his mind as to which is superior.
Thus, even if there were only one Eudaimonia, the case we have been
attempting to construct would not have been saved. We would still 
want to know whether the genuinely other-regarding qualities of virtue 
and civic friendship that we have associated with intrinsically pursued 
moral activity can also be associated with what Joachim calls "the 
supremely valuable life for man!’. We would still need to know that
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the intimate relationship that holds between friendship and the morally 
virtuous life also holds between friendship and "the supremely valuable 
life for man" (that is, a life devoted to theoretical activity).
We can conclude that the case we have been attempting to construct 
to show the other-regardingness of Aristotle's ethical theory would be 
proved only if, in the case of the two Eudaimonias interpretation,
intrinsically pursued moral activity were a constituent part of primary
or teleia Eudaimonia or, if in the case of the comprehensive inter­
pretation, such activity were a constituent of the superior level of it. 
We have, of course, seen that neither of these cases can be conclusively 
proved. Whether we believe, like Cooper, that there are two Eudaimonias, 
or, like Joachim, that there is one comprising two levels, there is one 
fact of which we can be certain. This is that Aristotle believes that 
theoretical activity is the more prized activity, that it is, in short, 
"supremely valuable for man". As this fact is certain, it is from this 
fact that we must begin our investigations in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
FRIENDSHIP AND THE THEORETICAL LIFE
.4.1 Introduction; Intention and Justification
We have seen how inexplicit Aristotle is in his discussion of the 
nature and content of Eudaimonia. It is for this reason that pur results 
in the last chapter were so inconclusive.. Despite this, we found that 
there was just one fact of which we could be certain, namely that, in 
Aristotle’s theory, the theoretical life is supremely valuable for man.
In this chapter, we shall attempt to establish whether there is an 
intimate relationship between true (virtue) friendship and the theoretical 
life. We shall attempt to establish whether Aristotle intends that 
friendship should play a role in this "supremely valuable" life, and we 
shall also attempt to establish whether he can justify that intention. 
These two issues are separate. It might be the case that Aristotle 
intends that true friendship should play a role in the theoretical life, 
but that given certain assumptions he makes, for example, assumptions 
regarding the nature of the soul, he cannot justify his intentions.
Given that there are these two issues of intention and justification, 
they can be combined in such a way as to yield the following four 
possibilities:
(1) That Aristotle intends that friendship should play no role in the 
theoretical life, and he provides no justification for the exis­
tence of such a role.
(2)'"That Aristotle intends that friendship should play a role in the 
theoretical life, and he provides a justification for the exis­
tence of such a role.
(3) That Aristotle intends that friendship should play no role in the 
theoretical life, but (his theory is such that) a justification 
could, nonetheless, be given for the existence of such a role.
(4) That Aristotle intends that friendship should play a role in the
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theoretical life, but (his theory is such that) he cannot 
justify the role.
We shall attempt to establish which one of the four possibilities
is true of the h e . Given the truth of Cooper’s claim that it is only
in virtue friendship that Aristotle expresses himself directly on the
value of "taking an interest in other people merely as such and for their
own sakes"^, it seems that if (1) is true, Aristotle’s ethical theory is
2
"ultimately selfish" as some critics have argued . However, if (2) is 
true, the criticism would be completely unjustified. What can we say 
about (3) and (4)? Intentions, I believe, are very important. If
Aristotle does not intend that friendship, (and hence other-regardingness) 
should play a vital role in the life that is "supremely valuable for 
man", we could scarcely be justified in exonerating his theory from the 
charge of selfishness, even though his theory is such that it can 
accidentally accommodate true friendship within it. It is simply 
"unintentionally unselfish". If (4) were true, à charge of selfishness 
does not seem justified. It would seem that it is merely unfortunate 
that a sound justification cannot be provided given that Aristotle desires 
a role for true friendship. If (4) were true, it would seem that the 
"selfish" criticism would have to be modified to read "selfish - but un­
intentionally so"; This, of course, takes much of the sting out of the 
criticism.
4.2 Aristotle’s Intentions
4.2.1 The Issue of Autarkeia
In the two books of the dealing with friendship, there is no 
separate section which deals specifically with the friendship of men engaged 
in the theoretical life. Nevertheless, I think it is possible to reach 
some conclusions as to whether or not Aristotle intends that friendship 
should play a vital role in this form of Eudaimonia. Of central
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importance in Aristotle’s discussion is the notion of auj^arkeia (self- 
sufficiency) and we shall, therefore, examine it in some detail.
Aristotle claims that the perfect good must be self-sufficient 
(autarkeia). He informs us at 1097b9-ll that by self-sufficient he 
does not
mean a man who lives his life in isolation, but a man who 
also lives with parents, children, a wife, and friends and 
fellow citizens generally, since man is by nature a social 
and political being.
What he does understand by self-sufficient is "that which taken by itself 
makes something desirable and deficient in nothing". He concludes: "It 
is happiness in our opinion which fits this description".
The chief good, according to Aristotle, must be final. This means 
that it must be desired for its own sake, and not for the sake of some­
thing else. Although we may choose honour, pleasure, reason, and 
virtue for themselves, we could also choose them for the sake of happiness. 
But happiness we could never desire for the sake of something else.
What men choose for its own sake must be completely or perfectly desir­
able and choiceworthy, and deficient in nothing. This is the way in 
which the final good is self-sufficient.
An important point must be made. Happiness (Eudaimonia), as we 
have seen, consists in various activities. According to Cooper’s 
interpretation, teleia Eudaimonia consists in theoretical activity alone, 
while Eudaimonia simpliciter consists in moral activity and some theo­
retical activity too. But, in saying that Eudaimonia consists in certain 
activities (not in others), Aristotle is not making any claims about the 
type of external goods (if any) that might be vital constituents of it.
In saying that Eudaimonia consists in the activity of theoria. and not, 
for example, in the activities of gambling and drinking, Aristotle is 
neither asserting nor denying that certain external goods may be necessary 
and vital constituents of Eudaimonia. The question is quite open.
Teleia Eudaimonia could be inclusive in that it includes certain external
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goods^ or it could be exclusive in that it excludes such goods . The 
passage quoted above suggests that Aristotle wants to include human 
relationships in Eudaimonia; he mentions specifically "parents, chil­
dren, a wife, friends and fellow citizens".
That Aristotle wants to include certain external goods in Eudaimonia 
becomes clearer in the continuation of that passage. Aristotle writes: ,
It is happiness in our opinion which fits this description.
Moreover happiness is of all things the most desirable, and 
it is not counted as one good thing among many others. But 
if it were counted as one among many others, it is obvious 
that the addition of even the least of these goods would 
make it more desirable; for the addition would produce an 
extra amount of good, and the greater amount of good is 
always more desirable than the lesser. We see then that 
happiness is something final and self-sufficient and the end 
of out actions. \ (1097bl5-21)
If Eudaimonia were an exclusive end (in Hardie’s sense), that is, if it
consisted in theoretical activity alone, and omitted all external goods
such as human relationships,then it is surely to be "counted as one good
among many" since the addition of friends, family, and general harmonious
social interaction would produce a greater amount of good. It appears
then that if Eudaimonia is to be self-sufficient (deficient in nothing)
it must be an inclusive end, that is, it must include such external goods,
for otherwise the addition of such goods would make it more desirable.
And if Eudaimonia is not that which is most desirable and choiceworthy,
it is deficient in certain respects, and thus is not self-sufficient
(sufficient unto itself, lacking in nothing). It appears then that
Eudaimonia (and of course teleia Eudaimonia) which cannot be deficient
in any way, must beinclusive ends. They must be particular lifestyles,
forms of life, characterised by certain activities, and certain "external"
goods such as human relationships .
It seems clear then that Aristotle's notion of Eudaimonia and self-
sufficiency cannot be such that it excludes goods such as friends and
social interaction within the city state. Such goods must be included
in Eudaimonia for the simple reason that the individual who has them will
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have a life that is more desirable and choiceworthy than he who is
without them. There are in fact passages in the NE where Aristotle
explicitly says that Eudaimonia includes such goods. At 1099a31-6,
for example, he says:
And there are some external goods the absence of which 
spoils supreme happiness* e.g. good birth, good children, 
and beauty: for a man who is very ugly in appearance or
ill-born or who lives all by himself and has no children 
cannot be classified as altogether happy; even less 
happy perhaps is a man whose children and friends are 
worthless, or one who has lost good children and friends 
through death.
To be self-sufficient, then, it is not necessary to live a"solitary 
life". The definition of self-sufficient at 1097b8-15 is thus quite 
consistent with Aristbtle's claim at the beginning of Book 8 that "nobody 
would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other good 
things-(1155a6-7), and with other claims he makes at 1157b-1158a. In 
these sections he says that even those who are supremely happy wish to 
"spend time" with others; in fact, "solitude suits these people least 
of all" (1157b21). It would surely be strange to make the happy man 
solitary, Aristotle writes elsewhere, and we should not imagine the 
supremely happy person enduring the pain of a solitary life (1169bl6-17). 
"Nobody", he comments, "can endure what is painful continually, not even 
the good itself, were it painful to him" (1158a24-25).
Man’s capacity for self-sufficiency is not realised by isolating 
himself, but by living a life that is truly Eudaimon. "The individual 
when isolated", Aristotle says in the Politics "is not self-sufficient 
;... He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he 
is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god" (1253a26-9).
A man does not become self-sufficient by denying his social nature. In 
this formulation of autarkeia (self-sufficient), Burnet points out,
Aristotle takes the "auto" in autarkeia as what suffices by itself, and not
, 5.
as what suffices for a man by himself
There is, however, another definition of*self-sufficien^*offered by
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Aristotle which appears to compete with,and contradict, the one just 
given by ruling out the possibility of friendship and harmonious social 
relations. We know that it is in the activity of theoria that a human 
being most closely approximates the divine. It is by the activity of 
theoria that humans come closest to living the divine life and come 
closest to attaining complete happiness, and it is as a philosopher that, 
a man is best loved by the gods, since it is reasonable that the gods 
should delight in that which is best and most akin to them (1179a25-6). 
But a god, as we have just seen in the quotation above from the Politics 
has no need of friends for a god is sufficient for himself alone.
This kind of divine self-sufficiency appears to compete with the 
appeals of friendship and harmonious social interaction. Aristotle 
makes clear that this kind of self-sufficiency is a measure of a thing's 
goodness. Among the ways of comparing good things in the Rhetoric, 
Aristotle mentions self-sufficiency since "of two things, that which 
stands less in need of the other, or of other things ... is the greater 
good, since it is more self-sufficing" (1364aS).
Among Aristotle’s recommendations for the theoretical life is its 
self-sufficiency. He suggests that if a man chooses this life, he can, 
in the activity of theoria, be most self-sufficient, independent and 
self-reliant.
And the self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong most 
to the "theoretic" activity. For while a philosopher as 
well as a just man, or one possessing any other virtue, needs 
the necessaries of life; when they are sufficiently equipped 
with things of that sort; the just man needs people towards 
whom and with_whom he will act justly, and the temperate man,
-the "brave man, and each of the others is in the same case, 
but the wise man, even when by himself, can engage in thought, 
and the better the wiser he is; no doubt he can do so 
better if he has fellow workers but he is nonetheless most 
self-sufficient. ' (1177a27-bl)
In this passage, Aristotle claims that the philosopher (he who is engaged
in the theoretical life), like the morally virtuous man, requires the
necessities of life, but unlike him, he can engage in his chosen
activity by himself, without other human beings. Friends, fellow
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citizens, and fellow workers are not vital to him. Aristotle 
certainly does not suggest that human relationships are a "constituent 
good" in his Eudaimonia* that his Eudaimonia would in some way be in­
complete without harmonious human relationships, without friends, parents, 
a wife, and children. This passage seems to contradict 1097bl9-21, and 
1099a31-b6 where we saw that Aristotle explicitly and implicitly holds 
that without such human relationships, Eudaimonia would be deficient (in 
desirability and choiceworthiness) and hence not self-sufficient.
Thus, the passages at 1097b9-21 and 1099a31-36 seem to support what 
Hardie calls the inclusive interpretation, the interpretation that 
Eudaimonia includes certain goods such as friends and harmonious social 
relations in addition to theoretical activity, while the passage at 
1177a27-bl seems to support the exclusive interpretation, the inter­
pretation that Eudaimonia is simply the life of theoretical activity and 
excludes such goods as friends and harmonious social relations.
There is clearly a tension in Aristotle’s account between the 
probable isolation of the philosopher arising both from his desire for 
self-sufficiency (the desire to be godlike) and also from the nature of 
his activity, and the inherent human need and desire for friendship and 
social interaction. This tension mirrors the tension in the between 
man as nous (and, therefore, divine) and man as composite or suntheton 
(and, therefore, human) that we examined before. Hardie’s "inclusive" 
Eudaimonia is more appropriate to man’s nature as suntheton, as a social 
being; his "exclusive" Eudaimonia is more appropriate to man as nous, 
as being.
Aristotle clearly praises the self-sufficiency, independence and 
self reliance of the théoriser; the fact that this man alone "can think 
even when by himself". Despite this, I believe that it is the con­
ception of self-sufficiency attained through community and friendship, 
rather than through total isolation, that Aristotle ultimately prefers.
My argument will refer to some passages in the NE to which we have
120
already referred in the context of moral virtue. The argument is, in 
fact, the parallel of that already given in that context.
Aristotle informs us that although the "activity of our intelli­
gence (nous) constitutes teleia Eudaimonia, such a life would be more 
than human. A man who would live it would ào so not insofar as he is 
human, but because there is a divine element within him.*' The activity 
of nous is as far above the activity of practical virtue as the nature 
of man qua nous is above the nature of man qua suntheton.
Aristotle also informs us that of all people it is the philosopher 
or théoriser who needs the fewest external goods for his activity for 
he can think without political power, without great wealth and without 
other people. But this philosopher is also a human being and insofar as 
he is human, and lives in the society of his fellow men, he chooses to 
live the morally virtuous life. Thus,like the morally virtuous man, > 
he will choose and desire appropriate external goods and this will include 
choosing and desiring friends, family, good children etc. (1178b3-7) .
Even though the théoriser^ i n  some sense his nous, Aristotle still 
insists that he must live in the light of the fact that he is, in some 
sense, human. Neither NE nor De Anima give a precise account of the 
sense in which man is his nous, or of the sense in which man qua nous is 
separate and distinct from man qua suntheton, or complex being. But, 
Aristotle certainly believes that the théoriser must live and choose like 
a human being. He thus acts as a moral agent, lives among his fellow 
men, and shows them concern and respect. The théoriser chooses to live 
as a human being because he is human . He chooses the society of his 
fellow men ( 1178^3—7 )*
This interpretation allows us to make sense of Aristotle's 
assertions about the importance of friendship and harmonious social 
interaction. It allows us to make sense of his comment in the Politics 
that "the individual when isolated is not self-sufficing", and of his 
comment in NE that "by self-sufficiency we do not mean a man who lives
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his life in Isolation, but a man who also lives with parents, children, 
a wife, and friends and fellow citizens generally". It allows us to 
make sense of his comment that "we should not imagine the supremely 
happy person enduring the pain of a solitary life" (1169bl6-17), of the 
comment in Magna Moralia that "the self-sufficient man will need, in 
addition, friendship", and finally, of his comment in that justice 
may be found among men "who share their life with an eye to being self- 
sufficient". It is the notion of self-sufficiency attained through 
friendship and community that, I believe, Aristotle ultimately prefers.
There is another important point concerning the human dimension of 
the théoriser. This point arises out of what was said earlier against 
the purely intellectualist interpretation of Eudaimonia.
The activity of the gods and their perfect happiness is to be 
found in theoretical activity, the life of the mind. The greatest 
happiness for mortals is attained in the same activity, so far as is 
possible for man, as this activity is best and most pleasant. The 
intellectual faculty, that power which makes man think is "our natural 
ruler and guide" (1177al4) , and%ven if it be small in bulk, in power 
and worth it surpasses everything" (1178a2-3). It is thus in the 
activity of theoria that humans come closest to living the lives of the 
gods, and come closest to complete happiness. When they engage in 
theoretical activity they are employing their "best part" (the theo­
retical element of the rational part of the soul) in conformity with 
theoretical wisdom, and the purer and more continuous the activity 
-becomes, the more they approach the realisation of their natures qua 
nous, qua divine. However, as we said before, only the gods can engage 
in pure theoretical activity. Men’s efforts are more limited, first, 
because their intellectual powers are more limited, and secondly, because, 
unlike a god, they also have a material being; they have a body, desires, 
sensations, and appetites which make pure and continuous theoria 
impossible for them. Because men have these limitations, it was argued
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that pure and continuous theoretical activity is an impossible ideal.
It was argued that the purely intellectualist interpretation of Eudaimonia 
must be wrong for it is an ideal that no man can realise, and yet Aristotle 
claims that Vthe good which we are now seeking must be obtainable". We 
then suggested that Eudaimonia must include at some level an attainable 
ideal such as intrinsically pursued moral activity. The inclusion of 
such activity certainly takes care of the problem of man's material mode 
(his desires, appetites, sensations), but what about the problem concer­
ning his limited or imperfect intellectual powers? With imperfect 
intellectual powers, men may find that a life devoted to theoria is too 
high an ideal, too daunting, and thus not fully pleasurable. I think 
that it is here that friendship and the sharing of intellectual 
activities play an important role.
In Book 10 of NE, Aristotle says of the philosopher that "he can 
engage in theoria better with fellow workers" (1177bl). This idea that 
"two heads are better than one" finds support from a passage in the 
Metaphysics. Aristotle writes;
The investigation of truth is in one sense difficult, in 
another easy. An indication of this is that while no one 
is able to attain it properly, neither do they all miss 
the goal, but each one says something about the nature of 
things. Thus, although individually they make little or 
no contribution to the truth, the sum of all their efforts 
is a result of some magnitude. (993a30-b4)
Philosopher friends share in the activity of thought. Aristotle claims
that the greatest mark of friendship is living together, and "sharing
together in discussion and thought" is what living together means in the
,case"6f men, and not, as for cattle "feeding in the same place".
Aristotle enumerates many activities that can be shared; among them is
the study or common pursuit of philosophy (1172al-7). We can, therefore,
say that, as friends, men of intellectual excellence live or share their
lives together as co-workers in theoretical activity.
According to Aristotle, a shared life is compatible with self-
sufficiency. In the NE, he remarks that justice may be found among men
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"who share their life with an eye to self-sufficiency" (1134a26-7). It
is this idea of self-sufficiency attained through community, friendship
and the sharing of activities which, I think, Aristotle ultimately
prefers, and which lies behind his belief that even those engaged in
theoria realise their activity more completely with other philosophers.
Joachim’s interpretation is similar. He writes:
Friendship ...i.e. Intellectual communion and fellowship 
of noble action - so far from arguing a want of self- 
sufficiency in the Eudaimon, is a necessary condition of 
life. For without it. he would be actually endees i.e. 
deficient in something intrinsically aireton (choice- ^
worthy) to him, something therefore which he ought to have.^
4.2.2 Which Type of Friendship?
Before we finally leave the subject of Aristotle’s intentions 
regarding friendship and the theoretical life, we must address one final 
question. In chapter 2, we saw that Aristotle analyses three distinct 
classes of friendship - utility friendships, pleasure friendships, and 
virtue friendships. He has no fourth class called "theoretical friend­
ships''. This,, indeed, is not surprising since, as we noted, there is no 
separate section in the dealing specifically with the friendship of 
men engaged in the theoretical life. Despite this, we have seen that 
it is reasonable to suggest that Aristotle intends that the philosopher 
or théoriser, like all other men, should engage in friendships. But in 
what kind of friendship? The question is very important. Virtue 
friendships are clearly the most other-regarding of the three classes.
The two lesser forms are, of course, much less so. If Aristotle’s 
ethical theory is to be exonerated from the charge of selfishness, we 
need at least to show that he intends that those who are truly Eudaimon 
engage only in the highest form of friendship.
We have seen that Aristotle argues that man fulfils his function, 
attains Eudaimonia, by exercising his soul in conformity with reason.
We have also seen that the "rational part of the soul has two sub-
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divisions (1103al-3), a theoretical subdivision and a practical sub­
division, and that the former is the higher and better of the two. In 
theoretical activity, the individual employs the better and divine 
element of the rational part of the soul. In engaging in such activity, 
he attains teleia Eudaimonia. In contrast, in practical (moral) 
activity, the individual employs the lesser or human element of the 
rational part of his soul. In engaging in such activity, he attains 
"secondary" Eudaimonia.
If the highest form of friendship is appropriate to the individual 
who is secondarily Eudaimon, it seems reasonable to assume that it is 
also appropriate to he who is teleios Eudaimon. It is implausible to 
suggest that he who is teleios Eudaimon should be fulfilled and content 
with inferior friendships. It is more reasonable to suggest that 
Aristotle intends that he who is teleios Eudaimon, like he who is sec­
ondarily Eudaimon, should engage only in the highest form of friendship, 
in virtue friendship. Theoretical wisdom, like practical wisdom, is a 
virtue. It is, in fact, the ^highest virtue". It seems plausible to 
argue that Aristotle should intend that he who lives in conformity with 
the "highest virtue" should choose the highest (virtue) friendship. I 
think that it is quite possible to construct an account of the friend­
ship of intellectually virtuous men which parallels Aristotle's account 
of morally virtuous men. There seems to be no evidence to show that 
the same principles do not hold.
In our discussion of morally virtuous friendship, several points 
_ emerged r ~
1. That morally virtuous men love and choose the good in itself.
2. That this good in itself is to be found, not in the metaphysical 
Platonic heaven, but in the concrete behaviour of virtuous men.
3. That morally virtuous activity or behaviour is good in itself; 
it is chosen as an end in itself, and he who chooses it will be
. Eudaimon.
- ^
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4. That since morally virtuous men cannot but love the good,
affection necessarily accompanies this awareness of the good,
I and it is for this reason that morally virtuous men have
affection for each other.
Morally virtuous men observe each other performing morally 
virtuous acts. This observation brings with it a consciousness 
of oneself and others as moral agents, and this consciousness 
brings with it an admiration and affection for others who share 
the goal of attaining what is morally best. One wishes for the
good of these people just because, and insofar as one is noble
I and virtuous, one wishes for the good in itself, and these people, 
in living such a life, are the personification of this good in
i t s e l f . A n y o n e  who loves the good will love these men, Aristotle
7
says, "qua good men"..
That morally virtuous friends value each other for what is 
essential to themselves, and not for what is accidental. It is 
accidental in Aristotle's account that a man is handsome or 
wealthy. His intrinsic value lies in his mind and in his 
character as ruled and guided by that mind. The morally 
virtuous friend opts for the intrinsic rather than for the in­
strumental, for the essential rather than for the accidental.
That the friendship of morally virtuous men is permanent, not 
transient, for good character, when fully developed, is enduring.
I think that a parallel account can be constructed for intellectually 
virtuous friendship upon the same principles.
1. It is clear that all virtuous men love the good in itself. This 
is the keystone in Aristotle's ethical theory. He who is intellec­
tually virtuous, no less than he who is morally virtuous loves and 
chooses the good in itself.
2 . That this good in itself is to be found, not in the metaphysical
Platonic heaven, but in the activities of intellectually virtuous • 
men.
3. That intellectually virtuous activity is good in itself; it is 
chosen as an end in itself and he who chooses it will be teleios 
Eudaimon. ,
4. All virtuous men love what is inherently good, what is good in it­
self. Morally virtuous men love what is morally good. Theoret­
ically virtuous men love and choose what is intellectually good.
We have argued that, in the case of morally virtuous men, affection 
necessarily accompanies the awareness of the moral good, and it
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is for this reason that morally virtuous men have affection for 
each other. It could similarly be argued that, in the case of 
the intellectual good, affection necessarily accompanies awareness 
of the intellectual good, and it is for this reason that fellow 
theorisers have affection for each other.
Intellectually virtuous men can observe each other's attempts 
at attaining theoretical wisdom. This observation can bring with 
it a consciousness of oneself and others as rational intellectual 
agents, and this consciousness can bring with it an admiration and 
affection for others who, share the goal of attaining intellectual 
excellence. One can wish for the good of these people just because, 
and insofar as one is good, one wishes for the good in itself, and 
these people, in living such a life, are the personification of this 
"good in itself, this intellectual excellence. Just as the inherent 
goodness of moral actions necessarily gives rise to mutual affection 
among fellow promoters of social harmony and welfare, so, it could 
be argued, the inherent goodness and rationality of acts of wisdom 
would necessarily give rise to mutual affection among fellow 
theorisers. •
5. To value and have affection for a man on account of his theoretical
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wisdom is to value and have affection for him on account of what 
he is essentially and not accidentally. Man’s essential and 
intrinsic value lies in his mind, in his rationality. We have seen 
that there is good reason to believe that Aristotle regards theo­
retical wisdom as the higher and better aspect of that rationality, 
the aspect that more truly defines him. Thus, it is certainly 
true to argue that the intellectually virtuous friend opts for the 
intrinsic rather than for the instrumental, for the essential rather 
than for the accidental.
6 . That the friendship of intellectually virtuous men is permanent,
imitating in this the duration of the eternal spheres which such 
\ ' 
friends may help each other to contemplate.
We can summarise this section as follows: Aristotle clearly intends
that the man engaged in theoretical activity, like the man who is engaged 
in moral activity, should have friends. He should not lead a solitary 
life. Aristotle does not specify which of the three classes of friend­
ship would be most appropriate to him. I have tried to show why, 
according to Aristotle's principles, according to what he says generally 
about friendship, virtue and the theoretical life, it is reasonable to 
suppose that it is the class of virtue friendship which is appropriate 
to the man who is teleios Eudaimon.
In chapter 2 we argued that virtue friendships have distinct other- 
regarding features. In particular, we noted that the well-wishing and 
affection in virtue friendship is genuine and unconditional; it is felt 
oh account of what the friend is in himself, and not on account of any 
pleasures and advantages he can offer. The affection and well-wishing 
is thus not hedged about with self-regarding conditions and qualifications, 
There is no,evidence in NE to show that the same principles do not hold 
in the case of intellectually virtuous friendships, that the unconditional 
and genuine well-wishing and affection that obtains in the case of 
morally virtuous friendship cannot also hold in the case of intellec­
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tually virtuous f r i e n d s h i p s . W e  have also seen in this section that 
there is some reason to believe that Aristotle intends that the man who 
is theoretically virtuous and, therefore, teleios Eudaimon, is also a 
good moral agent. He acts morally, not as Cooper suggests, because it 
suits his interests, but because he is a human being and he chooses to 
live as one. He thus desires and chooses the company of others, and 
he desires and chooses to live a moral life. Fbr these reasons, we can 
say that Aristotle does not intend the theoretical life to be a selfish 
one, and those engaged in it to be selfish.
At the beginning of this chapter, a distinction was drawn between 
"intention" and "justification". It was suggested that although
Aristotle might intend that his théoriser also be a good friend and a
morally virtuous man, he may not be able to justify that intention
because of certain assumptions he makes. It is to this topic of justi­
fication that I shall now t u r n . I t  will require a detailed examination 
of the nature of man’s soul. If Aristotle is to justify the claim that 
the théoriser chooses a moral life and chooses to be a good friend, he 
must show that there is some connection between the emotional and 
affective elements of the soul, and the intellectual element of the soul, 
for, if there is no such connection, the appropriate feelings and 
emotions that characterise friendship and which are also necessary for 
moral action could not be generated.
,4..3 -"Aristotle’s Justification
4.3.1 The Nature of the Soul
In NE Book 1, 13, Aristotle begins his discussion of the virtues
. ■ .:■■■ \ 8 ' 
with a brief analysis of the nature of the soul He informs us that
it consists of two elements, one rational and one non-rational. These
elements in turn each consist of two parts .
In respect of the parts of the non-rational element, Aristotle
comments :
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Thus we see that the irrational element of the soul has 
two parts: one is vegetative and has no share in reason
at all, the other is the seat of the appetites and of 
desire in general and partakes of reason insofar as it 
complies with and accepts its leadership; it possesses 
reason in thé sense that we say it is "reasonable" to 
accept the advice of a father and of friends, not in the 
sense that we have a rational understanding of mathematical 
propositions. (1102b28-33)
In respect of the parts of the rational element he says:
If it is correct to say that the appetitive (part) too 
has reason, it follows that the rational element of the ;
soul has two subdivisions: the one possesses reason in
the strict sense, contained within itself, and the other 
possesses reason in the sense that it listens to reason 
as one would listen to a father. (1103al-4)
When Aristotle says that the one subdivision "possesses reason in the 
strict sense, contaihed within itself", he is referring to the calcu­
lât ive and theoretical parts. The subdivision that "possesses reason 
in the sense that it listens to a father" is the appetitive part that 
listens to practical wisdom.
Man’s soul thus consists in three parts. First, there is the 
vegetative, completely non-rational part. This is responsible for 
growth and nutrition but it plays no part in man’s fulfilment as a
rational being. Secondly, there is an appetitive part (or capacity)
which is part rational and part non-rationali It is the centre of 
appetite and desire and it can listen to reason and conform to it. This 
part plays a role in the fulfilment of man as a rational being since it 
is ip some sense rational. Thirdly, there are the parts (or capacities) 
that "possess reason in the strict sense, contained within itself" and 
have no associatipp^with desire and appetite: These purely rational
parts (or capacities), the calculative and theoretical, play the most 
important role in the fulfilment of man as a rational being.
The appetitive, calculative and theoretical parts (or capacities) 
may be described as the rational parts (or capacities) of the soul.
These rational parts (or capacities) may be realised or used in rational 
activities. We know that, for Aristotle, a man attains Eudaimonia 
when he fulfils his function as a rational being. Thus, we can say
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that when a man engages in activities that use these three rational 
capacities, he is fulfilling his function as a rational being, and he 
thereby attains Eudaimonia. He who uses these capacities fully, 
engages in excellent (virtuous) activity and is, accordingly, an 
excellent (virtuous) man.
The three rational parts (or capacities) of the soul all have 
separate virtues. Moral virtue (morally virtuous activity) is the 
virtue of the appetitive part ; practical wisdom (practical activity) is 
the virtue of the calculative part ; and theoretical wisdom (theoretical 
activity) is the virtue of the theoretical part.
. In respect of moral virtue, Aristotle says:
Virtue or excellence is a characteristic involving choice, 
and it consists in observing the mean relative to us, a 
mean which is defined by a rational principle such as a 
man of practical wisdom would use to determine it
(1106b36-1107a2)
It is clear that Aristotle sees a relation between moral virtue, (the
virtue of the appetitive part) and practical wisdom, (the virtue of the
calculative part). We shall examine the relation shortly. But we
should note now that practical wisdom is essential to moral virtue. The
mean is determined by the individual who has practical wisdom. The
importance of practical wisdom for the practice of moral virtue is also
stated by Aristotle at 1106bl0:
For it is moral virtue that is concerned with emotions and 
actions, and it is in emotions and actions that excess, 
deficiency^ and the median are found. Thus we can experience 
fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, and generally any 
kind of pain either too much or too little, and in either 
case not properly. But to experience all this at the right 
toward the right object, toward the right people, for 
the right reason, and in the right manner ...this is the 
median and the best course, the course that is a mark of 
virtue. (1106bl6-23)
In respect of practical wisdom, the virtue of the calculative part,
Aristotle says:
It (practical wisdom) is a truth attaining characteristic 
of acting rationally in matters good and bad for man 
That is why we think that Pericles and men like him have 
practical wisdom. They have the capacity of seeing what
'"ry/ '/vr-' y-'^y'. isi
is good for themselves and for mankind, and these are, we
believe; the qualities of men capable of managing house­
holds and states. (1140b4-ll)
He who has practical wisdom calculates and deliberates well. But as
"no one deliberates about objects that cannot be other than as they are"
(1139al2-13); practical wisdom must deal with "objects" that admit of 
being otherwise, with things that are contingent. For Aristotle, there , 
are two kinds of contingent things; (1) things that are made, that is, 
artifacts and (2) things that are done, that is , actions performed in 
the city state. For our purposes (2) is especially important. The 
ability to do the right thing, to the right people, in the right circum­
stances, and in the right manner is directly dependent on the application 
of the virtue (or excellence) of practical wisdom.
Aristotle notes:
Practical wisdom, on the other hand, is concerned with 
human affairs and with matters about which deliberation 
is possible. As we have said, the most characteristic 
function of a man of practical wisdom is to deliberate 
well: no one deliberates about things that cannot be
other than they are, nor about things that are not directed 
to some end, an end that is good and attainable by action.
In an unqualified sense, that man is good at deliberating 
whOj by reasoning, can aim at and hit the best thing 
attainable to man by action. (1141b8-14)
Practical wisdom enables a man to deliberate well about actions he can 
perform. Aristotle denies that the actions upon which the man of 
practical wisdom deliberates are simply those that enhance his own well­
being. Practical wisdom is concerned with the welfare of the individual 
who possesses it, but it cannot be confined to the welfare of that indi­
vidual alone sinc.e__the individual is first and foremost a member of the 
society. ■ ■
A man who knows and concerns himself with his own 
interests is regarded as a man of practical wisdom ...
For people seek their own good and think that this is 
what they should do ... And yet surely one's own good 
cannot exist without household management nor without 
a political system. (1142al-10)
At 1141b24-27, Aristotle tells us that practical wisdom includes the
science of politics and legislation. Thus we can say that the capacity
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of practical wisdom has a wide field of application, extending to all 
social, political and moral affairs. Problems in these areas could 
not be adequately solved by individuals who lacked the .capacity to 
deliberate well.
In respect of theoretical wisdom which is the virtue or excellence 
that stems from the theoretical part of the rational element of the soul, 
Aristotle says:
It is, therefore, clear, that wisdom must be the most precise 
and perfect form of knowledge. Consequently, a wise man 
must not only know what follows from fundamental principles, 
but he must also have true knowledge of the fundamental 
principles themselves; Accordingly, theoretical wisdom 
must comprise both intelligence and scientific knowledge.
(1141al6-19)
\
Theoretical wisdom, unlike practical wisdom, deals with fundamental 
principles and realities that do not admit of being otherwise. It does 
not deal with contingent matters; nor does it have any affiliation with 
desire, choice and human action. Its only goal is the attainment of 
truth and the avoidance of falsity in the realm of eternal and necessary 
truths. It thus deals with knowledge of the highest and purest kind. 
Aristotle makes the contrast between practical wisdom and theoretical 
wisdom very clear. Practical wisdom is the foundation of all deliber­
ation and choice and is the virtue responsible for decision and action 
in the field of man’s moral, social and political well-being. Theo­
retical wisdom, in contrast, is the capacity that enables a man to 
discover fundamental principles and to make correct deductions from them. 
It is the virtue or excellence responsible for attaining truth in the 
_sphefe of eternal and unchanging reality.
We must now examine the relationships that exist between the three 
virtues. In particular, we shall need to discover if there are any 
substantive relationships between theoretical wisdom and practical 
wisdom, and between theoretical wisdom and moral virtue. This will 
enable us to establish whether the individual who is teleios Eudaimon,
or most proficient in theoretical actiyity is necessarily most
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proficient at performing actions that have the good of his fellow men 
at heart (whether, in short, he is also most proficient in practical 
wisdom), and it will also help us to establish whether he who is teleios 
Eudaimon also has the capacity to experience the other-regarding emotions 
that are central to personal and civic friendship.
There is much evidence to suggest a substantive relationship between, 
moral virtue and practical wisdom. It seems that Aristotle is attempting 
to show that these two virtues are mutually dependent upon each other in 
the sense that neither virtue can be complete without the other.
Aristotle suggests that moral virtue is a sine qua non condition 
for practical wisdom in that,' without moral virtue, the means-end 
deliberative ability that characterises practical wisdom is indistin­
guishable from cleverness . An individual who has the ability to work 
out appropriate means to a desired end, but who lacks moral virtue may 
be said to possess the capacity of cleverness, but not the capacity of 
practical wisdom. He is not, in short, a phronimos. For Aristotle, 
moral action must always have an end, and this end is what is intrin­
sically right and good. Deliberative excellence, excellence in means- 
end reasoning cannot provide this end.
A man fulfils his proper function only by way of practical 
wisdom and moral excellence or virtue: virtue makes us
aim at the right target, and practical wisdom makes us use
the right means. (1144a6-9)
"No choice", Aristotle informs us, "will be right without practical wis­
dom and (moral) virtue. For virtue determines the end, and practical 
wisdom makes us do what is conducive to that end". A morally good 
action results from the operation of moral virtue (which supplies the 
intrinsically right end) and of practical wisdom (which supplies the 
appropriate means). We know that, for Aristotle, a man is not good
because he performs a good action. To be morally good, he must perform
that action for its inherent goodness and rightness. The donation of 
a sum of money to a charitable organisation, for example, may be made 
either because it is (a) useful - the donor may be standing for office
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and feel that a reputation for charity would be helpful; (b) pleasant 
“ the donor may enjoy thinking of himself as a benefactor; or (c) good 
- the benefactor may make his donation for the sake of what is proper, 
correct, the right thing to do, and this, for Aristotle, equals what is 
morally good. Aristotle tells us many times that this motive, based 
upon a perception of what it is necessary to do, is the only one which 
gives moral value to an act. The objective constituents of correct 
action will always vary, because situations always vary, but the sub­
jective constituents wilT always be the same - a choice of the good for 
the sake of the good. In the case of (a) and (b) above, the agent is 
not acting morally. \ He is merely employing cleverness in finding means 
appropriate to an end he desires. But the end is not a moral end. Moral 
virtue "aims at the right target" and makes our choice right for it is 
moral virtue that causes us to perform good and right acts just because 
they are intrinsically good and right, just because they have intrinsic 
worth. Thus we can say that moral virtue is a sine qua non condition
for practical wisdom; it is necessary for a man to have moral virtue
if he is to have practical wisdom in the true sense, and not mere 
cleverness.
It is clear that just as practical wisdom requires moral virtue for 
its completion, so moral virtue requires practical wisdom for its com­
pletion. Aristotle argues for the dependence of moral virtue upon 
practical wisdom by distinguishing between full moral virtue and natural 
virtue, just as he argues for the dependence of practical wisdom upon 
moral virtue by distinguishing practical wisdom from cleverness.
Just as there exist two kinds of quality, cleverness and 
practical wisdom, in that part of us which forms opinions 
(i.e. in the calculative element) so also there are two
kinds of quality in the moral part of us, natural virtue,
and virtue in the full sense. Now virtue in the full 
sense cannot be attained without practical wisdom.
(1144bl2-17)
"Natural virtue" is a trait or capacity that can be found in "children 
and beasts" (1144b4-9):
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But it is evident that without intelligence, (natural 
virtue) is harmful ... (if a man acts blindly i.e. using 
his natural virtue alone, he will fail;) but once he 
acquires intelligence it makes a great difference to his 
action. At that point, the natural characteristic will 
become that virtue in the full sense which it previously 
resembled.
An individual may "be just and capable of self-control" because he has
natural virtue. But his justice and self-control is only "good in the •
full sense" if it is guided by and, indeed, united with practical wisdom*
Moral virtue or excellence, he tells us, "is not only a characteristic
which is guided by right reason, but also a characteristic which is
united with right reason; and right reason in moral matters is practical
wisdom" (1144b21-5). Thus, we can say that it is necessary for a man
to have practical wisdom if he is to have moral virtue, (moral virtue in
the full sense and not mere natural virtue).
Aristotle states clearly the mutual dependence of the two virtues
upon each other;
Our discussion, then, has made it clear that it is impossible 
to be good in the full sense of the word without practical 
wisdom or to be a irian of practical wisdom without moral 
excellence or virtue. (ll44b30-32)
We must now try to establish whether there is a relationship of
mutual dependence between moral virtue and theoretical reason similar to
that which we have just found to exist between moral virtue and practical
reason. It seems clear that the answer must be negative. Moral virtue,
Aristotle informs us, involves choosing what is right. Theoretical
wisdom, in contrast, deals with attaining pure truth, not truth displayed
in action.
What affirmation and negation are in the realm of thought, 
pursuit and avoidance are in the realm of desire. There­
fore, since moral virtue is a characteristic involving
choice, and since choice is a deliberative desire, it follows
that if the choice is to be good, the reasoning must be true, 
and the desire correct; that is, reasoning must affirm what 
desire pursues. This then is the kind of thought and the 
kind of truth that is practical and concerned with action.
On the other hand, in the kind of thought involved in theo­
retical knowledge, and not in action or production, the good 
and the bad states are, respectively, truth and falsehood.
(1139a21-8)
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Aristotle’s point is that moral virtue is inextricably tied to desire, 
choice and action, whereas theoretical wisdom which has no such link is 
concerned with knowledge, truth and falsity of a hon-practical kind. He 
is separating pure theoretical reasoning from the desire or choice-linked 
practical reasoning which is central to moral activity. The precise 
nature of the separation is not made clear, but it seems sufficient to 
rule out the possibility of a substantive relationship between moral 
virtue and theoretical wisdom.
We have found that there is a relationship of mutual dependence 
obtaining between moral virtue and practical wisdom. We have also found 
that no comparable relationship obtains between moral virtue and theo- 
retical wisdom. To complete the task, we must attempt to establish 
whether there is an integral relationship between practical wisdom and 
theoretical wisdom. We need to know, in particular, whether it is 
possible for an individual to have practical wisdom and not theoretical 
wisdom, or theoretical, wisdom and not practical wisdom. The latter is, 
of course, more important for the topic of friendship, as we need to 
know whether he who engages most fully in the theoretical life is 
necessarily morally virtuous and a good friend. I shall try to show 
that the two virtues are, in fact, sharply contrasted in that they have 
different fields of application and also different ends or functions.
We have already seen that the two virtues have different fields of 
application, so only a few words are necessary by way of a reminder. 
Practical wisdom deals with contingent matters that are capable of being 
-Otherwise, whereas theoretical wisdom deals with things that are eternal 
and unchanging. The contingent matters with which practical wisdom 
deals are matters that are in our power and can b© altered by human 
actions. Practical wisdom, unlike theoretical wisdom can, therefore, 
never be concerned with immutable truths, and with objects whose nature 
is divine. This already suggests a certain lack of common ground 
between the two virtues, but the distinction becomes sharper when we
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investigate the end or function of both virtues.
Both virtues have truth as their goal or end (1139bl2-13). Hut
the end of practical wisdom is truth concerning actions whioh are
particular and"that can be otherwise, while the ertd of theoretical
wisdom is truth concerning things that are universal and necessary.
The end-of practical wisdom is truth in'harmony with correct desire  ^ .
. (1139b29) but-'the end of theoretical wisdom is attainment of truth
and avoidance of falsity. , ,
The case for the independence of the two virtues is strengthened by
the fact that Aristotle never claims that theoretical wisdom will depend
upon practical wisdom for its proper functioning. We have seen that
' ' \ '
theoretical wisdom enables a man to have true knowledge of fundamental
principles and, in addition, to know what follows from such principles
In fact, it is intelligence (nous) that provides knowledge of the former,
it is scientific knowledge (episteme) that provides knowledge of the
10
latter (1139b31-2) . But neither nous nor episteme require practical
wisdom for their proper functioning.
In view of the fact that theoretical wisdom has a different field 
of application from practical wisdom, aims at a different end or goal 
from practical wisdom and, finally, does not require it for its proper 
functioning, it is clear that the two virtues are not substantively 
related to each other. There would appear to be no reason why a man 
who excels in one of these two virtues should necessarily excel in the 
other. Aristotle, in fact, admits as much,
L^Ouy^discussldh has shown that theoretical knowledge com- 
T prises both scientific knowledge and (apprehension by the)
intelligence of things which by their nature are valued 
most highly. That is why it is said that men like 
Anaxagoras and Thales have theoretical wisdom but not 
practical wisdom; when we see that they do not know what 
is advantageous to them, we admit that they know extra­
ordinary, wonderful, difficult and superhuman things, but 
call their knowledge useless because the good they are 
seeking is not human. (1141b2-9)
This passage is especially significant and revealing for in it Aristotle
allows that an individual may have theoretical wisdom and lack practical
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wisdom, and that practical wisdom, therefore, is not a necessary con­
dition for possessing and using theoretical wisdom. Anaxagoras and 
Thales are his examples of men who "have theoretical wisdom but not 
practical wisdom". If it is possible to have theoretical wisdom with­
out practical wisdom, it is not reasonable to argue that the two virtues 
are integrally related and are mutually dependent upon each other.
An individual may clearly have theoretical wisdom and not practical 
wisdom. Is the reverse also true? For our purposes, this half of the 
relation is much less important, so only two brief comments will be made.
In the first place, it should be noted again that the chief charac­
teristic of the man of practical wisdom is that he deliberates well.
There is no reason to suppose that a man who deliberates well, who makes 
correct choices in the field of human action should necessarily excel in 
acquiring knowledge of fundamental principles (and what follows from 
them), any more than he who excels in the latter should also excel in 
the former.
Secondly, Aristotle never suggests that he who has the virtue of 
practical wisdom will necessarily also have the virtue of theoretical 
wisdom. The only other virtue that the phronimos has in addition to 
practical wisdom is, as we have seen, moral virtue.
We can now see that theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom are 
not integrally related to each other; there is no relation of mutual 
dependence between these two virtues ;
We have seen that it is possible for an individual to have theo- 
j'etioal'^wlsdom and 'not practical wisdom. We have also seen that it is 
possible for an individual to have theoretical wisdom and not moral 
virtue. We must now spell out the implications of this situation for 
the theory of friendship.
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4.3.2 Good Deeds and Friendship
In chapters 2 and 3, we established that there is a very close 
relationship between the performance of good deeds and the highest form 
of friendship. We saw that the relationship between virtue-friendship, 
complete justice and virtue could be stated in the following way: in
doing the right thing, virtue is present; in doing the right thing 
relation to others , complete justice is present ; in being conscious of 
oneself doing the right thing, affection for oneself or self-love is 
present; in being conscious of another doing the right thing, friendship 
or affection for that other is present. Because good men love the good, 
affection always accompanies this awareness of the good.
It is important to note that good deeds are of prime significance
in the life of the virtuous man, the completely just man, and the virtuous
friend. The importance of good deeds in true friendship is clearly
stated by Aristotle:
We define a friend as one who wishes and does what is 
good. . (1166a2-3) , (My ital.)
Similarly, when he contrasts friendship with goodwill, he again emphasises
good deeds. Good deeds, particularly those that aim to benefit, are a
feature of friendship, but not of goodwill;
Affection implies intimacy, whereas goodwill can spring 
up quite suddenly as happens in the case of competitors 
at athletic festivals; ; for the spectators feel goodwill 
towards them: and share their hopes, but they would not 
do anything to help them, because their goodwill is a 
sudden development, and their kindly feeling is super­
ficial. (1166b34-1167a2) (my ital.)
Good deeds are thus important in virtue friendship. Virtue friends not
only share each other’s goals and aspirations, they also choose to help
e^ .ch^ othert:i,v
When the virtue friend performs good deeds, he does so for the sake 
of the good and noble, for the sake of what is proper and correct. 
Aristotle tells us many times that this motive, based upon a perception 
of what it is necessary to do, is the only one which gives moral value 
to an act. He also tells us many times that it is the combination of
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the powers of moral virtue and practical wisdom that enables a man to 
choose and perform good deeds. In performing good deeds, a man employs 
practical wisdom and moral virtue, but not theoretical wisdom.
We have seen that it is possible to have theoretical wisdom and to 
lack practical wisdom and moral virtue. It is, therefore, possible to 
excel in theoretical activity and to be thoroughly deficient or incom­
petent in moral, social and political activities. The words: " i t  is 
possible" are i m p o r t a n t . T h e r e  is no relationship of mutual dependence 
between theoretical activity and moral virtue, or between theoretical 
activity and practical wisdom so that the presence of theoretical wisdom 
does not guarantee the presence of either moral virtue or practical wisdom. 
But, at the same time, there is no evidence to suggest that theoretical 
wisdom in any way precludes or excludes moral virtue or practical wisdom, 
so that he who excels in theoretical activity must necessarily fail in 
practical activity. It seems, therefore, that a man may embody both 
kinds of wisdom, or he may not. It seems clear, then, that the morally 
good man and the théoriser can coincide, but that the coincidence is a 
matter of contingent fact rather than of necessity. The contrast between 
virtue friendship and moral excellence on the one hand, and virtue friend­
ship and theoretical excellence on the other, can be stated in the 
following way: The morally virtuous man, the completely just man and
the true friend are all different descriptions of one and the same 
individual - the individual who is a phronimos. But we cannot extend 
the identity to include theoretical wisdom too. The philosopher or 
théoriser is not necessarily the morally virtuous man, the completely 
just man and the true friend. It may be that the théoriser and the 
good friend often coincide, but it is not necessary that he does so. We 
must, therefore, conclude that we may describe as teleios Eudaimon the 
man who lacks the capacities for moral, and hence, other-regarding 
activities.
The point that the théoriser can lack moral virtue and practical
141
wisdom might be conceded, but an objector might argue along the 
following lines: an individual who lacks moral virtue and practical
wisdom can, nonetheless, perform good deeds and other-regarding acts of 
the kind that are usually associated with virtue friendship. Aristotle 
speaks of natural virtuej,and he speaks of an individual's acting justly 
through natural virtue. Although he does not specify which kind of . 
justice he means, it is quite plausible to suggest that he means com­
plete justice, for why should a man not be naturally generous, naturally 
brave, and naturally thoughtful? It would then be possible to say that 
an individual who lacks practical wisdom and moral virtue could, never­
theless, perform good deeds, aim to benefit others, and act in a genoraliy 
other-regarding manner.
Such an argument would, I think, have two weaknesses. The first is 
that there is no relation of mutual dependence between theoretical wisdom 
and natural virtue. The individual who has theoretical wisdom need not 
necessarily have natural virtue. Natural virtue, like other natural • 
characteristics, varies between individuals. It is thus quite possible 
for a man to excel in theoretical activity and possess little natural 
virtue.
The second weakness of the argument is as follows: Aristotle says,
as we have seen, that the théoriser "chooses to act as virtue demands" 
and this suggests that engaging in such activities is something he wants 
to do and freely opts to do. This is because, for Aristotle, "choice" 
is "a deliberate desire for things that are within our power" (lllSall).
-But natural virtue, in contrast, is spontaneous and unchosen. It is for 
this reason that Aristotle argues that animals and children who lack the 
power to choose, can, nonetheless, possess natural virtue. The only 
moral virtue for Aristotle is choice of the good for the sake of the 
good. Thus, deeds that benefit others, but which are performed from 
natural virtue cannot be counted as moral in the full sense and cannot 
give Aristotle what he needs to justify his claim that the théoriser
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"chooses to act as virtue demands". We must, therefore, conclude that 
it is not the case that the théoriser is necessarily a man who has 
genuine moral virtue in the sense that he chooses to perform acts that 
benefit others and, hence, engages in other-regarding activities.
Our objector might concede this point, but press his case in a 
different direction; He may argue that it is a mistake to give the perr
formance of good deeds so central a place for it is not by performing good
deeds alone that a man may be a good friend and be genuinely other- 
regarding. Our objector might argue that the friendship of fellow 
theorisers must be sharply distinguished from the friendship of fellow 
promoters of social harmony and welfare. In the case of the former,
there need not occur "acts of friendship", as such, but only a common
consciousness of acts of wisdom whose inherent goodness and rationality 
would necessarily give rise to mutual affection. The affection and 
well-wishing felt for the friend in the case of theoretical virtue
friendship is just as unconditional as it is in the case of morally
virtuous friendship. In both cases, it is based upon what is intrinsic 
and essential rather than upon what is extrinsic and accidental. In 
both cases, it is based upon what the friend is in himself (his rational 
soul) rather than upon the advantages or pleasures the friend can give, 
so the affection and well-wishing is genuinely other-regarding and totally 
unselfish. In the case of the morally excellent man, we may say that
his intrinsic value lies in his mind, and in his character as ruled and
guided by that mind, and that affection and well-wishing is based upon 
__that -intrinsic self. In the case of the theoretically excellent man, we 
may say that his intrinsic value lies in his mind, in particular, in his 
nous or that part of him which is most divine and godlike, and that the 
affection and well-wishing is based on that intrinsic self. To wish for 
the friend's preservation for the sake of what best defines him, namely 
his power of theoretical thought (nous),our objector could argue, is most 
laudable and certainly unselfish.
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The latter point is surely correct. To wish someone well, to have
affection for him on account of what he is in himself, rather than on
account of what is to be gained from him for oneself is, as we have
argued before, an important feature of unselfishness. Nevertheless,
I think that the argument as developed in the last paragraph may be
faulted on two accounts. First, 1 believe that it is implausible to
argue that good deeds are completely irrelevant. Secondly, I think it
is possible to show that someone who lacks moral virtue (as the man of
outstanding theoretical ability may do) may not, on that account,
experience the requisite affection and other emotions that are central
to friendship; I shall deal with the first point in the remainder of
this section and with the second point in the next section.
My case for the importance of good deeds in theoretical virtue
friendships will be brief and will centre around two related examples
that stem from comments that Aristotle makes.
Even less happy perhaps is a man whose children and 
friends are worthless or who has lost good children 
and friends through death. (1099b4-6)
y Suppose that there are two philosophers, A and B. A is very
wealthy, and B is quite poor. B's young son becomes ill, is taken to
the doctor who diagnoses that*he has a certain condition which must be 
treated quickly otherwise he will die. B, however, is most distressed 
because the treatment is very expensive and he knows that he cannot, by 
himself, raise sufficient money now or perhaps at any time. A gets to 
know of B ’s predicament. It seems clear that A should practise the 
virtue"OT generosity, that it is implausible to argue that moral virtue 
and good deeds are irrelevant to those engaged in the theoretical life.
If A does not make the money available to B on terms B can manage, then 
he is surely not a good friend. To be a good friend, A must have 
affection for B and wish him well, but one cannot plausibly argue that 
such affection and well-wishing is displayed in being totally neglectful 
and unresponsive to B's personal needs, and the personal needs of those
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he loves. Aristotle, of course, sees this clearly; he notes the
importance of helping friends (1167a9) and he argues that "insofar as
(the philosopher): is human and lives in the society of his fellow men,
he chooses to act as virtue demands" (1178b3-7) .
In the related example, we can suppose that it is B himself who is
ill, his philosophy begins to suffer but, as above, he cannot afford the.
treatment because-, unlike A, he is quite poor. Even as a philosopher
he has the needs of a human being:
But being a man (the philosopher) will need external pros­
perity; for our nature is not sufficient for the purpose 
of contemplation, but our body must also be healthy, and 
must have food and other attention. (1178b33-5)
As a man, the théoriser has certain needs which must be fulfilled. That
is, even though the théoriser in some sense is his nous (and neither NE 
nor De Anima give a precise account of the sense in which he is his 
nous), Aristotle still insists that he has human needs and must, there­
fore, live in the light of the fact that he is, in some sense, a human 
being. If A wishes for his friend's preservation for the sake of what 
best defines him, namely his power of thought (nous) , and he sees his 
friend's philosophy suffering through ill-health, then he must surely 
see the appropriateness of an act of generosity. Friendship without 
good deeds would be no friendship at all.
4.3.3 Affection, Moral Emotion and Friendship
We have already seen that theoretical wisdom is concerned with 
knowledge, truth and falsity in their non-practical applications, and 
that such wisdom has no connection with desire, choice and action. We
have also seen that practical wisdom and moral virtue, in contrast, are
inextricably bound to desire, choice, and action, and that in order to 
act correctly and well, an individual must employ his powers of practical 
wisdom and moral virtue. Virtuous action, in short, depends upon the 
correct application of practical wisdom and moral virtue. In this 
final section, I shall attempt to extend the analysis by showing how, in
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Aristotle's account, appropriate emotional experience and response 
(this term will be explained shortly) also depend upon the correct 
application of practical wisdom and moral virtue. This dependence of 
emotional experience upon practical wisdom and moral virtue is very 
significant for our purposes for the following reason. We know that a 
man may possess theoretical wisdom and yet lack practical wisdom and  ^
moral virtue. If appropriate emotional experience depends upon practical 
wisdom and moral virtue, then it follows that it is possible for an indi­
vidual who lacks these capacities to lack also these appropriate emotional 
experiences and responses. It is, of course, possible for a man to 
possess both theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom and moral virtue; 
the possession of theoretical wisdom does not exclude the possession of 
the other two excellences, but equally it does not guarantee their 
presence.
Aristotle informs us that by emotions:
I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, 
friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, 
and in general the feelings that are accompanied by 
pleasure and pain. (1105b21-23)
He adds that it is not the presence of these emotions alone that make us
virtuous; we do not praise a man merely because he feels a particular
emotion such as pity but we do praise a man who "feels it in a certain
way" (1105b28-33).
I shall now attempt to show that in order to feel these emotions in
a certain way, in order to be praised, a man must employ moral virtue.
Fqr_lt is moral virtue that is concerned with emotions 
and actions, and it is in emotions and actions that 
excess, deficiency and the median are found. Thus we 
can experience fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity 
and generally any kind of pleasure and pain either too 
much or too little, and in either case not properly.
But to experience all this at the right time, toward 
the right objects, toward the right people, for the 
right reason, and in the right manner - that is the 
median and the best course, the course that is a mark 
of virtue. (1106bl6-23)
It is thus possible to feel too little of a particular emotion, or too
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much, or to feel it in the wrong manner, for the wrong person, or for
the wrong reason. It is possible, for example, to feel too little
pity or sympathy for a friend who is in a particular predicament, or to
feel it in the wrong manner or even for the wrong reason. It is moral
virtue that enables us to attain the median or mean in respect of pur
emotions, to experience appropriate emotions.
There is clearly a mean in respect of our emotions just as there
is a mean in respect of our actions. Aristotle makes this clear in
the passage quoted above. He also says:
A mean can also be found in our emotional experiences, 
and in our emotions. (1108a30)
We have already 'seen that in order to attain the mean in our emotions,
in order to be virtuous; we need moral virtue. However, we also need
practical wisdom:
(Moral) virtue or excellence is a characteristic involving 
choice, and it consists in observing the mean relative to 
us, a mean that is defined by a rational principle such as 
a man of practical wisdom would use to determine it.
(1106b36-1107a2)
At 1178a9-23, Aristotle tells us that it is necessary to control our 
emotions by possessing and employing practical wisdom, and that the 
emotions are closely related to virtues of character.
Enough has been said concerning the dependence of correct or 
appropriate emotion (emotion that attains the mean) upon moral virtue 
and practical wisdom to show that there is a problem for the individual 
who has theoretical wisdom but not these other two virtues. It would 
be quite possiblefor a man to be excellent in theoretical activity, but, 
for example, to miss the mean of pity or sympathy towards a friend who 
is in a particular predicament. The théoriser may feel too little pity 
and sympathy or he may feel none at all, his sympathy may be directed 
towards the wrong person, or he may feel it for the wrong reason.
The same problem could arise in respect of affection too, and 
affection, as we know, is central to friendship. The théoriser may 
feel too little affection for a friend, or he may feel it in the wrong
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manner or for the wrong reason. The idea that a man of great theoretical 
ability could, nonetheless, feel affection for his friend and wish him 
well for the wrong reason is very significant. In Aristotle's theory, 
there is only one virtuous motive - the choice of the good for the sake 
of the good, and it is this motive that is associated with virtue friend­
ship. The virtuous man chooses correctly; he chooses what is essentia^ 
and intrinsic, what is good in itself, and this is the rational soul. In 
the case of theoretical virtue friendship, I suggested that the affection 
and well-wishing would be based, not upon the rational soul in its 
entirety, but upon one part of it, upon nous or that part that is most 
authoritative and most godlike. To feel affection and wish a man well 
on this account is to feel affection for him for the right reason in 
Aristotle's account. If the théoriser feels affection for the friend 
for any other reason, we must conclude that it is not virtue friendship. 
We can now see that it is possible for a man to have outstanding theo­
retical ability and yet to lack the moral emotions and moral affection 
that is requisite for virtue friendship. The type of affection 
associated with virtue friendship is the only one that is truly other- 
regarding, and there seems to be no guarantee that the théoriser should 
experience it.
As the possession of theoretical wisdom does not rule out the 
possibility of the possession of practical wisdom and moral virtue, it 
is quite possible that the man who excels in theoretical wisdom could 
also attain the mean in emotional experience, character and deeds. 
_ E q u a H y 7 “however, we must conclude that as there is no mutual depen­
dence of theoretical wisdom upon moral virtue and practical wisdom, as 
it is possible to have theoretical wisdom and to lack the other two 
virtues, we cannot be sure that the théoriser will attain the mean in 
these three respects. We have seen that the morally good man (he who 
attains the mean in these ways) and the true friend are one and the same 
person under different descriptions; we can now see that we cannot
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similarly identify the theoretically excellent man with the true friend. 
It may be that they coincide as a matter of contingent fact; on the 
other hand, they may not do so.
There seems to be good evidence to suggest that Aristotle Intends 
that the théoriser choose and live a morally excellent life, and engage 
in the best form of friendship, a form of friendship that is genuinely . 
other-regarding. Despite this, we must conclude that he leaves that 
intention unjustified. He cannot justify a role for true friendship 
and morally excellent activity in the life that is teleios Eudaimon.
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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 4
1. COOPER, John M. Aristotle on the forms of friendship, iji Review 
of Metaphysics, vol.30 , 1977, p .622 .
2. FIELD. G.C. Moral theory, 1963, pp.109 and 111.
3. HARDIE, W.F.R. Aristotle's ethical theory, 1968, pp.22-23, and
/2i5-2i7'.:/''.':':'^v ^
4 . This is the line of reasoning that Hardie seems to be presenting 
on pages 22-23 of Aristotle's ethical theory.
5. BURNET, John The ethics of Aristotle, 1900, pp.32-33.
6. JOACHIM, H.H. Aristotle: the Nicomachean ethics, 1951, p.261.
7. Aristotle's argument about the desirability of having a friend, 
another self, on the grounds that we can observe his actions more 
easily than we can our own, has met with objections. Hardie writes:
If it is obVious that there is a sense in which we can be 
aware of the activités, including the thoughts, of others 
more easily than we can be aware of our own, it is no less 
obvious that there is a sense in which our own activities 
and thoughts are the only activities and thoughts of which 
we can be aware at all ... Aristotle ignores the difference 
between a man's awareness of his own thoughts, and his 
awareness of the thoughts of his friend ... Unless there 
were a difference, the thoughts of his friend would have to 
be literally his own thoughts. HARDIE, W.F.R. op. cit.,
1968, p.331.
Cooper in "friendship and the good" (p.294) grants Hardie's point, 
but says that it makes no difference to Aristotle's argument. 
However, perhaps Hardie's point should not be granted anyway, for 
it is not at all clear that "awareness" in the argument at 1170b8-12
should be interpreted as introspection, as an immediate awareness
of the contents of consciousness (of the other person).
8 . It should be noted that the terminology used in Books 1 and 6 of
the NE is different frotn that used in Book 10 chapters 6-9. In 
Books 1 and 6 , Aristotlb speaks of the parts and elements of the 
soul, whereas in Book 10, 6-9, he speaks of nous and suntheton. It 
might be thought that this change of terminology indicates a change 
in Aristotle's views, that his views on the nature of the soul and 
man's fulfilment of his function as a rational being have undergone 
major revision so that his ideas about the soul's parts and virtues 
in -Books 1 ~ahd 6 should not be taken as his real view of the sub­
ject. L.H.G. Greenwood offers four reasons for "supposing that
VI and X, vi-viii are in the main thoroughly consistent with one 
another". (Aristotle: Nicomachean ethics, book six, 1909, p.78).
First, X, vi-viii, regards theoretical wisdom as the best virtue 
(as VI does), and makes Eudaimonia result from the employment of 
this virtue. Secondly, theoria kata sophian in VI may be regarded 
as equivalent to theoretike in X, vi-viii since both expressions are 
used to refer to speculative, as opposed to practical, activity. 
Thirdly, there is no need to be concerned by the fact that in VI 
to epistemonikon but not nous is called the best part of the soul, 
since:
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Nous in X vil is probably used (in much the same sense as 
in VI ii) to mean the intellect in general, and is distin­
guished from the Inferior part of the soul, whose energeia 
(activity) is praktike (practical), in the same way as, in 
VI ii, dianoia aute (understanding itself) is distinguished 
from dianoia conjoined with orexis (desire). (Ibid. p.77)
Finally, there are a number of details in X, vi-viii which "show 
agreement with, or dependence upon, the doctrine of VI and the form 
in which it is there expressed" (Ibid., p.78), Two of the more 
important details that Greenwood mentions are (i) the relationship, 
between practical wisdom and moral virtue, and (ii) the relation­
ship between practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom.
9. It should be pointed out that there is no agreement among commen­
tators in respect of the terminology that should be employed to 
refer to the divisions and subdivisions of man's soul. Ross uses 
"faculty", "element" and "part"; Rackham uses "faculty" and 
"part", and Ostwald "element" and "part". Moreover, where one 
commentator uses the term "part" to describe a particular division 
of aspect of the soul, another commentator may use the term 
"element" instead to describe precisely the same division or aspect 
of the soul. Thus, to avoid confusion, I have used one trans­
lation (Ostwald 's) throughout this section.
10, See also NE 1141a3-8. Ostwald refers the reader to Posterior 
Analytics 71b9-72b4, 73a21-74a3.
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